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Introduction
Drugs figure prominently on the political agenda of the European Union.
While policy on drugs is still primarily the responsibility of individual
member states, the Council of the European Union increasingly forges
agreements on a joint approach. The European Commission too has com-
plementary powers in certain drug-related matters as part of Community
policy.
Until a few years ago drugs were hardly ever discussed within the institu-
tions of the , for the simple reason that they were not a European political
issue. The fact that they have now become one is mainly a consequence of
the many recent changes in the European political landscape, especially
since the entry intro force of the Maastricht Treaty in . Before that,
European cooperation was primarily economic in nature. Maastricht
extended it substantially to other policy areas. Since  the policy areas in
which the  has competence have been divided into three “pillars”, and
drugs are discussed in each one of them. In the first pillar discussions arise in
relation to development cooperation, and to Community health measures
adopted to complement member states’ actions at national level. Drugs also
come up in the second pillar, that of the ’s Common Foreign and Securi-
ty Policy. The issue is discussed most of all in the third pillar, “Justice and
Home Affairs”, in the context of policy and agreements on cooperation
between police and judicial authorities.
In the relatively brief period that drug-related matters have belonged to
the competence of the , the issue has acquired a prominent place on the
political agenda. It is discussed at length within the ’s three main institu-
tions, the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament. It has
also become a standard item on the agenda of the European Council, the

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summit of the heads of government. Many  documents explain that the
reason why the  is now playing an active role in the fight against drugs is
because drugs are among the greatest threats to society and humankind.
Several  booklets and other publications announce that the  will take
whatever action is necessary in the war on the “scourge of drugs”, since it is
self-evident that drugs have a destructive impact on health, safety at work
and human relationships.
Besides measures taken within the , drugs are increasingly being
brought into the ’s talks with “third countries” (countries outside the )
– not only applicant countries but all countries wanting to have any kind of
relationship with the . In fact the  has adopted the policy that taking
certain anti-drugs measures is a prerequisite for cooperation with the .
Drugs policy has therefore effectively become an element of the ’s foreign
policy.
This study describes the way in which the drugs issue is dealt with in the
. This will include looking at the activities undertaken by the ’s differ-
ent institutions and their forums. However, these will not be described in
detail, as that is not the primary objective of this study. The main question
examined here is how the policy that is pursued and propagated by the 
actually came into existence. Why have drugs become such a “hot item”
within the  in such a short space of time? What are the most authoritative
or trend-setting institutions, forums, countries, individuals or other active
forces? This report will therefore focus primarily on the mechanisms under-
lining the ’s activities in this field, the mechanisms that determine how
and why drugs are placed on the political agenda and the factors and power
relationships that play a role in this process.
A guide to this book
While each of the following chapters is part of the whole, the structure is
such that each one may be read separately. This may mean that the reader
will encounter repetition. Readers who are familiar with the structure of the
 may find such repetition redundant, but for those for whom the  is
still something of a labyrinth it may serve a useful purpose.

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The book is set within the wider context of studies of international drugs
control, a policy area that has been dominated by the  since the beginning
of the th century. The  has grown into the most important internation-
al organisation in Europe, indeed one of the most important in the world.
With its increasing cooperation in economic, political and military affairs,
its influence is likely to expand still further in the future. On the interna-
tional stage of drugs control, it has only recently become an active player. In
order to follow the developments in this policy area, it is important to
understand the way in which these issues are dealt with by and in the .
Chapter  briefly reviews the wider historical background of internation-
al drugs control and the part that the  has played in it. It will also discuss
the special role that the drugs issue sometimes plays in politics.
Chapter  sets out to clarify the sometimes bewildering institutional
framework of the . The idea is not to give a complete survey of the ’s
organisational setup – several books cover that territory – but to shed light
on certain relevant areas. Few European citizens are at all familiar with the
complex structure of the , such as the three “pillars” of which it consists
and the roles played by its different institutions, even though the decisions
made there affect their lives. Many know the Maastricht Treaty, the Amster-
dam Treaty and the Schengen Agreement by name, but few are familiar
with their content. Chapter  also discusses some significant initiatives that
the  took prior to the Maastricht Treaty, through the anti-drug commit-
tee  for instance.
Chapter  focuses more on content. It describes the role and powers of
the three institutions, the Commission, the Council and the European Par-
liament, and their involvement in drug-related matters. It also discusses the
main groups that are active in this policy area. It concludes with an account
of the power struggle in this area between the Commission and the Coun-
cil, and seeks to establish where the power really lies.
The heart of the study is chapter  on decision-making. It examines the
question of how drugs have moved to such prominence on the political
agenda and describes the bureaucratic mechanism that ensures that the
issue stays there. It also looks at the content of the drugs issue and places it in
a wider social and political framework. It discusses the customary approach
to drugs within the ’s bureaucracy and the limitations of this approach.

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After this lengthy description and analysis of the context and decision-mak-
ing on drugs, chapter  looks at the measures that the  has actually intro-
duced, as opposed to mere talk. While the  does not determine the drugs
policy pursued by individual member states, various joint actions are
increasingly agreed within the , on the mutual adjustment of legislation
and practices for instance, and on an early warning mechanism for new syn-
thetic drugs. Finally, chapter  discusses the various action plans and strate-
gies that have been produced by the Commission and the Council, the sta-
tus of which is far from clear.

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 ,   
. Background: international drugs control
Many voluminous and well-informed studies have been written about the
remarkable history of international drugs control. It is a relatively recent
phenomenon. Most of today’s illicit substances, such as opium, coca and
cannabis, were legal at the beginning of the th century, and were used
both medicinally and recreationally. In some countries opium was pro-
duced under state supervision and retailed at state-owned outlets or by
physicians. Coca too was legal, and served as the basis for cocaine-contain-
ing drinks, notably in the United States. It also had medicinal applications,
for instance as a local anaesthetic.
In the course of time, however, the three best known drugs – cannabis,
coca and opium – came under an international ban. The stimulant amphet-
amine was in general outlawed much later – not until the s and s in
many European countries.
The history of the international ban on drugs begins with the meeting of
the Shanghai Opium Commission in , attended by representatives
from  countries, the aim being to arrive at a stricter international policy on
drugs. As this conference took the form of a Commission, its recommenda-
tions were not binding. Then, in December , the first opium confer-
ence took place in The Hague, which resulted one month later in the 
convention on opium. This convention marks the beginning of today’s
international drugs policy, based on prohibition.
Most studies on international drugs control have been written by Ameri-
cans and focus on the role played by the United States. This is entirely
understandable, since the United States played a key role in the genesis of
the international drugs control regime at the beginning of the th century
and has continued to dominate its further development. A classic study that

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should be mentioned in this connection is The American Disease – Origins
of Narcotic Control by the American physician and historian David Musto.
His study shows that the  was the driving force behind the Shanghai
Opium Commission and the Hague Convention of . The United
States’ attitude served certain domestic political causes and was fuelled by
economic and foreign policy considerations. Compared to European coun-
tries, the  had a relatively large number of addicts at the time (both at
home and in the recently acquired Philippines), but this ultimately proved a
less important factor than political and commercial motives.
Around the year  the  experienced a number of drug scares, situa-
tions in which drugs were singled out as a source of social evil, which invest-
ed the struggle against them with significance and legitimacy. It was
towards the end of the nineteenth century that the  passed the first laws
against smoking opium. This ban had unmistakable racial undertones: it
was prompted not so much by problems associated with opium use as by
general anti-Chinese rabble-rousing in California. This increasingly led to
an association in the public mind between Chinese people, Chinatown
communities, opium, prostitution and gambling. The Chinese were even
alleged to be using opium to entice white women into sexual slavery.
Although opiate use was far more common among white Americans than in
the Chinese community at the end of the nineteenth century, it was above
all the smoking of opium by the Chinese that was seen as a problem. As time
went on, opium smoking became a focus for general anti-Chinese senti-
ments, and this group and its use of opium came to be perceived as a threat
to American society.
At the beginning of the th century, cocaine and several cocaine-con-
taining drinks, including Coca-Cola, came to be associated with black
Americans, who reportedly became incredibly powerful and wild after
using it. To incapacitate “cocaine crazed Negros”, some police stations
switched from . to . calibre revolvers. Another popular rumour was that
African Americans were raping white women under the influence of
cocaine. David Musto concludes that this opium scare resulted not from
problems in cocaine use, but from white fears of black rebellion against seg-
regation and oppression. Another drug scare arose in the s, this time

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around marijuana. Harry Anslinger, who had headed the alcohol prohibi-
tion task force during Prohibition, was later appointed head of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics. In his zeal to ban marijuana, he published propaganda
describing murders committed by people under its influence. Since mari-
juana was mostly used by Mexicans, they became the focus of this new anx-
iety: marijuana supposedly made them violent. Anslinger also alarmed the
public by pointing out that the “killer weed” was gaining popularity among
young white Americans. As a result of the ensuing “reefer madness”, engi-
neered almost single-handedly by Anslinger, Congress declared marijuana
illegal in .
Notwithstanding these fears in American society, however, foreign poli-
cy and commercial considerations were the prime motives in the United
States’ active role in international drugs control. Tellingly, the  did not
introduce its own Federal legislation in this area – the Smoking Opium
Exclusion Act – until , the year in which the Shanghai Opium Com-
mission was convened. Since the  was advocating a ban on drugs, it had to
protect its credibility on the international political stage by showing that it
was putting its theories into practice at home.
The United States’ policy on drugs stemmed first and foremost from the
country’s new status: its war against Spain in  had yielded Cuba, Puerto
Rico and the Philippines. With these new overseas possessions the  had
become a political and economic world power. As an entrepreneurial
nation, it had to compete with several European powers for the expanding
markets in the Far East. One of the reasons that the  had conquered the
Philippines was to use it as a bridgehead for the huge Chinese market. How-
ever, the trading ties between the  and China were marked by friction. As
Jan-Willem Gerritsen has pointed out, “What united China and the Unit-
ed States was their common adversary – the European colonial powers, and
Britain in particular. By emphasising its aversion to the colonial opium
trade, the United States was able to distinguish itself from its European
rivals”. Fifty years after losing the opium wars to Britain, a vigorously
nationalistic anti-opium mood prevailed in China, in which the national-
ists in particular wanted to reopen debate on the opium trade. The Ameri-
cans presented themselves as the ideal partners to help the Chinese with

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their opium problem, starting off with an international ban. By currying
favour with the Chinese they hoped to gain access to their vast economic
market. Besides, an international ban on opium would not be a bad thing
for the , since the country hardest hit by it would be Britain, its main
commercial rival.
Another study on international drugs control, also written in the s, is
by three Scandinavian authors, Kettil Bruun, Lynn Pan and Ingemar Rexed:
The Gentlemen’s Club: international control of drugs and alcohol. Document-
ed with interviews and case studies, this book covers seventy years of interna-
tional drugs control and describes the part played by the diverse protago-
nists, countries as well as pressure groups and individuals. It paints a rather
discreditable picture of the way in which international drugs control came
into being. In particular, its account of the “Gentlemen’s Club” describes
how a handful of men managed to secure the introduction of international
drugs control policy. Many of these key players were diplomats, law
enforcement officers or health-care officials. More importantly, many were
friends and had close ties with the pharmaceutical industry.
The Gentlemen’s Club makes dismal reading. It is a tale of ill-conceived
priorities, disputes about the powers of organisations, conflicting national
interests, the influence of the pharmaceutical lobby, and the lack of expert
knowledge among the leaders of decision-making bodies. The book also
provides an interesting picture of the way international organisations work,
including their policy-making and administrative apparatus. It describes
the often arbitrary way in which subjects end up on the agenda and subse-
quently lead lives of their own, culminating in some policy measure. It also
demonstrates the immense influence that may be exerted by a single indi-
vidual. Harry Anslinger, for instance, not only played a decisive role in
American policy, but was also a leading player in the drafting of interna-
tional drugs policy, especially on cannabis.
. Approach and methodology
The two historical studies just mentioned, The American Disease and The
Gentlemen’s Club, demonstrate the complexity of drugs policy and identify

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the factors and events that have helped to produce international drugs con-
trol. They show the frequently irrational nature of this policy and the polit-
ical role that the drugs issue may play. They also make it clear that the role of
the  has been decisive.
This study of the  represents a relatively short period of research and
does not lay claim to the same depth or sophistication as the two books dis-
cussed above. Nor does it have their historical dimension, since the  has
only become active in the realm of drugs in the past few years. But the  is
now starting to make its influence felt in the arena where international
drugs policy is made: the  Commission on Narcotic Drugs () and its
executive agency, the United Nations Drug Control Programme ().
This influence can be expected to expand in the future, as  countries are
contributing an increasingly large proportion of the  budget – their
share has now reached %.
The ’s growing influence was already noticeable at the last Special Ses-
sion of the  General Assembly (), convened in June  to delib-
erate on the global drugs problem. The largely European emphasis on
demand reduction clearly gained ground in relation to the American law
enforcement approach that had been more traditional in  circles hitherto.
Prior to , countries had already reached agreement in the  on the
guiding principles of demand reduction. Part of it was reducing the negative
effects of drug use, which means that “harm reduction” – though not yet
referred to as such – has now been incorporated de facto into  drugs policy.
One year later these guiding principles, including the harm reduction meas-
ures, were translated into the Action Plan on Demand Reduction. 
also adopted the principle of shared responsibility, which means taking a bal-
anced approach to demand and supply reduction. This helps to shift the bur-
den of “blame” away from the producing countries in the South.
 policy still lags behind European practice: harm reduction is an inte-
grated part of policy or even the basic point of departure in most  coun-
tries, while the  adopted this approach only recently, at , and even
then in guarded terms as part of demand reduction. It is still impossible to
use the phrase “harm reduction” in  texts, any more than it can be used in
the  . For the rest, the  still follows the American usage of defining all

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use of illicit drugs as “abuse”. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that the  no
longer plays the all-important role in international drugs control that it had
for almost the entire th century. The countries of the South and the
member states of the  are making their voices heard more clearly than
before. However, the  is too divided to exert itself in this respect as an
organisation; it may do so in the future, if the member states can agree on a
uniform approach.
The ’s appearance in the arena of international drugs control, and the
likelihood of its growing influence in the future, makes it important to
understand the way in which policy within the  is formulated and agreed.
This information is particularly relevant to member states, as they have less
and less autonomy when devising domestic drugs policy. Although the 
has decided that member states need not harmonise their drugs policies, a
certain amount of coordination and agreement is essential. Yet little is
known about the way in which this takes place, or the mechanisms involved.
This book therefore sets out to clarify the ways in which the  deliberates
and adopts policy on drugs.
Drugs measures can also have dramatic consequences or side-effects that
go far beyond drugs control. One salient example is the “prison industrial
complex” in the  . At over two million detainees (in ), the American
prison population is many times larger today than it was in the early s.
Stricter drugs policy is the driving force behind the growth in registered
crime; the number of drug arrests is eight times more than it was  years
ago, and more than half of all detainees have been incarcerated for drug
offences, largely for possession of small quantities. The  now has by far
the highest percentage of detainees in the Western world. An increasing
proportion of its jails are private companies, to whose owners they consti-
tute a lucrative growth market.
Other side-effects of the fight against drugs include human rights viola-
tions, infringements of privacy and environmental damage.  anti-drugs
programmes in Latin America, for instance, involve both human rights vio-
lations and substantial damage to the environment. As for infringements
of privacy, the  government and most American companies have now
introduced compulsory drug tests. In some states people have to pass drug
tests to qualify for welfare or food vouchers.

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In Europe, only Sweden has introduced blood and urine testing thus far.
Since  it has been possible under Swedish legislation to force individu-
als to submit to testing if they are suspected of being under the influence of
drugs. This means the police may intervene without individuals being in
possession of drugs or any other offence having been committed. So in
examining drug-related measures in the , we should bear in mind the
possibility of such side-effects coming into play. The history of internation-
al drugs control shows that drugs sometimes play a specific role in politics as
a scapegoat for other social problems. What is more, policy is decided
more often by political factors than objective facts. Drugs are a ready vehicle
for populism. Since they can be perceived as a threat to safety, something
everyone finds important, they can easily generate public anxiety. Chapter
 will deal with these issues in more detail.
This report on the  to some extent follows on from previous reports on
the drugs situation in France and Sweden, which set out to place the issues
involved in a wider context than that of official accounts. While the present
book focuses more on policy than the two country reports, its emphasis is
less on describing official policy – though this aspect also receives attention –
and more on the underlying mechanisms and processes that help to shape it.
It is always a good idea – especially when dealing with large organisations
– to look at processes from an outsider’s point of view. Employees are often
so preoccupied with their day-to-day work that they are unable to take the
necessary distance essential to a more inclusive, holistic analysis. An out-
sider’s analysis is not just useful, but perhaps essential. It will become clear
in the following pages that the ’s decision-making machinery is complex
in the extreme. Drug-related issues are discussed in many different bodies
within the . Even people who have been working in Brussels for years do
not always have a grasp of how all these bodies work. This complexity is one
of the constraints on the present study. It is impossible to look at all the ’s
procedures and decision-making mechanisms and every single body in
which drugs are discussed.
In the course of the research another reason for this study became clear –
the importance of the policy-making procedures and political decision-
making processes themselves, along with the non-transparent mechanisms

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that play a role in the background. This study shows that internal bureau-
cratic mechanisms within the  greatly influence the formulation of poli-
cy. It became virtually unavoidable to examine these processes closely. So
this study of  policy on drugs can also be seen as an analysis of the way in
which decisions in general are made within the , with drugs policy as an
example. That is not to say, of course, that drugs are a representative issue.
Not all the ’s policy areas are as politically sensitive as this one, added to
which it is very much a “cross-pillar” theme, in  jargon. Still, this analysis
gives an impression of the procedures and mechanisms that are at work in
the . It takes a look behind the scenes of the , from the vantage point of
a specific policy area.
A variety of sources were used in the course of this research. It was essen-
tial to start by studying the ’s highly complicated structure: the treaties on
which it is based, the many forums of which it consists and the diverse, non-
transparent decision-making procedures of its administrative machinery.
The study of the literature embraced general works on the , scholarly
treatises on international drugs policy, and official documents produced by
the Council, Commission, European Parliament and other  bodies.
Material was also incorporated from interviews with dozens of people of
different nationalities who work for, or are closely involved with, the Coun-
cil, Commission or Parliament, from policymakers at Directorates-General
to secretarial staff. Other interviewees included people whose ministries
have dealings with the , for instance through the Permanent Representa-
tive in Brussels. Finally, numerous people were interviewed who do not
work within the  but have many years’ experience in Brussels as consult-
ants or other freelance operatives.
One final remark is in order about the terms used in this report. In the
interests of intelligibility,  jargon and abbreviations have been kept to a
minimum. The term “Maastricht Treaty” is used, for instance, instead of its
official title, the Treaty on European Union. Terms are sometimes explained
in footnotes. Readers seeking further clarification of terms or procedures
may find it useful to consult a concise guide to the  such as Europe from A
to Z, obtainable free of charge from  publicity offices.
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     
. Introduction
This introductory chapter will review the institutional framework of the 
before and after the Maastricht Treaty, or Treaty on European Union, of
. It was this Treaty that first gave the  powers in drug-related issues.
Section . briefly summarises the way in which the  came into exis-
tence. Section . looks at  activity in this area before the Maastricht
Treaty of . This primarily involves measures taken through , the
European Committee to Combat Drugs. The European Parliament was
also active to some extent, and its Cooney Report contained some interest-
ing observations.
Section . looks at the institutional structure of the  since Maastricht.
It describes the three “pillars” of the  and explains the various contexts in
which drug-related issues are discussed in each pillar. This section has been
included for readers who are unfamiliar with the maze-like structure of the
 and its obscure decision-making processes. Section . and . look at
the Schengen and Amsterdam Treaties, respectively. The latter entered into
effect on  May , and amended the Treaty on European Union in sever-
al important ways.
. The institutional framework before Maastricht
For the sake of completeness it is useful to give a very brief summary of the
way in which European cooperation came into existence. The first steps
were taken in the aftermath of World War . The rationale was that cooper-
ation would reduce the risk of war within Europe, especially between
France and Germany, which had been involved in three armed conflicts
since . Cooperation would also help to allay the “German peril”:

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anchored in a European framework, Germany would be less likely to dis-
play expansionist tendencies in the future.
The initial focus was on economic cooperation. In line with proposals by
Robert Schuman and the ideas of Jean Monnet, the entire French and Ger-
man coal and steel industries were placed under a supranational authority.
This would initiate economic integration and reduce the risk of conflict
between Germany and France to a minimum. This plan led to the establish-
ment of the European Coal and Steel Community () in , which the
Benelux countries and Italy also joined. In  the  was founded in
Rome by the three Benelux countries, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Italy and France. The treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy
Community, or Euratom, was signed at the same meeting. From then on,
there were therefore three Communities: the , Euratom and the .
The latter proved to be by far the most important, and it became increasing-
ly dominant with the passage of time.
In , ten years after the signing of the Treaty of Rome, the Merger Treaty
was signed. From then on the three European Communities would have
common organs and institutions, in particular the Commission, Council,
Parliament and Court. However, the three Communities would keep their
own rules. Legally speaking, therefore, there were still three Communities,
but informally, and for the sake of simplicity, the three were referred to collec-
tively as “the ”. This three-strand history explains why the  is still some-
times referred to in the plural as “Communities”.
The next important moment in the history of European cooperation was
the adoption of the Single European Act in . This Act incorporated a
series of measures and additions to the Treaty of Rome. While European
cooperation had been largely economic in the beginning, centring on
Community policies on coal and steel, agriculture and fisheries, little
progress had been made in other fields. The Single Act placed more empha-
sis on the creation of an internal market. This meant that all obstacles to the
free movement of goods, services, persons and capital had to be abolished, a
process to be completed by .
Meanwhile, the , the most important Community, was gradually
taking in more members. In  the , Ireland and Denmark joined, fol-

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lowed in  by Greece, Portugal and Spain. In  the  officially
changed its name to . Three years later it acquired three new members:
Austria, Finland and Sweden. How far political cooperation should go was,
and remains, a contentious matter: should the  strive to achieve a federal
Europe, or should it be an intergovernmental Europe of States? Successive
plans were formulated to expand the existing cooperation into non-eco-
nomic areas (such as the proposal to establish a political  alongside the
economic ), but it was not until the Maastricht Treaty of  that a
new cooperative framework was adopted.
With the entry into force of Maastricht, the European Community
became the European Union. Maastricht expanded European cooperation
by adding two new “pillars”: a common foreign and security policy ()
in the second pillar, and closer cooperation in justice and home affairs ()
in the third pillar. The first pillar consisted of the existing cooperation with-
in the . The result was therefore a considerable expansion in the ’s areas
of competence, and drug-related issues were included in the subjects about
which member states would make agreements for the first time. How this
has developed will be discussed in the following chapters. First, the follow-
ing section will describe the initiatives taken in relation to drugs before
Maastricht.
. European initiatives on drug-related issues before Maastricht
Drugs were scarcely discussed within the framework of the  until the
s. There was no mention of them, for instance, in either the Treaty of
Rome of , which laid the foundations for the , or in the Single Euro-
pean Act of . So during this period of integration, drugs were not
regarded as belonging to the realm of European policymaking. Nonethe-
less, they were sometimes discussed, and several bodies took initiatives in
this area before Maastricht.
The Stewart-Clark Committee (-)
In  the European Parliament set up a committee to investigate drug
problems in the countries of the Community, which became known as the

 Powers Before and After Maastricht
Union binnen  16-11-2001  11:06  Pagina 21

Drugs and Decision-Making in the European Union
Stewart-Clark Committee. This Committee, whose composition reflect-
ed the makeup of the Parliament, may be regarded as the first European ini-
tiative relating to drugs. It studied a variety of drug-related issues for one
year, interviewing experts and making working visits along the way.
At the end of this year, in , the Committee found itself unable to
reach a unanimous verdict. The report, drawn up by the British Conserva-
tive Sir Jack Stewart-Clark, led to a left-right schism within the Commit-
tee’s members. The right-wing majority initially rejected the report and
submitted a large number of amendments. The left-wing members would
not agree to these amendments, and adopted a minority position, which
was published as such along with the report. Hedy d’Ancona, a Dutch
politician who was among this left-wing minority, later commented that
“the essence of the schism was a difference of approach, on matters of prin-
ciple, to the phenomenon of drug use”. The right-wing Committee mem-
bers took the view that drugs are illegal and that policy should be based on
the principle of prohibition, while the left-wing members preferred a more
pragmatic approach, the emphasis being on reducing the harm caused by
drug use.
The report pronounced on various policy options, one of which being
the legalisation of drugs, which it rejected. For the Committee took the
view that the most important effect of legalisation, that is, the elimination
of the illegal market in drugs, would only be possible if governments were to
make large quantities of drugs available. And this the Committee consid-
ered immoral, because of their harmful effects. Nonetheless, it advocated a
relaxation of policy on cannabis use, partly on the basis of experience gained
in the Netherlands. The liberal cannabis policy in the Netherlands had not
led to more widespread use, it was argued. Furthermore, the separation of
markets would reduce the likelihood of cannabis users switching to hard
drugs. Substitution programmes involving methadone, for instance, were
rejected because they generated a new dependency.
The left-wing minority emphatically favoured methadone substitution
programmes, as they enabled people to live more normal lives. They also
favoured a “normalisation” of the phenomenon of drug use, and proposed
that people should no longer be prosecuted for the consumption, posses-
sion or sale of small quantities.
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Although the Committee spent a year studying these issues, there was no
institutional framework at the time enabling practical measures to be taken
on the basis of its findings. The European Parliament, for instance, did not
have a permanent committee on drug-related issues. The Council did
respond to the Stewart-Clark report, however. On the basis of the report,
the Council adopted a resolution reaffirming the illegality of all drugs listed
in the relevant  Conventions. Summing up, in  the European
Community came down firmly on the side of tackling drugs from the van-
tage point of the criminal law.
Signing of the UN drugs convention of 
In  a  conference took place in Vienna on trafficking in narcotics and
psychotropic substances, which eventually led to the Convention of .
In principle this conference was meant for countries, but the  also
attended as a legal entity. In  the  signed Article , paragraph  of
the  drugs convention of , the part of the convention that deals with
precursors. The fact that the  acted here as a legal entity and signed an
article was based on article  (now article , para. ) of the Treaty of
Rome, the treaty establishing the . This article empowers the Commu-
nity to “cooperate with third countries to promote projects of mutual inter-
est”. On the basis of this competence, the  acted as a legal entity and
signed the article concerned.
The European Committee to Combat Drugs (CELAD)
It was in  that the subject of drugs first acquired a firm place on the ’s
political agenda. For this was the year in which the European Committee to
Combat Drugs () was set up, following a proposal by President Mit-
terrand of France. In October that year, Mitterrand wrote a letter to the
other eleven  government leaders and to the President of the European
Commission, a letter that Georges Estievenart has called a milestone in the
history of the European fight against drugs. Mitterrand’s initiative recalled
the efforts of Georges Pompidou in . The latter had initiated an expert
consultative committee (the “Pompidou Group”), which was set up by the
judicial authorities and met in the framework of the Council of Europe.

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Like Pompidou, Mitterrand sought to immortalise himself through his
stand on drugs, and set up a special committee that was initially intended to
bear his name. Other government leaders were unenthusiastic about the
new forum. Mitterrand’s persistence eventually carried the day, but the new
committee was given the more neutral name of .
Two months after Mitterrand’s initiative, the European Council, meet-
ing in Strasbourg, ratified the government leaders’ proposal and established
 on a formal basis. This European committee consisted of individuals
designated by each member state as coordinators of national drugs policy.
Some countries delegated a former minister, others a senior civil servant. A
representative of the European Commission also sat on .
 occupied a unique position – it had been established as an ad hoc
political committee outside the ’s usual institutional framework. The 
rules had been circumvented, as it were, and the committee had no formal
powers. In spite of this, the Committee reported directly to the European
Council. This meant that there was a direct line between the national coor-
dinators who sat on  and the heads of government, who make up the
European Council. The fact that some countries sent politicians instead of
experts to  indicated that the political leaders wanted to keep things
under firm control. Not everyone within the  bureaucracy was entirely
happy with ’s existence. Some bodies viewed it as a threat to their
competence. On the other hand, the  did little to impede , in spite
of its peculiar informal status, and a representative of the Commission
indeed sat on the Committee. It should be borne in mind that  had
been set up as an initiative launched at the level of heads of governments, at
the initiative of the only head of state – the most influential person – in their
midst.
’s aim was to coordinate drug-related activities within the .
Besides the fight against drugs, this included coordinating definitions of
addiction and setting up a monitoring centre. Coordinating drug-related
activities was a logical step, it was argued, given that several  countries –
Germany, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain – already had national drugs
policy coordinators. By joining forces,  hoped to form a more effec-
tive front against drugs. This optimism was partly inspired by the success, at

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the time, of a joint  effort to curb immigration. Another factor was the
recent adoption of the  drugs convention in , which had helped to
create a climate favouring joint action against drugs.
In retrospect  can be viewed as the first consultative body of 
countries that discussed the whole spectrum of drug-related issues. Accord-
ing to its critics,  was not always very effective: it talked long and
hard, but often without producing any results. Still, it exerted immense
influence. The two Action Plans to combat drugs that were adopted at the
European Councils of Rome (December ) and Edinburgh (December
) respectively were both attributable to . The European drugs
prevention week that is organised annually by the European Commission
was also originally an idea launched by . But the Committee’s main
achievement was the establishment of the European Monitoring Centre for
Drugs and Drug Addiction (). When the preparations started for
the launch of this new body, the  had not yet formally decided that drugs
policy was to fall within its competence. The preparations for the launch
started as early as , and the negotiations between member states took
place in , but it was not until a year later, with Maastricht, that the 
decided that drugs should indeed be an  issue.
In general,  can be said to have played an important role in the gen-
esis of European cooperation on drugs policy between  and . It
eventually died a quiet death when the Maastricht Treaty entered into effect
in . Its work was later more or less taken over by the  Committee,
whose powers, in contrast to , were clearly defined. However, ’s
members were lower in rank than those of , and it was therefore less
influential.
Adoption of first Action Plan to Combat Drugs ()
At the Rome European Council in , the twelve heads of government
adopted the first Action Plan to Combat Drugs, as proposed by . The
second Action Plan was adopted at the Edinburgh European Council in
December .
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The Cooney Report on drug trafficking and organised crime (-)
In  the European Parliament decided to launch an enquiry into the
increase of organised crime related to drug trafficking. To this end it
appointed a committee of enquiry, with Patrick Cooney as rapporteur.
The report that emerged in due course started by commenting on the
alarming increase in the power of criminal organisations that controlled
drug trafficking. It noted that “the financial gains to be made from drug
trafficking enables the criminal organisations involved to contaminate and
corrupt the structures of the State at all levels”, and went so far as to state
that in some countries organised crime possessed so much influence that it
could impose its own conditions and blackmail those responsible for mak-
ing political decisions. It pointed out that there had been several instances
of collusion between criminal groups and secret services and other state
agencies in relation to fraud, money laundering, secret funding and the use
of the same financial agencies. “All this can weaken the political determina-
tion to attack the main centres of the international traffic in drugs”. The
report implicitly questioned the wisdom of the current policy as the answer
to the existing problems, in that it observed that the current policy had been
very ineffective.
“The policies carried out to date have not achieved their objective, namely
to stop, or at least reduce the penetration of drugs into the . It is estimated
that repression has so far brought about a reduction of between  and % in
drugs traffic and the capital that generates. It is therefore necessary to assess
whether – assuming it were possible – a determined increase in the effec-
tiveness of repression could deal a significant, or even fatal, blow to the traf-
fic or whether other strategies should not be considered”.
On the basis of these observations, the Cooney Committee asked for a cost-
benefit analysis of current drugs policy. It also noted that aside from investi-
gating the phenomenon of drug trafficking, the consequences of the fight
against drugs should also be investigated, in particular the consequences for
democracy and the security and freedom of the public. The Cooney Com-
mittee then made a large number of recommendations, including (in
abbreviated form) the following:
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More attention should be paid to the demand side of the drugs problem.
Governments should also invest more in measures that reduce the risks of
drug abuse, such as the distribution, free of charge, of needles and substi-
tute substances. (Without actually using the term, the Committee advocat-
ed a policy of “harm reduction”); 
Drug addiction and drug abuse should be treated primarily as a subject
relating to health and welfare, and not as one of “police and justice”. The pos-
session of small quantities of drugs for personal use should not be regarded as
a criminal offence;
The emphasis in the fight against drugs should not be on users or the bot-
tom of the trafficking hierarchy, but on organised international trafficking.
With a view to reducing the health risks associated with drug use, a prag-
matic approach should be followed, consisting of reimbursing the costs of
drug addicts’ health and social care. Attention should also be paid to ensur-
ing that unadulterated drugs are available at specific dosages.
The subtext of the Cooney Report was that a new approach was needed.
The Report struck an unusually rational, pragmatic and open tone, and did
not flinch from violating taboos. For instance, it stated that cannabis was
less harmful than tobacco and spirits. However, it did not follow this argu-
ment through to its logical conclusion by advocating a different regime
(such as liberalising policy on cannabis and tightening up restrictions on
tobacco and spirits). It also omitted to draw the more or less logical conclu-
sions from previous statements, for instance in connection with  drug
conventions. While stating that the ’s position on drugs constituted an
insuperable obstacle to legalisation, the report did not go so far as to ques-
tion the conventions or accession to them; on the contrary, it called upon
 member states to accede to the ’s three drug conventions and to
observe their provisions. The report also stated that the  was the organi-
sation best qualified to monitor the fight against drugs. R.A. Visser has
rightly observed that by adopting this stand the Cooney Report under-
mined a significant proportion of its own recommendations, many of
which diverge from or are even diametrically opposed to elements of 
drugs policy.
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In a resolution based on the recommendations of the Cooney Report, the
European Parliament rejected the legalisation of drugs and called upon
member states to comply with the  conventions. Prohibition was to
remain the basis of the ’s policy on drugs. Nonetheless, the report seems
to point to changing opinions within Parliament on the policy to be pur-
sued. Visser comments that the recommendations included in the Stewart-
Clark Report as a minority view recur in the Cooney Report, but this time
as the majority view.
. The institutional framework since Maastricht
After the Maastricht summit in , the Maastricht Treaty was signed in
 and entered into effect in . Its official name is the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union, or  Treaty. Since Maastricht the decision-making processes
of the  have changed, and to a certain extent they have become more
complex and impenetrable. For Maastricht introduced the principle of the
three pillars as the organising principle of the ’s policy areas. The trouble
is that numerous different and extremely complicated decision-making
procedures apply in each of the three pillars – dozens in total – which are
difficult even for insiders to comprehend. This impenetrability of the pro-
cedures is one of the primary reasons for the criticism expressed of Euro-
pean integration.
Everything that had previously comprised the European Community
was assigned to the first pillar. In this pillar, decisions are made together – by
the “Community method”. Whereas this cooperation was initially primari-
ly economic, other areas were gradually added, such as agriculture. The
important point about the Community method, which hence only applies
within the first pillar, is the special interaction that takes place between the
Commission and the Council. The Council is the body in which member
states and their ministries are represented. It is the highest organ of the ,
because it makes the decisions. With the Community method, the Council
reaches its decisions only after the Commission has formulated a proposal.
For issues that are included in this first, Community pillar, the Commis-
sion thus has the “right of initiative”. As will become clear, which bodies
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possess the right of initiative is of considerable importance within the pil-
lars. Entitlement to formulate proposals confers influence.
Since Maastricht, other policy areas have been added to the ’s areas of
competence. These new policy areas are organised in the second and third
pillars. These pillars do not operate according to the Community method,
but are intergovernmental in nature, which means that member states
arrive at policy in joint consultations. The organ within which member
states conduct these consultations is the Council. So for policy areas
belonging to the second and third pillars, the right of initiative lies with the
member states. Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Commission – in addi-
tion to member states – has acquired the right of initiative in third-pillar
questions. What has not changed is that all decisions, in all pillars, are
always taken by the Council.
Before the ministers of the member states make decisions in the Council,
the documents are first inspected by Coreper, the meeting of the Ambas-
sadors to the , known in Brussels as Permanent Representatives (PRs).
Within Coreper, decisions are prepared by Council groups, comprising
officials from the ministries of the member states. Chapter  will deal with
all these matters in more detail.
First pillar
Thus the first pillar comprises the “old” European Community more or less
as it existed before the Maastricht Treaty. The policy areas in the first pillar
include agriculture, transport, environment, energy, research and develop-
ment. Here the European Commission possesses the right of initiative,
which means that it carries out the preparatory work and formulates pro-
posals. It only takes initiatives if it believes that an issue is “hot” in the mem-
ber states, in other words that there would be enough support for its initia-
tive. This means that the Commission formulates proposals that it antici-
pates will be accepted by the Council. If the Council does not agree with a
proposal, it formulates a compromise alternative. In principle a qualified
majority within the Council is enough to adopt this alternative, provided
that the Commission agrees. If the Commission does not agree with the
compromise, however, the Council can only adopt it by unanimous vote.

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All in all, the Commission therefore has a lot of influence in first-pillar mat-
ters; once it has formulated its proposals, it is not easy for the Council to
sweep them aside.
After the Commission has formulated a proposal, it is submitted to the
relevant official  working parties, whose members can consult the
responsible ministries of their own member states. As already noted, the
first pillar operates by the Community method: the Commission formu-
lates proposals, after which the Council decides. The actual decision-mak-
ing procedures differ from one issue to the next. For instance, for some
issues (such as taxation, industry and culture) unanimity is required. For
others a simple majority will suffice. But the most common procedure
within the first pillar is qualified majority voting ().  requires a
qualified majority in the Council, sometimes with the additional condition
that ten of the  countries must support the proposal. It applies to matters
concerning, for instance, agriculture, fisheries, internal market, environ-
ment and transport. Qualified majority voting proceeds by “weighted”
votes in the Council. At present the total of  votes are divided up as fol-
lows, with a qualified majority being reached at :
Germany, France, Italy and the :  votes each
Spain: 
Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal:  each
Austria and Sweden:  each
Ireland, Denmark and Finland:  each
Luxembourg: 
It is customary with many (but not all) first-pillar subjects that as soon as
the Commission has formulated a proposal, Parliament is asked for its
advice. This advice is non-binding, however; it is up to the Council to
adopt, amend or dismiss the proposal. So the European Parliament does
play a role in these issues, but ultimately it does not possess real power. True,
Parliament is consulted by the Commission, and public parliamentary
debates are held on each proposal, but its formal powers do not extend
beyond making recommendations, in the form of resolutions. Like the
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Council, the Parliament can ask the Commission to take a particular initia-
tive.
For certain policy areas a different procedure exists, however, in which
Parliament has far more influence. This is the codecision procedure. In this
line of decision-making both the Council and the European Parliament
have to approve a proposal, which in this case is called an “incentive meas-
ure”, from the Commission. So here Parliament has more tangible powers.
The Treaty of Amsterdam increased the number of policy areas to which the
codecision procedure applies to several dozen, including the internal mar-
ket, consumer affairs, culture, environment, education and health care. So
for all these policy areas, the  has the right of amendment. The codecision
procedure is quite elaborate and can take up to two years. After the Com-
mission has submitted its proposal, Parliament formulates its recommen-
dations to the Council. If the Council and Parliament agree, the Council
can adopt the proposal by qualified majority. If the Ministers do not agree
with Parliament, however, the Council resubmits the proposal to Parlia-
ment in amended form. If the two bodies still fail to reach agreement at this
stage, a mediating committee is appointed, consisting of  s and repre-
sentatives of the  member states. This committee is given six weeks to find
a compromise that is approved by Parliament and Council. If they fail to do
so, the proposal is abandoned.
It is significant that drug-related issues come under the first pillar on the
basis of Article  (ex Article ) of the  Treaty, which deals with public
health. The Article states: 
“The Community shall contribute towards ensuring a high level of human
health protection by encouraging cooperation between the Member States
and, if necessary, lending support to their action. Community action shall
be directed towards the prevention of diseases, in particular the major
health scourges, including drug dependence, by promoting research into
their causes and their transmission, as well as health information and edu-
cation.”
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This established public health as a province of European policy-making,
but public health is also subject to the principle of subsidiarity, which basi-
cally means that Community action is taken only if it has added value com-
pared to policymaking at national level. In practice this means that most
aspects of public health care still come under the responsibility of member
states, but that the Commission has complementary powers in this area.
Community policy on drugs lies primarily in the realm of public informa-
tion and education. This includes the - programme of action on
drug prevention, the ’s first programme of this kind, which was adopted
by the Council and Parliament in .
It can therefore be said that Community policy on drugs exists as far as cer-
tain complementary public health care aspects of the problem are concerned.
The working group that concerns itself with these issues is the Public Health
group. Certain other aspects of the drugs theme belong to the first pillar, such
as precursors and money laundering; these are dealt with in the Economic
Affairs and Finances group respectively. Precursors, the raw materials from
which synthetic drugs are made, belong to the first pillar because they are
related to trade, while money laundering belongs here because it has to do
with the implementation of the internal market, which is subject to Commu-
nity law. In addition, the establishment and legal basis of the , and
any changes to them, also come under Community policy. Finally, policy on
drugs is also discussed at length in the first pillar in relation to development
cooperation. This involves cooperation with regions such as East and Central
Europe, the  countries (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific), and Central Asia.
A special North-South drugs “budget line” has been created for this purpose,
which is managed by the Development Directorate-General. Drug-related
issues are also incorporated into the talks that the  conducts with the coun-
tries in Eastern and Central Europe.
Second pillar
The second pillar covers the Common Foreign and Security Policy ().
In other words, it deals with the ’s external relations in the political and
diplomatic spheres. The Ministries of the member states most involved
with the issues in this pillar are Foreign Affairs and Defence. The nature of
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the cooperation here is intergovernmental, which means that decision-
making is arrived at in joint consultation between countries and requires a
unanimous vote. In the second pillar countries can also decide on what is
called joint action, which also requires unanimity. For certain implementa-
tion decisions the Council can decide (unanimously) that a qualified
majority vote will suffice.
In second-pillar issues, the European Commission does not have the
right of initiative; it is the Council (which basically means the combined
member states) that takes the initiatives here. The European Parliament has
little influence on matters that arise in the second pillar. The Council Presi-
dency keeps it informed of developments in the , and Parliament is
entitled to ask the Council questions and make recommendations.
The Treaty on European Union does not refer explicitly to drugs as a
theme to be dealt with in the second pillar. Still, it does come up in various
contexts, albeit in a somewhat abstract fashion – far more abstract than in
the other two pillars. The reason for this limitation is that the second pillar
does not possess a budget for implementing measures. In this sense, the sec-
ond pillar is purely political and diplomatic – it is a consultation pillar, focus-
ing on the political dialogue with third countries (the  term for countries
outside the ). So when drugs are discussed, the question is how to improve
international cooperation with a view to achieving a more effective approach
to the problems involved. The second pillar also includes talks with appli-
cant countries and decisions on the conditions under which accession can
take place. However abstract these deliberations may appear to the  itself,
they are of direct practical significance to the countries concerned.
The second pillar also includes discussions of international instruments,
such as the international conventions to which the  has joined up. This
includes everything related to the ’s international drug conventions,
such as the preparations of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs () and
those for  (see also .). Wherever possible, the  countries formu-
late joint positions for the  and , although countries also present
their own points of view. Until , the most important Council working
group that dealt with these second-pillar questions was Codro.

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Since all  countries of the  have signed the three drugs conventions,
these conventions have been incorporated into what is known as the ’s
acquis or legal foundations. This means that all acceding countries also have
to have sign them. At the Amsterdam European Council, the heads of gov-
ernment adopted the Action Plan on organised crime and with it the pre-
accession pact on organised crime, a series of conditions with which coun-
tries must comply in order to accede to the . This means that applicant
countries must show that they are taking effective action against drugs as an
important constituent part of the accession process. For instance, it is a pre-
condition that countries have signed the Strasbourg Convention on money
laundering and the  drugs conventions. In addition, countries that want
to accede must in principle take all the other measures that  countries
have already taken in areas such as money laundering and precursors, and
the same or similar measures to combat drugs as the present  countries.
Besides passing legislation, this also means that they must have institutions
similar to those in the  countries and national policy coordination points.
Countries that want to sign association agreements with the  must also
have signed the  drugs conventions. Drug-related issues are raised in
talks with several of these “associated countries”, such as Iran, Afghanistan,
Nigeria, Morocco and Peru. The  goes further still: it brings drug-related
issues systematically into virtually all political dialogues with third coun-
tries or regional organisations, including Afghanistan, Myanmar (Burma),
the Southern African Development Community and the countries of Cen-
tral Asia. Drugs and human rights are among the subjects that are raised
routinely. The  holds up action to combat drugs and respect for human
rights as key conditions for cooperation. Indeed, the relationship between
human rights and the war on drugs is a typical second-pillar subject. The
two may well conflict, as in Burma. On the one hand, the  wants to make
agreements with the Burmese regime about measures to combat drugs, but
on the other hand it wants to draw attention to human rights violations in
Burma. Policy has to be developed concerning this dilemma within the sec-
ond pillar.
The ’s active approach to the international fight against drugs, includ-
ing insisting that countries have signed the  conventions, is based on the
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’s position that the  conventions constitute the foundation of interna-
tional drugs policy, and that all countries in the world should sign them.
Another reason for this approach is that the  is eager to restrict the quan-
tity of drugs within its territory.
Within the second pillar, drugs are also an issue in dialogue with the
United States. The Dublin Group, an informal consultative drug preven-
tion platform whose participants are Western donors to multilateral and
bilateral drug programmes (see section .), also operates within this pillar.
Third pillar
The third pillar relates to cooperation in the realm of Justice and Home
Affairs (). Here too, decisions must be taken unanimously, which means
that every country has the right of veto. Here as in the second pillar, joint
action may be decided upon unanimously, and here too the Council may
decide that certain implementation decisions can be adopted by a qualified
majority.
In the third pillar, the right of initiative lies in any case with member
states. The Maastricht Treaty also gave the Commission the right of initia-
tive in certain parts of cooperation in the third pillar, such as asylum policy,
illegal immigration and fraud. Where the fight against drug trafficking and
other forms of international crime are concerned, the right of initiative lies
exclusively with member states.
The investigation and prosecution of those suspected of drug offences
are matters discussed within the third pillar. Title , Articles  and of the
 Treaty on police and judicial cooperation provides that the fight against
drug trafficking belongs here. To coordinate activities in the third pillar, the
 Group was set up under the auspices of Coreper. With the Treaty of
Amsterdam,  was subsumed into the Article  Committee. A variety of
groups fall under this Committee, such as the Multidisciplinary Group on
Organised Crime, and the Police Cooperation, Customs and Europol
groups. Drug-related matters are raised in all these forums, but the Multi-
disciplinary Group on Organised Crime is one of the most active. Although
it discusses other matters besides drugs, it may be regarded as the most
important group dealing with these issues in the third pillar.

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Various things have changed since the Treaty of Amsterdam. The third pil-
lar has been thinned out a little, with some themes having been “communi-
tised”, that is, moved to the first pillar. Since then, the third pillar has been
largely confined to cooperation between police and judiciary in criminal
cases. What is more, the Commission’s right of initiative has been expanded
since Amsterdam; it can now take the initiative in all third-pillar questions.
So the Council and the Commission are now on an equal footing in this pil-
lar. But Parliament’s role has also been strengthened. The Council is now
required to ask Parliament for its advice, although it is still entitled to set it
aside.
. The Schengen Agreement
The Schengen Agreement dates from , and its object is to accomplish
the free movement of persons, goods and services. To achieve this, the
Schengen countries strive to abolish all controls along their inner frontiers.
This clearly makes it harder to curb cross-border crime. The Schengen
countries have therefore decided to endeavour to harmonise their legisla-
tion on drugs, arms and explosives, and hotels’ registration procedures, to
improve the effectiveness of law enforcement.
The harmonisation of legislation on drugs is a stumbling block in these
negotiations. The question arose of which national legislation or practice
should be adopted as the standard. Should Schengen rules be based on the
liberal policy of the Netherlands or the stricter policy favoured by France?
Eventually a political solution was found by invoking the  drugs conven-
tions. The ratification of these conventions should be regarded as a guaran-
tee for the harmonised legislation as enshrined in Article  of the Schengen
Agreement.
In the course of time, however, this political compromise has proved
inadequate: the countries concerned may well have signed the  drug con-
ventions, but this does not in fact provide any guarantee that they have har-
monised their legislation on drugs. Quite simply, in practice every country
has its own drugs policy, and even within a single country significant differ-
ences may be observed. One clear difference between countries emerged
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in the follow-up negotiations to the Implementation Agreement of , in
which Germany – where prosecutors have no discretion on whether or not
to prosecute – wanted to introduce a minimum prosecution norm, an idea
that did not appeal to countries where prosecutors do have this discretion.
A new compromise was eventually struck, by adopting as the general
principal that if a country’s drugs policy deviates from that of others, all par-
ties must take measures to limit the impact of this discrepancy on those
other countries. With the adoption of this solution, the original objective of
the Schengen Agreement was effectively abandoned.
It should be noted that since the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into effect,
the Schengen Agreement has been annexed to the official Treaty on Euro-
pean Union as a protocol. What this means is that the compromise solution
just described now applies to all  member states. Because of the Schengen
Agreement, the countries have to take more account of one another than in
the past, and they have less freedom, de facto if not de jure, to pursue their
own policies.
. The Treaty of Amsterdam
The Treaty of Amsterdam that entered into effect on  May  made sub-
stantial changes to the Treaty (“Maastricht”) and the Treaty (“Rome”).
One of the most significant changes is that the European Council has now
been endowed with a formal legal basis, which it lacked before. The purpose
of this summit of heads of government, which takes place in principle every
six months (at the end of each Presidency) is to lay down the lines to be fol-
lowed by  policy. The actual decision-making takes place not here but in
the Council. Still, these summits are of crucial importance to  policy.
The Treaty of Amsterdam gave the European Parliament more powers.
The  can now participate in decisions on legislation in a growing number
of areas through the codecision procedure. Between Maastricht and Amster-
dam, the codecision procedure applied in  areas of policy; Amsterdam
added another , so that the European Parliament now has a large say in the
drafting of much European legislation. It participates in decisions on mat-
ters involving environment, culture, transport and technological research.
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The Treaty of Amsterdam also provides that Parliament must always be
asked for its advice in matters relating to the third pillar.
One important change in the approach to drugs is that aspects relating to
public health are to receive more emphasis. Article  of the  Treaty had
stated, prior to Amsterdam: “Community action shall be directed towards
the prevention of diseases, in particular sources of great danger to human
health, including drug addiction”. The Treaty changed this formulation, and
the Article (now Art.  of the Treaty) states: “Community action, which
shall complement national policies, shall be directed towards improving
public health, preventing human illness and diseases, and obviating sources
of danger to human health.” It is important here that the Community, repre-
sented by the Commission, can take initiatives to complement national poli-
cies. The drugs theme is mentioned explicitly in another part of this Article:
“The Community shall complement the Member States’ actions in reducing
drugs-related health damage, including information and prevention”.
Legal experts from the European Commission have tried to define the
precise legal implications of this Article, which are not entirely clear. But it
appears that the new Article will provide more scope for harm reduction as
part of policy on health care, under the headings of “complementary” meas-
ures and “prevention”. Article  also refers to “drugs-related health dam-
age”, which was not mentioned in Article . As it is up to the European
Commission to take initiatives in this area, the Commission can also do so
in the realm of harm reduction.
The Commission has also acquired extra powers in relation to drugs
issues in the third pillar. Before the Treaty of Amsterdam it could only take
initiatives for subjects in the first pillar, and now it can do so in the third pil-
lar. The Treaty of Amsterdam has also introduced agreements about closer
cooperation between police and judiciaries in the realm of illicit drug traf-
ficking, but the legal and practical implications are not yet entirely clear. At
present, decisions in the third pillar still require unanimity, but there is a
gradual development towards more decisions being taken by qualified
majority vote. This development is obviously related to the growing num-
ber of member states.
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. Summary
Member states started cooperating in drug-related matters at the end of the
s. , a coordinating committee launched on the initiative of Presi-
dent Mitterrand, played a leading role in this process.  essentially
acted in an institutional vacuum, as the , or , had not yet decided to
concern itself with drugs. The European Parliament too undertook various
activities, such as the publication of reports by the Stewart-Clark and
Cooney Committees. The Cooney report in particular, which focused on
drug trafficking and organised crime, made several interesting observations
and recommendations, which were however not adopted by the Council.
It was not until the Treaty of Maastricht, in , that drugs, along with a
great many other new subject areas, were brought within the ’s compe-
tence. Since then the subject has been on the agendas of numerous 
forums. The powers possessed by these forums depend on the aspect of the
drugs problem that is under discussion. This is because Maastricht intro-
duced a three-pillar structure, which distinguishes between the ’s differ-
ent policy areas. The first pillar consists of the “old” European Community
(), the second deals with the Common Foreign and Security Policy, while
the third deals with Justice and Home Affairs.
It is important to note which parties may take the initiative in the differ-
ent pillars, as this provides scope for influencing decision-making. The first
pillar operates according to the Community method; here the Commission
plays an important role and possesses the right of initiative. The second and
third pillars operate according to the intergovernmental method, which
means that member states arrive at agreements in joint consultations, with
the Commission having a far less prominent role. Despite the differences in
the right of initiative, it is always the Council, in which the member states
are represented, which takes the final decision. The powers of the European
Parliament are relatively limited. It participates in decision-making only in
policy areas that are subject to the codecision procedure, in which the
Council and Parliament have to reach agreement. As far as drugs are con-
cerned, this applies only to certain health-related aspects.
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In the first pillar, drugs are discussed primarily within the framework of
public health and development cooperation. In accordance with the princi-
ple of subsidiarity, public health is largely a matter of domestic policy for
the member states. However, the Commission may take complementary
measures, which it does primarily in the realm of preventive measures and
disseminating public information. In addition, certain other aspects of
drugs are discussed in the first pillar, such as precursors and money launder-
ing. In the second pillar (Common Foreign and Security Policy), although
drugs are not discussed in specific detail, they often arise in talks with third
countries and international organisations. Such talks centre on concluding
joint agreements, and the  will sometimes question whether countries are
doing enough to combat drugs. In the third pillar (Justice and Home
Affairs), there is a great deal of discussion about drugs, since this pillar deals
with the fight against organised crime and drug trafficking.
Drugs are increasingly being brought into talks with third countries in
recent years. The Commission raises the subject in talks on development
cooperation, and the Council does so in the second and third pillar. The 
operates a policy whereby countries must demonstrate that they are taking
adequate measures to combat drugs as a condition for cooperation. This
applies not only to applicant countries, whose capacity to act effectively
against drugs is an important condition for accession, but to all countries
that want to do business with the . It is in this area of external relations
that the  has become particularly active in drug-related matters.

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
 ,   
. Introduction
Chapter  discussed the division of the  into three pillars. This chapter is
based on another threefold division, as deals with on the ’s three main
institutions: Commission, Council and Parliament. The focus will not be
on their institutional framework, but on content and the way in which dis-
cussions and decisions relating to drugs come about within these bodies. It
will become clear that each one has a different approach to the problems
involved.
Many  documents refer to action to combat drugs as a priority. The
Cannes European Council of June  (during the French Presidency) was
the first to put drugs high up on the European agenda. For it was this sum-
mit that adopted the European Global Plan of Action in the Fight against
Drugs. From that time onwards, the theme has had a fixed place on the
agenda of each European Council, although it is not always discussed there.
As this survey will make clear, drugs are discussed in many different
forums within the . Not only the Commission, but also the ’s most
important decision-making body, the Council, has many working groups
that discuss this issue. The European Parliament is active as well. Besides
looking at the drug-related activities of each of the ’s three main institu-
tions in turn, this chapter will also seek to answer the question of why drugs
are discussed in so many different forums. We shall see that there is a power
struggle being fought out within the  on this issue. Sections . and .
will address this point and try to answer the question of which party really
has most influence in this area of policy.
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. The European Commission
Outsiders sometimes find the term “Commission” confusing, since it is
used not only to refer to a body consisting of  Commissioners, but also to
the administrative apparatus of -odd Directorates-General (s) that
supports them. What is more, many people believe that the Commission is
the most important body within the , whereas the Council in fact takes
precedence, since it takes the most important decisions.
The Commission has a vast array of responsibilities. An executive body
with some , officials, it is in some senses comparable to a ministry in a
member state. Yet its concerns go beyond those of a ministry. The Commis-
sion is charged with defending the Community’s interests, and it is sup-
posed to watch over the system of democratic legitimacy. Chapter 
touched on the Commission’s important role in taking initiatives in the first
(and now also in the third) pillar. Besides preparing decisions, the Commis-
sion also has managerial, supervisory and executive responsibilities.
Several Commissioners concern themselves in some way or other with
policy on drugs. This is not so surprising, since the issues involved impinge
not only on justice and home affairs, but on health, consumer affairs, agri-
culture, external relations, development cooperation, research and train-
ing. Because of their multi-faceted nature, drugs were originally placed
under the responsibility of the then President of the Commission, Jacques
Santer. The drugs unit set up to coordinate the Commission’s policy on
drugs accordingly came under the Secretariat-General’s authority.
This situation changed in July , when the drugs unit was placed
under the Task Force for Justice and Home Affairs that had been created in
 to coordinate the Commission’s third-pillar activities. The reason for
forming a Task Force instead of a  for this purpose was that the Treaty on
European Union limited the power of the forum that would deal with these
matters. (After the Treaty of Amsterdam it soon became likely that the Task
Force would be changed into a , which eventually happened when the
new Commission under Romano Prodi took office.)
Formally speaking, the Task Force still fell under the Secretariat-General,
but the responsible Commissioner was no longer the President, but the
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third-pillar Commissioner, who was then Anita Gradin. More accurately,
the drugs unit was subject to a dual authority: in the first instance it fell
under Gradin, but the President retained formal involvement. In terms of
content, it is strange that the Commission’s drugs unit should have come
under the third-pillar Task Force. After all, the Commission’s drug-related
powers have to do with health issues, not law enforcement. On the other
hand, drugs policy can be regarded as a cross-pillar issue, and it is therefore
not exclusive to the third pillar. It would have been more logical to keep to
the original designation, directly under the Secretariat-General.
It is sometimes said that the dysfunctionality of certain officials precipi-
tated the drug unit’s wholesale transfer away from the Secretariat-General.
Given its subject matter, the second most logical place for it would have
been the  for Health, since that is where the Commission’s competence
lies. This idea was allegedly abandoned because the then Irish Commission-
er Pádraig Flynn, whose portfolio for social affairs and employment includ-
ed health, did not want drugs added to his responsibilities. The Swedish
Commissioner Gradin, on the other hand, was interested in the portfolio,
and it was therefore assigned to her. Given her nationality this is quite
understandable. Drugs were an important theme during the Swedish
debate on accession to the , with many Swedes fearing – as some still do –
that their country would have to abandon its restrictive policy and adapt to
the more “liberal” Europe. Given the strength of Swedish Euroscepticism,
it was strategically astute for Gradin (and Sweden) to assume responsibility
for drugs policy within the .
With the advent of the new Commission under President Romano Prodi
in the second half of , it was decided to keep the drugs unit as part of the
Task Force and to turn the latter into a Directorate-General. This meant
that the Portuguese Commissioner Antonio Vitorino, whose portfolio is
Justice and Home Affairs, assumed responsibility for drug-related issues.
Vitorino acts as drugs coordinator within the Commission, but health
aspects still come under the Irishman David Byrne, Commissioner for
health and consumer protection. 
Not everyone within the Commission’s apparatus is happy with the way
the situation has developed. Since drugs are a cross-pillar theme involving
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several s, critics feel that it sends out the wrong signal to assign its coordi-
nation to the Directorate-General for Justice and Home Affairs. They are
concerned that it could create the impression that health issues related to
drugs are thought less important than law enforcement.
The Commission has several other specific responsibilities in this policy
area. Where health aspects are concerned, it possesses the right of initiative:
it formulates proposals that are forwarded to the Council and Parliament.
The Directorate-General for Social Affairs is responsible for this, and a spe-
cial programme of action was set up in this context. In , the Commis-
sion, on the basis of its competence in health matters, launched its first
drugs prevention action plan, which was scheduled to run until . In
May  it presented its Action Plan to Combat Drugs -, which
outlined the ’s future activities in relation to drugs. However, several
months earlier, during the  Presidency, preparations had been launched
for a similar plan, the  Drugs Strategy -. It is unclear how the
Commission’s Action Plan to Combat Drugs is related to the Council’s 
Drugs Strategy. This confusion seemingly reflects the competition raging
over this policy area, a matter dealt with at length in section . below.
The Commission’s external relations
It is in the area of external relations that the Commission has been most
active in relation to drugs in recent years. Sometimes it cooperates with the
Council, and in other cases their activities overlap. As noted in the previous
chapter, the drugs problem is systematically broached in talks with third
countries, with the  highlighting the importance of anti-drugs measures.
The formal  position is that these talks are based on a “balanced
approach” – that is, they accord equal weight to supply and demand reduc-
tion measures. In practice, however, the emphasis often lies on cooperation
in the fight against drugs, if only because demand reduction is far harder to
tackle. The External Relations and Development s are both involved in
these talks.
Let us start with the External Relations DG, which often raises the drugs
problem in its talks with third countries. Eastern and Central Europe,
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including Cyprus, are designated a priority region here, because many of
these countries are hoping to accede to the . This means that they are
bound by the pre-accession pact and the  acquis on drugs. Since the 
drugs conventions signed by the  countries have become part of the ’s
acquis, all applicant countries have to ratify them. For the rest, the newcom-
ers must take the same measures as the present member states have already
taken. The  Multi-Beneficiary Drugs Programme has been developed
to help applicant countries develop their drugs policy, both by building up
institutions and by adjusting legislation. In  its budget was set at  mil-
lion euros. The main priorities that year were gathering information about
drug abuse (involving member states in the work of the ) and taking
action against synthetic drugs. Other activities have included developing a
drugs prevention policy and working with the  to tackle the Balkan
route.
Drugs have also been placed on the agendas of summits between the 
and , the industrialised countries of Asia. Few if any drugs come from
this region to the , so it is hard to see any specific reason or problem to
account for this issue being raised. Even so, the theme was discussed and a
special first-pillar subgroup created for the purpose, known as the Narcotics
Drugs Committee.
Latin America is one of the priority regions for cooperation on drug-
related issues. In February  the Commission concluded an agreement
with the Andes countries in Panama on the harmonisation of legislation,
money laundering and checks on precursors. The Commission attaches
particular importance to this latter point, and an agreement is currently in
force with five countries of the Andes. Another one has been concluded
with Chile and Mexico. In addition, a donor meeting took place in Brussels
under the Commission’s responsibility, where the Commission announced
that it was considering launching a crop replacement programme. A
national drugs observatory will probably be set up in Venezuela, funded by
the Commission as a demand reduction measure. In  the Commission
raised the total anti-drug aid budget for Latin America from  million to
about  million euros. This dramatic rise was decided upon after a meeting
between the then Spanish  Commissioner Marin and the then  drug
czar Barry McCaffrey.
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It is in the Development  that drugs are discussed at greatest length. This
 handles relations with the  countries (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific).
The priority areas for drugs control are the Caribbean and western and
southern Africa. Drugs control activities are discussed in relation to the
Lomé IV Convention, which refers to illegal drugs under the heading of
health cooperation. Drug-related measures are part of the ’s development
programme with the countries concerned, which seeks to promote sustain-
able development, social integration and above all poverty reduction. This
is partly because the consumption and production of drugs and interna-
tional drug trafficking are on the increase in many  countries. The
emphasis in production is on cannabis (in the Caribbean as well as in west-
ern and southern Africa) and over the last ten years traffickers have been tar-
geting the export market. What is more, Africa and the Caribbean are
increasingly becoming transit regions for cocaine and heroin consign-
ments.
Every  country hoping for cooperation with the  has to keep to a
“master plan”, a national drugs strategy plan, the main outlines of which are
developed by the country itself. The plan is also recipient oriented, which
means that the country itself has a large say in the way it uses the money it
receives. Its main elements must be law enforcement (drugs legislation
based on the  conventions, measures to combat money laundering and
the production of precursors), demand reduction (primary, secondary and
tertiary prevention), and supply reduction (in particular by developing
alternatives).
In the recent past, the main emphasis in the Commission’s approach to
external relations had to do with supply reduction. The  had a policy
quite similar to that of the  . Today, however, the Commission adopts the
view that supply and demand reduction should be balanced, within a wider
multisectoral approach that also discusses health-related aspects of drugs
and vulnerable groups. In recent years the  has displayed greater under-
standing for the predicament and views of the  countries themselves.
The growth in cannabis production in western Africa, for instance, is relat-
ed to the increasingly poor profits to be made on the world market with
other crops, such as coffee, cotton and cocoa. The Development ’s docu-
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ment notes in this connection that the growth in cannabis production in
western Africa during the s coincided with the ’s structural adjust-
ment programme. Given the complexity of the drugs issue in  countries,
the Commission proposes dealing with it in a wider socio-economic and
psychological framework, and feels that a purely punitive approach would
not be appropriate.
Even so, given that the  has been dealing with these issues for much
longer and that the  is increasingly cooperating with the , it is pos-
sible that the measures the Commission is advocating may end up empha-
sising law enforcement. On paper they may seem to strike a balance
between supply and demand reduction, but given the wider issue of poverty
in many  countries and the Commission’s limited budget for such
North-South cooperation, this approach is unlikely to succeed. In total,
about . million euros a year are available in this budget line for four
regions (Asia,  countries, Latin America and the Maghreb), which
amounts to a little over  million for each region – counting the  as one
region. Given the socio-economic and psychological context, making
demand reduction measures work effectively will be very difficult.
Efforts to reduce supply by encouraging crop replacement will also be
hard to implement. The  and  have been carrying out programmes of
this kind for many years, with in general poor results, as evaluated, for
instance, in a study commissioned by the  Research Institute for Social
Development. Crop destruction and replacement are hard to achieve in
practice, because drugs crops yield far more than their legal replacements.
And precisely because these measures are so hard to implement, past efforts
(by the  in any case) have shown that attempts at supply reduction can
easily lead to unethical practices such as militarisation, human rights viola-
tions and environmental damage. Investigation and prosecution are simply
easier avenues to pursue, and it is therefore conceivable that the drugs meas-
ures taken in the  countries will end up being largely a matter of law
enforcement. What is more, the tone of the Commission’s documents on
the anti-drugs measures in the  countries is suggestive of a punitive
approach.
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It should be added that some passages in these documents reflect a rather
patronising and interventionist attitude. Given their dependence, the coun-
tries themselves, especially the poorer ones, have little choice but to comply
with the conditions set by the  (in this case the Commission). Many
Southern countries probably prefer cooperating with the  rather than the
 . The  imposes even stricter anti-drugs conditions than the , which is
a source of considerable resentment, especially in Latin America.
It is morally relevant to ask whether the Commission is not simply
imposing its own policy on third countries here and whether it has the right
to do so. For instance, under the heading of “drugs and decriminalisation”
we read that this topic is much debated in the  but that it is “not an issue”
for the  countries. This is not a fair reflection of reality in certain
regions. In parts of Africa and the Pacific, and particularly in the Caribbean,
which is a priority region, the use of cannabis is fairly widespread and cul-
turally integrated. Decriminalisation is debated there, even at political
level. Some of the documents produced by the Commission follow a rather
skewed logic. One paper notes, for instance, that decriminalisation is not
an issue in  countries because many of them lack adequate control
mechanisms for legal drugs. But if their governments find it hard to con-
trol even legal drugs, it would be more logical to conclude that there is little
point in demanding that they prosecute people for using illicit drugs. What
is more, it is rather unpalatable that the Commission should impose such
demands on third countries when  countries themselves are actually
relaxing their criminal sanctions, at least where cannabis users are con-
cerned, and decriminalisation has become the trend. Cannabis use is even
more closely integrated into the culture of some  countries than it is in
the .
. The Council
Although not so well known among the general public, the Council, whose
full name is the Council of the European Union (sometimes called the
Council of Ministers), is the body that takes the decisions within the . The
Council has been referred to as the ’s most obscure institution, which is
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curious, and not a little alarming, given its importance. Formally speaking,
the Council consists of Ministers from the various governments. In the
beginning, “the Council” generally meant the assembled Foreign Ministers
– what is now called the General Affairs Council. But it was soon decided to
create different, specialist Councils, such as the Agriculture Council, Envi-
ronment Council, etc. Today there are about  different Councils. Some
meet more often than others. General Affairs and Economic and Financial
Affairs meet monthly, whereas Transport, Environment and Industry meet
only two to four times a year.
It would clearly be impossible for the Ministers to discuss every subject at
length at each of their meetings before making a decision. Decisions are
therefore prepared in the Committee of Permanent Representatives,
known by its French acronym of Coreper. The members of Coreper are
the member states’ ambassadors to the  – their highest diplomatic
envoys. Every document that is intended for the Council is first scrutinised
by Coreper.
Formally speaking it does not matter which Council takes a decision,
whether it is General Affairs or Agriculture; in each case it is a decision
taken by the Council of the European Union. In practice, which Council
takes the decision depends partly on the subject and partly on what stage of
the decision-making process is involved. If it is a matter about which
Coreper is already in full agreement, the subject acquires the status of “A
point”. Since no disputes remain to be ironed out, the next Council –
whichever specialist Council this may be – can basically rubber-stamp it. If,
on the other hand, Coreper has been unable to reach agreement, the matter
is labelled a “B point”. This means that the Ministers have to discuss it and
try to come to an agreement.
As noted, Coreper acts as a crucial filter before documents are passed
onto the Council. And before a document goes to Coreper, it is prepared in
various Council working groups that consist of officials from the ministries
of the  member states. As neither the Council nor Coreper wants to dis-
cuss every matter in detail, officials try to reach agreement as much as possi-
ble at an earlier stage. This makes sense, since these preparatory consulta-
tions take place between people who have more specialist knowledge than
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the ambassadors or Ministers. But it basically means that the lion’s share of
real decision-making takes place in these preliminary consultations
between officials.
Several Council working groups answerable to Coreper concern them-
selves with drug-related matters. The most important is the Horizontal
Drugs Group, launched in  in acknowledgment of the cross-pillar
(“horizontal”) nature of the drugs problem. Everything that has to do with
drugs is supposed to undergo the scrutiny of this group before it goes to
Coreper. At the same high level, that is, directly under Coreper, is the Arti-
cle  Committee (previously the  Committee), which deals with third-
pillar matters. The Article  Committee reports in principle directly to
Coreper, except where drug-related issues are concerned. Within the three
pillars there are numerous other Council working groups that discuss spe-
cific aspects of the drugs problem. They include the Customs Group, the
General Systems of Preferences Group (on regulations and priorities with
third countries), the Police Cooperation Group, the Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters Group, the Telecommunications Group, the Finance
Group (which discusses money laundering), and the Economic Affairs
Group (which deals with precursors). The following sections will look in
greater detail at the most important groups.
Horizontal Drugs Group
Coreper set up this Council working group in February , in acknowl-
edgement of the fact that drugs are a cross-pillar theme. The Horizontal
Group is by far the most important Council working group that concerns
itself with drugs, and all subjects bearing on this issue must pass through it
before being sent to Coreper. The Group has something of a unique status:
it is a working group, yet it also plays a coordinating role for all drug-related
issues. This makes it comparable, in terms of function and status, to the
Article  Committee which coordinates third-pillar issues. Decision-mak-
ing in the Horizontal Group is by unanimity, a kind of decision-making
procedure that really belongs in the third pillar. This is consistent with the
fact that the group discusses a great many third-pillar matters.
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The Group’s history is rather complex. At the Cannes European Council in
June , at the end of the French Presidency, the broad contours of the
new European Global Plan of Action in the Fight Against Drugs (-
) were adopted. The heads of government asked the national drugs
experts, who were yet to be appointed, to work out the details of the plan
with a view to presentation at the Madrid summit in December . The
original plan contained  measures,  of which related to public health.
However, these latter  were not adopted at Cannes. At the Madrid Coun-
cil in December  the  health-related measures of the original plan
were adopted, but under the Italian Presidency they were removed again.
This meant that the expert group became primarily a third-pillar group.
In January  the Dutch Presidency proposed that Coreper expand the
group’s mandate; and this gave rise to the Horizontal Drugs Group. As the
fifteen health-related measures were initially kept separate from the rest and
passed to the Council’s working group on health, they did not receive much
attention in the Horizontal Group in the beginning. For the first two years,
the Group focused primarily on third-pillar subjects. And most of its dele-
gates came from the third-pillar ministries of Justice and Home Affairs.
Although it also included delegates from Health and Foreign Affairs min-
istries, and from national interministerial bodies, the third pillar dominat-
ed this Group for a long time. In the course of  the Horizontal Drugs
Group gradually acquired a more cross-pillar character, with subjects from
the first and second pillars being discussed as well, and in  delegates
from health and social affairs ministries came to dominate the forum. 
The Horizontal Group’s responsibilities are very wide-ranging. As the
central group dealing with drug-related issues, it sees every relevant docu-
ment. This means that it has gradually moved from coordination to policy-
making. One of its key tasks was to prepare the Drugs Strategy plan
launched under the last  Presidency. It was up to the Horizontal Group to
define the main foundations of this strategy. It also concerned itself, together
with the second-pillar group Codro, with the preparations for .
The Horizontal Group has also been active in other foreign relations,
such as those with associated applicant countries in Central and Eastern
Europe. Since the  has a pre-accession strategy for these countries, the
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Horizontal Group met with the associated countries to discuss how they
could comply with the drugs-related conditions for membership. It also
concerned itself with the further implementation of regional initiatives in
the Caribbean, Latin America, Central Asia and southern Africa. The latter
has been designated a new priority region because of the increase in drug
use and drug trafficking. A special summit was held on these issues in 
between the  and the South African Development Community ().
At the Florence European Council in  it was decided to cooperate in
third-pillar issues with the former Soviet Union, that is, Russia and the
newly independent states (). The Luxembourg European Council of 
extended a mandate for this purpose to the Council, which worked out the
details of this cooperation during the  Presidency. The agreements are
mainly about improving border controls and tackling organised crime. The
Commission is also involved through the  programme, which specifi-
cally targets this region. For customs cooperation,  million euros were
made available for the years -. At the Dublin European Council of
, a British-French initiative was adopted to set up a programme to help
the countries of Central Asia in their fight against drug production and traf-
ficking. For  and ,  million euros were made available for this pur-
pose from . Most commentators view the Central Asia programme as a
failure, in which a lot of money has been wasted. This is generally blamed on
the incompetence of those in charge.
Cooperation with the Caribbean and Latin America in drug-related issues
has intensified in recent years. The initial impetus was provided by the
Madrid European Council of December , which adopted a British-
French proposal tabled by John Major and Jacques Chirac (and supported
by Wim Kok) for a Drugs Action Plan in the Caribbean. At Spain’s insistence
this was later expanded to include Latin America. Senior representatives of
the , Latin America and the Caribbean subsequently decided, in March
, to set up a Coordination and Cooperation Mechanism on Drugs. For
this meeting the Horizontal Group decided in advance that the  would set
the following priorities in this cooperation: alternative development; culti-
vation, production and transport; chemicals for precursors; organisation of
government action against drugs; legislation; law enforcement; enforcing
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sentences; information/intelligence; money laundering; prevention and
rehabilitation. This list basically includes every single  policy area related
to drugs.
The Council is also active in other drug-related matters. Following a pro-
posal by the Commission it approved funding for a Colombian system of
remote sensing, which involves satellite monitoring of the growth of drugs
crops. The Council has also held several meetings with the countries of the
Andes to discuss the drugs problem.
When it comes to external relations in the fight against drugs, the Hori-
zontal Group is not the only active body; the Commission is also active in
this area on the basis of its competence in development cooperation.
Working Group on Public Health (first pillar)
The first-pillar Council working group on public health discusses all
health-related aspects of drugs, including projects such as the Community
Programme for the Prevention of Drug Dependence -. As already
noted, proposals in this area are formulated by the Commission, and the
European Parliament takes part in decision-making on the basis of the
codecision procedure.
However, this group is in general not very influential in drug-related
issues, since in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, policy on pub-
lic health is primarily the responsibility of member states. The Commission
has complementary powers, mainly in the realm of prevention. This has
affected the institutional embedding of drug matters within the Council,
where the emphasis is on the law enforcement angle and not so much on
health.
Codro (second pillar)
Until its incorporation into the Horizontal Drugs Group in , Codro
was the most important second-pillar Council group on drugs. Among
other things it was responsible for implementing the pre-accession pact on
organised crime adopted by the Amsterdam European Council ().
Under this pact, applicant countries must show that they can take effective
action against drugs; it is a key condition for accession. But the  does not
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stop at applicant countries; it systematically raises drugs in almost all its
political talks with third countries, and agreements are often made on anti-
drugs measures. The Horizontal Group () now deals with these exter-
nal matters.
The ’s attitude to third countries can be illustrated by what happened
in , when Vietnam wanted to enter a reservation to the  Convention
of . All countries wanting to have an association with the  must sign
the  drugs conventions, and any failure to do so prompts the  to issue a
formal reminder of this condition through the Presidency. Germany held
the Presidency at this time, so the German ambassador to Vietnam commu-
nicated the ’s position to the Vietnamese government.
Relations with Burma, an important opium producer, are also discussed
in the second pillar. The international community faces a dilemma here, as
it wants local production to be reduced but is disinclined to negotiate with a
military dictatorship. Codro’s other activities included bilateral relations
with various associated countries such as Afghanistan, Iran, Morocco,
Nigeria and Peru. In , Codro and the  prepared  together.
Both before and after Codro’s incorporation into the  the dividing-
lines between groups and pillars have often been unclear. There may be
cooperation or a certain duplication, with the same matters being discussed
in two or more forums. What is more, the Commission has its own drugs
programmes, and drugs are also regularly raised in consultations between
government leaders. In March , for instance, a conference was held for
the government leaders of the present member states and the applicant
countries. Among other things it decided to launch a group to examine the
relationship between drugs and organised crime. One month later the gov-
ernment leaders met in London for the Asia-Europe Meeting, and here too
agreements were made, this time on the precursors of synthetic drugs. In
 the  concluded a treaty with South Africa including a paragraph on
drugs.
Multidisciplinary Group (third pillar)
Drugs are discussed in several third-pillar groups, but the Multidisciplinary
Group on Organised Crime is one of the most active. The Dublin Euro-
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pean Council (December ) decided that the  should formulate a
strategy on organised crime. To develop the basic contours of this policy, a
High-Level Group on Organised Crime was set up. The Amsterdam Euro-
pean Council (June ) adopted this Group’s  recommendations, laid
down in an Action Plan on organised crime, and established a Multidisci-
plinary Group to implement them. The new group basically took over the
activities of the previous Group on Organised Drugs Crime, but its man-
date is wider, covering all organised crime. The Group concerns itself with
concrete measures such as harmonising legislation on organised crime,
money laundering and legislation to deprive criminals of the proceeds of
crime. It is vigorous in its use of deadlines and progress reports to sustain
momentum.
. The European Parliament
The European Parliament () is the only  institution consisting of
directly elected politicians. In fact it is the only directly elected internation-
al parliamentary assembly in the world. In June  almost  million
Europeans were entitled to vote in the elections for the , and just under
% of them did so. The  cannot be compared to a national parliament;
it is in a fundamentally different position. The  does not have a govern-
ment that is installed and scrutinised by Parliament. And unlike national
parliaments the  has no ruling party or coalition, and no opposition.
When the  was created in , its sole function was to advise the
Council of Ministers. Its powers have gradually widened, as the codecision
procedure, in which it shares decision-making powers with the Council,
has been extended to more and more policy areas. The Maastricht Treaty
gave the  the power of codecision in  policy areas. The Treaty of Amster-
dam, which entered into force on  May , added another , and the 
is now an important actor in the drafting of much European legislation – on
the environment, culture, transport and technological research.
The  also has supervisory powers in respect of the Commission.
Besides being required to approve the Commission’s budget, it can ask
questions and set up committees of inquiry. The  also has the power to
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dismiss the European Commission, a fact that was driven home to everyone
in the spring of , when it actually did so. Since then the  has grown in
self-confidence. It does not yet possess the power to dismiss individual
Commissioners, but President Romano Prodi is expected to introduce this
power, as he has spoken out in favour of it.
The fact that Parliament now has a say in more and more policy areas is
important for member states and for citizens. However, few citizens appear
to have realised this, given the low turnout at the last  election. European
legislation takes precedence over national legislation. This means that all
member states have to amend their national legislation accordingly, with-
out the intervention of national parliaments. However, in some policy areas
the  still has little influence, and lacks the powers of national parliaments.
For instance, it cannot take the initiative for new legislation; it can only ask
the Commission to draft a proposal for a directive. Furthermore, many
decisions are still taken by the Council, with the  having a solely advisory
role. The ’s new powers of codecision all relate to first-pillar issues; as
things now stand there is little chance of it acquiring this power in the sec-
ond or third pillars. Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Council has asked
the  for its advice on third-pillar questions (which it may however choose
to ignore), but in the second pillar (Common Foreign and Security Policy),
the  has no say at all.
Although Parliament’s powers are undoubtedly more limited than those
of the Council, some s feel confident that they will steadily increase.
One such optimist is the British Conservative Sir Jack Stewart-Clark, who
was an  for  years, until June . He emphasises the historical devel-
opment, and is struck by the great change in recent years: Ministers some-
times consult s today, something that would have been unthinkable
only a few years ago.
It must be borne in mind that the  is still in the process of develop-
ment. The balance of power between its institutions has not yet fully crys-
tallised. Formal powers are not the whole story; institutions also have to
forge their own power base through the political process and through inter-
action with other institutions. The actions and initiatives taken by Parlia-
ment itself are significant here. Some s study specific issues for years and
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build up considerable expertise, giving their opinions more weight. This
partly explains why the Commission and the Council take more account of
s’ views than in the past.
Whatever the increase in the ’s powers, its image was rather dented by
the lack of interest in the elections of June : turnout averaged below
% in the  member states, with the  sinking to the record depths of
%. Some will explain this by saying that “Europe” is too remote from
ordinary people, who do not realise how much influence the  has and
how much it impacts on their lives. This is actually rather curious, given
that the  dismissed the entire Commission in the spring of  in con-
nection with charges of corruption and nepotism. One explanation for the
low turnout could be that the  itself has become tainted by the aura of
profiteering and nepotism and has done too little to dispel it.
The elections of June  resulted in a shift from left to right. The social-
ists are no longer the largest parliamentary party in the ; their place has
been taken by the European People’s Party (), consisting of Christian
Democrats and Conservatives. This is particularly striking, since most 
member states currently have social democrat or socialist prime ministers.
It will become clear in the near future, as the debates in the  unfold,
whether this institution is set to gain influence in comparison to the Com-
mission and the Council.
The fact that the  possesses only advisory powers in certain areas is
sometimes an advantage. It means that s have fewer political con-
straints, and are freer to express new ideas. This creates more scope for open
exchanges and enables s to adopt firm positions, which sometimes leads
to heated emotional debates. As a result, fresh and dissident views are often
expressed in the . The Council and Commission, on the other hand, tend
to keep to the safer middle ground of political compromise, without ven-
turing much into the realm of fundamental debate. Their meetings are
closed and seek to forge a consensus; whatever real differences of opinion do
arise are unlikely to be released into the public domain. In sum, the  is the
most innovative of the three major institutions, and the only one that con-
ducts its debates in public.
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Since the Maastricht Treaty, the  has had different powers in each pillar.
In health-related drug matters it has the right of amendment through the
codecision procedure. The parliamentary committee that deals with these
subjects is the Committee for the Environment, Public Health and Con-
sumer Policy, which discusses drugs under the heading of public health pol-
icy. The European Commission formulates a proposal, after which the
Council and Parliament decide whether or not to adopt it. Other drug-
related matters subject to the codecision procedure are those that impinge
on Community policy, such as money laundering and precursors.
However, it is in the third pillar (Justice and Home Affairs) that drugs are
discussed at greatest length. The key parliamentary committee here is the
committee now known as Citizens’ Freedoms and Rights, Justice and
Home Affairs, to which numerous drug-related matters are passed on.
Since these are third-pillar issues, the  can only make recommendations,
which the Council may choose to ignore. In recent years it has become cus-
tomary for the Council to ask the  for its advice. Title  of the Maastricht
Treaty required the Council to consult Parliament about the most impor-
tant third-pillar matters. However, the Luxembourg European Council
() decided that Parliament should be consulted about all third-pillar
matters, anticipating the provision to this effect in the Amsterdam Treaty.
As before, the Council’s third-pillar decisions are taken by unanimity,
which means that a single member state can block Parliament’s recommen-
dations.
The EP’s position on drugs
It may briefly be recalled here that the  undertook some activities in this
area prior to the Maastricht Treaty. It set up committees such as the Stewart-
Clark Committee in , which studied the drugs problem in the countries
of the Community in , followed in - by the Cooney report on
drug trafficking and organised crime. These reports have already been dis-
cussed in chapter ., but the key points may be repeated here.
The final report of the Stewart-Clark Committee of  came out
against the legalisation of drugs, but favoured relaxing the policy on
cannabis use. Harm reduction measures such as needle exchange and
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methadone programmes were rejected. A split emerged within the Com-
mittee between its left-wing and right-wing members. Basically what was at
issue was the attitude to drug use: the right-wing majority favoured a total
ban, while the left-wing minority preferred a more pragmatic approach
based on harm reduction.
In  Parliament set up the Cooney Committee to investigate the
increase of drug-related organised crime. This Committee’s report advo-
cated the use of needle exchange and methadone programmes and recom-
mended that the possession of drugs for personal use should no longer be
considered a criminal offence. In light of the health risks associated with
drug use, the Committee recommended ensuring the availability of drugs
in safe doses. The Report’s tone reflected the view that an approach based
purely on the criminal law did not constitute an effective response, and that
it would be better to accept drug use and take a more pragmatic line. The
Report implied that there was a need for a new policy, although it did not
say so in so many words. In the  Resolution adopted in response to the
Cooney Report, Parliament rejected the legalisation of drugs and called on
member states to act in accordance with the  Conventions. So prohibi-
tion was to remain the basis for the ’s policy on drugs.
Although the  did not adopt the recommendations made in the Cooney
Report, it does seem to have changed its approach to the drugs problem. In
any case, assuming that a committee of inquiry reflects the political views of
the Parliament, the differences in the recommendations made by the Stewart-
Clark () and Cooney () Committees evidently reflect a shift in opin-
ion. For instance, while the majority were against distributing methadone
and clean needles in , the majority favoured such programmes six years
later. There are other significant differences. While only a minority of the
Stewart-Clark Committee advocated the “normalisation” of drug use, a
majority favoured this approach in the later Report. The Cooney Report’s
first recommendation, on prevention, stated that member states were doing
too little in their schools to educate children about risks such as those associat-
ed with drug use, and about resisting peer pressure and accepting responsibil-
ity for their own behaviour.
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Until , views on drugs in the  were quite clear-cut, largely following
party lines. Left-wing parties wanted a more progressive and pragmatic pol-
icy, one that was at least based on harm reduction and decriminalisation.
The Greens and the socialist s from some countries were more progres-
sive still. Right-wing parties, on the other hand, supported more traditional
views, insisting on the importance of a ban and its deterrent effect, and
largely rejecting harm reduction measures.
In June  the European Parliament adopted a resolution on drugs pre-
vention in response to the European Commission’s drugs prevention action
plan. It was up to the chief parliamentary committee on drugs, the Com-
mittee for Citizens’ Freedoms and Home Affairs, to prepare this resolution.
The rapporteur was Sir Jack Stewart-Clark of the European People’s Party,
the party of Christian Democrats and Conservatives. The Resolution stated
that the prosecution-based policy of the past few years had done more harm
than good. It also pointed to the differences between the official positions
adopted by member states at national level and actual policies pursued by
regional and local authorities. It emphasised the need for a thorough inves-
tigation, in which policies would be judged on the basis of results.
Up until this point there had been a certain consensus about drugs (or a
desire to reach one, at any rate) within the Committee for Citizens’ Free-
doms and Home Affairs, based on a pragmatic approach. The resolution of
June  is a clear example. Prominent s such as Daniël Cohn-Bendit
and Sir Jack Stewart-Clark (representing the German Greens and the ’s
Conservatives respectively) were active in the drugs problem, and tried to
cooperate in spite of their different political views.
This fairly clear political landscape in attitudes to drugs started to change
in , partly because of Sweden’s accession to the  on  January of that
year. Sweden’s membership would prove highly influential on drugs debates
in the . The Swedish representatives were not yet a strong presence during
the preparation and adoption of the resolution of June , since they were
new to the . This soon changed, however, leading to quite an upset in Par-
liament, and even more so in the Citizens’ Freedoms and Home Affairs
Committee. The national objective of Swedish drugs policy is to attain a
drug-free society, and Swedish s are very active in this area. Given the
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role that the drugs problem has played in Swedish politics in recent years,
and given that the word “liberal” used in connection with drugs has
acquired very negative connotations, it is not surprising that all Swedish
s oppose liberal tendencies when it comes to drugs. In other issues
they have relatively little to say, but as soon as drugs are mentioned they are
fired up and speak out emotionally, sometimes fanatically, against any form
of harm reduction or liberalisation. As a result, since the advent of the
Swedish s, debates are less oriented towards finding pragmatic compro-
mise solutions than they were before. The positions have become more
polarised and more ideological.
Besides its influence on what is now the Citizens’ Freedoms and Rights,
Justice and Home Affairs Committee, Sweden has also altered trends in the
Green and socialist political groups. The socialist group had been moving
towards a consensus on a pragmatic, non-punitive approach, although the
British Labour Party had distinct reservations. The advent of the Swedish
Social Democrats reversed this trend. In the Green group, which had
achieved a consensus on a more liberal approach to the drugs problem some
time before, the advent of the Swedes was more dramatic still, causing a
split between the Swedish and the other Greens.
In retrospect, the resolution of June  may perhaps be seen as a turn-
ing point in the ’s thinking on drugs. Important though Sweden’s role
may have been, it did not bear sole responsibility for the change in attitude.
It seems that the opponents of a more pragmatic approach have gained in
self-confidence as a result of the fanatical and hence persuasive determina-
tion with which the Swedes oppose any liberalisation, and present their
opinions more forcibly than in the past. So Sweden’s membership has had a
catalytic effect, serving to bolster the forces of conservatism in relation to
drugs. One sign of this change was that the Conservative group  pro-
posed a different rapporteur for drug-related matters. Its  Sir Jack Stew-
art-Clark, a British Tory, had for years been the party’s specialist in the drugs
problem, and he appeared to be the obvious candidate for nomination as
rapporteur from this group. He had studied the problem since the mid-
s, and his views had grown more pragmatic and more liberal with the
passage of time. However, at the end of the s it was not Stewart-Clark
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whose name the  put forward as rapporteur on drugs, but the more con-
servative Austrian Pirker.
This shift in attitudes to drugs within the  has also become clear during
other debates. In May , for instance, a resolution was adopted in
response to a report on synthetic drugs, in which the Austrian Pirker had
served as rapporteur. Compared to other reports on drugs that had issued
from the  in recent years, the Pirker report focused more heavily on a
punitive approach. For instance, it stated that imposing criminal sanctions
against drug users acted as a deterrent. Only a few years earlier it would have
been hard to imagine Parliament adopting a formulation of this kind. The
plenary session held in October that same year to formulate the ’s posi-
tion on  also reflected its changed views. Parliament wanted to
send its recommendations to the Council. A long debate proved necessary
before agreement could be reached on allowing for the possibility of intro-
ducing harm reduction measures at local level.
The  had also used the debate on  as an opportunity to debate
the Council’s Drugs Strategy Plan. The ’s changed views, and the Swedish
s’ key role in defining them, was very clear when the report on this strat-
egy was discussed in the chamber. The Dutch rapporteur D’Ancona had
included some extremely progressive proposals, such as the decriminalisa-
tion of cannabis, the distribution of heroin to known addicts, and the
reform of the  drugs conventions. Her report seemed to enjoy enough
support when it was debated in the parliamentary committee, but only
because of the absence of some right-wing committee members. This
became clear during the plenary debate, when the report failed to gain the
endorsement of Parliament as a whole. So many amendments were submit-
ted that the rapporteur decided to return the report to the committee
instead of having it voted down. The main opposition came from the
Swedish representatives, who formed a block against the liberal portions of
the report and submitted several dozen motions – a large proportion of the
total. Another group that failed to endorse the report was the British
Labour Party, which declined to vote along with other members of the
socialist group. It seems that the Labour s had been told to adopt a cau-
tious stance by London, where Tony Blair had only just come to power.
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The report was therefore sent back to the parliamentary committee, where
its proposals were watered down in consultation with the  group. The
most controversial passages, such as the decriminalisation of cannabis, the
distribution of heroin to known users and the reform of the  drugs con-
ventions, were all removed. Eventually a political compromise emerged
that amounted to very little. The report had so much of its stuffing removed
that it did not really represent a clear position any more. This hollowed-out
report was finally presented to the  again in October , where it was
adopted. In plenary session it was supported by the  and the liberal
group, but it still met with a great deal of opposition from the Swedes, who
all voted against it again because of its inclusion of harm reduction meas-
ures. One innovative element of the debate was the ’s adoption of a reso-
lution stating that there was no need to harmonise drugs policy, as there was
already considerable convergence between member states in this area and
the ways in which they applied their national legislation displayed more
similarities than differences.
Something that is in danger of being overlooked in all this is that the
drugs resolutions passed by Parliament do not ultimately affect policy. As
this is a third-pillar policy area, Parliament’s powers do not extend further
than advising the Council. A resolution on such issues therefore possess
largely symbolic value, as a document enunciating the views of the ’s par-
liamentary assembly. Even so, if this resolution subsequently attracts media
attention and is publicised by s, it can have some social impact.
Summarising, it is fair to say that the European Parliament no longer has
a coherent position on drugs policy. The situation has become rather diffuse
over the past few years. It may be that the powers of conservatism have
gained influence, but alternatively, this may later turn out to have been a
brief period of resistance in an overall trend towards a more liberal policy.
The Parliament’s new composition and the coalitions that are formed
between its various groups will gradually make this clear.
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. Power struggle over drugs
The previous sections outlined the ways in which the Commission, the
Council and the Parliament are involved in drugs policy. They reveal a dif-
fuse picture of three institutions carrying out different activities in this area,
each in their own way and in mutual interaction. Who orchestrates this
whole is unclear. What does emerge, however, is that something of a power
struggle is going on over drugs. A similar phenomenon can be seen within
national governments, where, for instance, the Ministry of the Interior or
Justice “does battle” with the Ministry of Health for primacy in decisions on
drugs. Within the , the rivalry is chiefly between the Commission and
the Council, with the Parliament playing a relatively marginal role at the
moment.
We have seen that both the Commission and the Council are very active
in broaching drug-related matters in relations with third countries. This is
the most striking development in drugs policy in recent years. Here too a
certain power struggle is going on. The Commission tries to impose its
authority through its first-pillar powers. But the Council also has powers in
this policy area, in the second and third pillars, and in this capacity it sets up
activities and enters into agreements with third countries or their organisa-
tions.
Drugs play a role in almost all the ’s external relations. Sometimes one
would be justified in questioning their relevance. Why, for instance, are
agreements about drugs concluded with the  countries, when hardly
any drugs reach Europe from that region? One reason sometimes given for
drugs clauses being included in agreements with countries or regions is that
it is useful to have them there in case they need amplifying at a later stage. In
other words, drugs are apparently a suitable policy area to allow for an
expansion of powers. The Commission’s drugs activities within the 
programme can be viewed in the same light.
Documents produced by the Commission and the Council state that
drugs programmes must be based on a so-called balanced approach, that is,
aimed at reducing both supply and demand. In general, the Commission
seems to display more understanding for the predicament of third coun-
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tries, while the Council places more emphasis on a “third-pillar” law
enforcement approach. According to Council documents, the Horizontal
Drugs Group stresses that its drugs programmes must be “balanced, com-
prehensive, participatory, gender-sensitive, and internationally coordinat-
ed”. Yet agreements made with third countries in the second and third pil-
lars generally emphasise supply reduction. In comparison, the Commis-
sion’s programmes tend to focus less on punitive measures and more on the
position of the third countries, emphasising demand reduction and health
issues. This difference between the Council and the Commission is in part
simply a function of their institutional powers. The Council is primarily
active in external relations in the second and third pillar, whereas the Com-
mission bears responsibility for health issues and development cooperation.
The power struggle manifested itself in the run-up to the  drugs sum-
mit  in June . The preparations for this meeting had been dis-
cussed by the Horizontal Drugs Group and Codro. The British Presidency,
which had defined drugs as a priority, tried to gain control of the ’s input
at  in order to highlight the ’s point of view. The  had drawn up
a document which it wanted adopted as representing the position of the
Council and the . The document emphasised law enforcement and was
rather strong on political rhetoric. Prime Minister Tony Blair had wanted to
deliver a fiery oration at  on the ’s behalf. However, there was too
little support in the Council for the political statement, and a compromise
was eventually forged in a watered-down and hence rather insubstantial
document. In the event it was not Tony Blair who delivered the speech. But
the Council’s report to the European Council, drafted by the British Presi-
dency, was decidedly upbeat: “Much work was done on the Political Decla-
ration, where the  took a prominent position in the production of a short
and politically useful document, to ensure maximum media impact”.
That same year the  had also presided over the 8, where it had taken the
opportunity to raise the issue of organised crime and drugs. In this frame-
work too a drugs group was set up. The same  report noted that the Presi-
dency had given a fine presentation of the ’s position in the run-up to
 at the meeting of the 8’s Group on drugs at Edinburgh on -
February .
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However, the Commission was not entirely happy about the rather incon-
sequential Council document that the  had drafted for . It there-
fore drafted one of its own, a “Communication to the Council and the Par-
liament”, intended as a basis for a joint  position at . In its clos-
ing passages the Commission asked the Council to take note of the Com-
munication and to use it as a joint platform for statements by the Commu-
nity and its member states at . Furthermore, it asked the Council to
note that it would be presenting the agreed positions on precursors at
, and said it also wanted to sign political statements adopted at the
assembly on the Community’s behalf. Reading these passages, it is impossi-
ble to avoid the impression that the Commission had felt rather passed over,
and wanted to make it clear that it too had a say in these matters, of which
the Council should take more account in future. The text also carried a dis-
tinct inference that the Commission was the appropriate party to coordi-
nate matters at .
In the event, a European Commissioner, the Spaniard Manuel Marin,
vice-president and responsible for  affairs, also made a speech at .
Ironically, it caused a political incident. Marin’s draft text contained a sen-
tence stating that prohibiting drugs did not work, but that decriminalisa-
tion was not the answer either. To a good listener, it was clear that he wanted
to launch a debate on legalisation. After protests from member states this
sentence was scrapped, but the draft text and translations had already been
distributed. So when Marin made his speech in Spanish, the interpreters
read out English and French versions which still contained the offending
sentence. Some delegations were furious, and embassies including those of
the  and France later wrote to the Commission asking whether the sen-
tence had been read out or not.
The power struggle between the Commission and the Council also rears
its head in their different plans for  drugs policy. The European Councils
of Cardiff and Vienna had asked the Council, Commission and Parliament
to devise a plan for the ’s future drug-related activities. During the 
Presidency, which had defined drugs as a priority, the Council presented its
 Drugs Strategy -. The Horizontal Drugs Group was the
Council group most involved in preparing this document. Commenting
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on its Drugs Strategy, the Council wrote that the ’s integrated and multi-
disciplinary approach to the drugs problem had now been enshrined in a
single, coherent document. As noted above (in section .), this plan had
led to the D’Ancona report and the debates about it in the European Parlia-
ment. Meanwhile, in May  the Commission presented a document of
its own, the European Union Action Plan to Combat Drugs (-).
This document too claims to give a comprehensive overview of the ’s
drug-related activities in the next few years.
The existence of these two documents has hardly served to clarify mat-
ters. The relationship between them is quite unclear. Again, they evidently
reflect a certain rivalry between the two institutions, both of which claim
responsibility for coordinating this policy area. The introduction to the
Commission’s piece emphasises that to fight drugs effectively calls for a
clear and integrated approach, suggesting that instead of everyone fighting
on all fronts and at all levels at the same time, there should be coordination
and interaction between the various actors and approaches. Here the
Commission is clearly claiming to be the most suitable body to undertake
this coordination, strengthened by the fact that since the Treaty of Amster-
dam it has also possessed the right of initiative in the third pillar. The Coun-
cil too states that it is important to strive continuously to improve coordina-
tion at all levels in drug-related matters. The difference is that the Council
does not believe that the Commission is the right body to do it. According
to the Council, the proliferation of working groups impedes effective coor-
dination in the fight against drugs and the implementation of existing
strategies. However, it states with satisfaction that the consultations on
drugs are now centralised in a cross-pillar forum, thanks to the establish-
ment of the Horizontal Drugs Group. The Council accordingly proposes
that the  should take the leadership in consultations to decide how the
drugs issue can be fitted into the institutional framework more effectively
than in the past.
Summing up, both the Council and the Commission have produced
sizeable documents containing a large number of objectives and measures
in response to the European Council’s request for such a document. Both of
them have announced all sorts of plans, which is of course a simple matter:
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producing a report does not take much time or money, and both bodies can
announce all sorts of measures and plans without incurring any accounta-
bility for them. So reams of text are produced, and dozens of agreements are
announced and promises made, but what it will all mean in practice is quite
unclear. Both plans contrive to be comprehensive while remaining low on
detail and in some places quite vague. As it would be impossible to imple-
ment all the measures that have been announced, everything depends on
the priorities that are set and implemented. At the moment, however, it is
unclear who bears responsibility for setting priorities and for coordination.
It may seem puzzling that such a struggle should be going on within the
 for competence in a specific policy area. Why do the parties not set their
sights on the ultimate goal instead of making each other’s lives difficult? But
a little familiarity with bureaucracies and the way in which they operate
makes it seem less strange. Such processes are common enough, and to a
certain extent unavoidable, in all large organisations. In any bureaucratic
environment you will find an ongoing effort on the part of different depart-
ments to expand their powers. In the struggle for primacy, clashes or fric-
tion may arise between different departments and their directors. As a
result, those involved see the way in which policy is made as a goal instead of
as a means to an end – that is, the end of formulating the best policy. These
processes manifest themselves all the more strongly within a large, interna-
tional bureaucratic apparatus, that is, in multinationals and supranational
organisations such as the  and the . Power struggles are most acute in
times of change, for instance when cuts are imposed, leading to a struggle
for survival between departments, or when an organisation is undergoing
expansion, and each department rushes to widen its own powers.
One key reason for the prominence of these mechanisms within the  is
that the “European house” is still under construction. Its expansion into
new areas of cooperation is fairly recent, and the  is therefore still in an
intermediate stage at which the balance of power and areas of competence
are not yet fully formed. Each institution and group has to secure a position
and define its relationship to the others. A contributory factor here is that
there is a certain intrinsic clash of interests between the Commission and
the Council. The Commission was set up to represent and defend the Com-
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munity’s interests. The Council and its working groups, on the other hand,
consist of the representatives of member states and their ministries, whose
aim is to uphold national interests. The Commission (which enjoys, it
should be said, the support of a few member states) wants as much as possi-
ble to formulate Community policy, whereas the Council (or more precise-
ly, most of the countries represented in it) want to formulate policy by the
intergovernmental method. This old debate between advocates of a Com-
munity-based and intergovernmental European Union lies is at the root of
this power struggle. Given their different basic principles and the process of
change in which the  has been involved for several years, it is not strange
that clashes and competition may ensue, although the Commission and the
Council ultimately pursue the same objective: the further expansion and
strengthening of the Union.
The Commission has become far more influential in recent years. The
Single European Act of  extended its powers to new policy areas
(including research and technology, environment and structural policy for
the regions), which has made it a key liaison point for organisations, enter-
prises, and local and regional authorities. Mediating between national gov-
ernments has also strengthened its position. This is something it does more
frequently than in the past, chiefly because more and more decisions are
now being taken by qualified majority vote. Its international role has also
been strengthened by the expansion of economic and commercial ties and
development cooperation. Finally, Jacques Delors’ powerful leadership in
the years - was of great significance. For ten years, the European
Commission and the s saw their powers steadily increase.
Around - a turning point became visible in this growth. Maas-
tricht created a new institutional structure, with a new constellation of
powers. The Commission found its sphere of action confined to only one of
the three pillars, while the Council’s role was expanded. The latter repre-
sents the member states, and its interests are not served by seeing the Com-
mission gain too much power. After the Delors years, the member states
believed it was time to clip the Commission’s wings. The  Guide Europe
from A to Z states that the arrival of the new Luxembourg President Jacques
Santer ushered in a new era marked by moderation and consolidation.

 Commission, Council and Parliament
Union binnen  16-11-2001  11:06  Pagina 69
Some, including the President of the , said that after Delors, what mem-
ber states wanted was a Commission that did as little as possible. In any
case, the net result of this process was a dilution of the Commission’s impor-
tance, and in itself it is understandable that this body, as the representative
of Community policy, responded by seeking to expand its powers.
The Council, of course, sees things very differently. The Council consists
of representatives of member states that, since Maastricht, no longer have
exclusive power over certain matters. Several policy areas that previously fell
within the competence of member states have been wholly or partly trans-
ferred to the . This means that member states have to forge agreement
with one another and make concessions. This new phase, which means relin-
quishing a measure of national control, will take time, and it is not strange
that it sometimes provokes a defensive response, with countries seeking to
keep as much as possible within the sphere of national sovereignty.
In practice, the diametrically opposed interests of the Commission and
Council have led to a kind of power struggle. While this obviously mani-
fests itself in various areas, it seems to be more pronounced in drugs policy
than elsewhere. Several authoritative insiders observe that drugs policy is an
attractive area, politically speaking. It may be a sensitive issue, but it is above
all a policy area that holds out scope within the : “Drugs are easy”. The
theme has gradually evolved into a fixed item in  policy, including foreign
relations. And precisely because it crops up everywhere, all the time, and
because it is a dynamic policy area, it is also a means of gaining influence
and expanding bureaucratic power.
However, there is another dimension to this power struggle over drugs.
Behind the competition between the Commission and the Council is
something else: a difference of approach to the problem. For if drugs
becomes a health issue, it will mean that the Commission will gain more
influence. Through its powers in health care the Commission has a point of
access from which it can make its influence felt. So the Commission has an
interest in fostering a health-based approach to drugs. If the emphasis ends
up more on the law enforcement side, on the other hand, the Council will
have a greater say.
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. Power and the democratic deficit
When we come to consider which of these parties has most say on drug-
related issues, the answer seems perfectly simple. It is of course the Council,
which takes all the important decisions within the . But the European
Council – the six-monthly summit of heads of government – also plays a sig-
nificant role. Formally speaking, the European Council is responsible for
defining the broad outlines of policy, while the Council makes the actual
decisions. However, the lines between them are not so clearly demarcated,
as the guidelines announced at these summits exert considerable influence
on the drugs activities of other forums within the . So it is fair to say that
the European Council effectively determines policy. The European Coun-
cil has gradually expanded its powers in recent years, doubtless in part
because it is composed of the holders of the highest political office, who are
used to taking a lead without worrying too much about any restrictions
imposed from below.
When we are discussing the Council and its influence on drugs policy,
the individuals concerned are not so much the Ministers who make the for-
mal decisions, but all the groups of officials that do the preparatory work.
As already noted, these groups exist in all three pillars. In the second pillar
drugs do not come up as a separate issue, but as part of dialogues with third
countries. They are discussed more explicitly in the other two pillars, partic-
ularly in the third.
Since decisions on subjects in the third pillar and the Horizontal Group
are taken by unanimity, it is essential to reach a consensus, which is general-
ly done in official preliminary consultations. These may take place in
Coreper or in the official working groups set up under Coreper, composed
of officials from national ministries. This means that a certain bureaucratic
power has gradually developed within the Council. The journalist Arendo
Joustra, who worked as a  correspondent for several years, makes a num-
ber of interesting observations on decision-making in his book Het Hof van
Brussel (“The Court of Brussels”). He identifies the fifteen permanent rep-
resentatives who make up Coreper as the most powerful group in the ’s
capital. According to Joustra, the real decisions are taken at this meeting of
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ambassadors, partly because the Council of Ministers has gradually reduced
the time it sets aside for actual negotiations. Within the decision-making
process, Coreper can be seen as a channel through which all decisions
reached by lower-ranking working groups have to pass before they go to the
Council. Joustra has counted more than  working groups that meet
annually to discuss some  proposals. As Coreper has to shape all deci-
sions into manageable portions for the Ministers, it plays a crucial role and
is responsible for an estimated % of all decision-making. Joustra’s book
quotes one Permanent Representative as saying that if you want good deci-
sion-making, it has to be kept out of the hands of the politicians. The s
can reach agreement more easily, as they can negotiate behind closed doors,
enabling them to deviate from their national governments’ positions.
After all, negotiations are all a matter of give and take, sometimes on the
basis of the principle “you scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours”, in which
one country’s support in a specific issue can be reciprocated in a different
one. Another important point is that negotiators have to avoid digging in
their heels: too much obstinacy will damage your position. And precisely
because Coreper’s members have to reach agreement, they must display a
measure of political flexibility, which may mean ignoring their govern-
ment’s instructions.
The same applies to some extent to the lower-ranking working groups,
which try to reach agreement before a proposal goes to Coreper. As Euro-
pean integration advances, and the Council has to decide on an ever-
expanding range of issues, it is becoming unworkable for either the Council
or Coreper to hold lengthy discussions, making it ever more important for
agreement to be reached beforehand. In other words, the real decision-
making is increasingly taking place in these working groups. Joustra quotes
a doctoral dissertation that concludes that the real power in Brussels lies
with the officials. Since the working groups too meet behind closed doors,
their members have a similar discretion in the positions they adopt.
You might expect that the position adopted by an official at a meeting has
been determined beforehand in consultation with the relevant member
state. You might also assume that the member state will have gone through
the appropriate channels of political debate in order to formulate that posi-
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tion. The reality is often quite different, however. In numerous groups rep-
resentatives adopt positions that correspond only partly, or not at all, to that
of their national governments. Officials may adopt a position on the basis
of personal convictions or because of the position adopted by someone else.
They may be guided by their own personal history and end up pursuing
some policy as a private hobby, or they may be inclined to forge a swift
agreement if they get along well. Another contributory factor is the dis-
tance between the staff at the Permanent Representation and the national
governments. If officials spend most of their time in Brussels instead of at
their national ministries, where they are constantly confronted with their
country’s policy, a gap may open up between a member state’s policy and
the positions presented in Brussels on its behalf. Officials who have been
based at the Permanent Representation for a long time have a certain power
and experience on the basis of which they believe they have the right, or
obligation, to deviate from their country’s policy.
Discrepancies of this kind often become clear when there is a shift in
national policy, for instance when there is a change of government, or a new
minister. This creates an awkward situation for the officials representing the
country in international organisations, who are at a loss to know what line
to pursue. It sometimes leads to representatives in Brussels adopting posi-
tions that lag behind changes of policy in their country or are diametrically
opposed to domestic trends. The reasons may be pragmatic: the representa-
tive may assume that the new policy will catch on very slowly and hence opt
for what seems a familiar middle road. Or he may disagree with the new
policy, or judge that the time is not ripe for it. There is yet another possibili-
ty. Member states do not always realise that their new policies have to be
communicated to their representatives in Brussels. It is not always clear to a
representative’s fellow negotiators who they are speaking to: does this per-
son represent the present government or the last one? For all these reasons it
may be some time, after a change of government, before new policy lines fil-
ter through to Brussels, which may lead to peculiar, obscure debates in the
Council’s working groups.
For instance, the change of government in Germany was not immediate-
ly reflected by changes in the German positions defended in Brussels. And
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the shifts that took place in national drugs policy in Belgium and Portugal
were not presented within the . It cannot be assumed that such changes
will be reported in the official working groups in Brussels. When France
argued in favour of a harmonisation of drugs policy, to rid the  of the lib-
eral approach of the Dutch, it received support at official level from the
Spanish and the Portuguese, even though the trend in their own countries
was closer to Dutch than French policy. Meanwhile, the Dutch officials in
the  Committee initially endorsed the harmonisation of drugs policy,
whereas the Netherlands did not support this idea at all. And when Presi-
dent Chirac called and lost an election, and had to carry on with a left-wing
government, it was some time before France started adopting different
positions in Brussels.
All this makes it clear that there are serious flaws in the harmonisation
between member states and their representatives in Brussels. It seems possi-
ble that some countries do not have inter-ministerial preparatory consulta-
tions. This has everything to do with a member state’s administrative cul-
ture. Weak administration, or a lack of administrative scrutiny in the coun-
try concerned, may be extended to Brussels. This gives representatives con-
siderable freedom in the positions they adopt.
But there is another reason for this discrepancy. It has to do with the lack
of clarity in decision-making procedures and the so-called democratic
deficit of the . In his L’esprit des lois, Montesquieu expounded his theory
of the separation of powers. This dogma is based on the belief that the only
way to guard against the abuse of power is by ensuring that it is kept in
check by another power, since all power that is not counterbalanced has the
tendency to degenerate.
As this chapter has shown, there is no such balance between the Council,
the Commission and the Parliament. For some time now, academics, jour-
nalists and others have been seriously criticising the undemocratic way in
which the  is being fashioned. If even people who work for the  have
difficulty understanding its structure and its procedures, this shows just
how difficult it is to put proper controls in place, especially since the deci-
sion-making takes place behind closed doors. Deirdre Curtin, Professor of
the Law of International Organisations at Utrecht University, has said of
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the  decision-making process, “One of the most significant problems of
the Maastricht Treaty is that citizens are increasingly confronted with the
undemocratic nature of the Union”. According to her, not only has deci-
sion-making become more opaque since Maastricht, but the legal status of
certain decisions is also unclear. 
This problem is most acute in the third pillar, where the legal force of deci-
sions, according to Curtin, appears to have been left vague on purpose, mak-
ing it possible for countries to enter into binding agreements on an ad hoc
basis. This is particularly unsatisfying, Curtin continues, as “the whole idea
behind the third pillar was to remove decisions on a number of sensitive
issues from the legal vacuum and to institutionalise them, and to introduce a
measure of coherence into the activities conducted in this area.”
Another of Curtin’s examples is the lack of scrutiny of the preparatory
negotiations conducted along the road to a resolution. The Council does not
inform Parliament until after a decision has been taken – a procedure that
Curtin calls an insult to democracy. She also refers to multilateral conven-
tions as instruments that are not conducive to transparency. As an example
she cites the Europol Convention, which was not made public until the
member states had already signed it – when it was too late for a debate. The
only solution to this problem, in Curtin’s opinion, would be to make it
mandatory to inform national parliaments about all draft decisions that
would be binding on the state, and to obtain their prior approval.
For first-pillar issues, reasonable controls are in place: the Commission is
subject to the scrutiny of the European Parliament, which also possesses the
right of codecision in a growing number of policy areas. The democratic
deficit chiefly applies to Council decisions in the second and third pillars.
Where the second pillar is concerned this is hardly surprising, since defence
and diplomacy are traditionally areas of government that fall partly outside
the range of democratic control. But the third pillar is a different matter
altogether. Decisions on cooperation between the police and judicial
authorities have a direct bearing on citizens’ rights and obligations.
It is often assumed that democratic legitimacy is safeguarded in the
Council. The  booklet Building the European Union states this as a matter
of fact, explaining that at every meeting of the Council, representatives of
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the member states, usually Ministers, are present, who are accountable to
their national parliaments and public opinion. This is a very optimistic
view, as it takes for granted that democratic legitimacy is guaranteed solely
by virtue of the fact that politicians are elected.
In reality, decision-making is more complex and less transparent, and
there is little or no direct democratic control. As this chapter has described
at length, most decisions are actually made not by Ministers but by officials.
They are prepared behind closed doors in Council working groups, which
have considerable freedom, thus creating a certain bureaucratic power. It
is far from certain that the positions adopted in official groups arise from
substantive considerations and discussion. This brings us to another aspect
of the democratic deficit, namely the lack of a “public space” or forum in
which to debate European affairs. The sociologist Abram de Swaan has said,
“Democracy is only possible by virtue of public debate in which public
opinion can be formed. And that debate is only possible if a climate of
openness exists in which people can air their feelings and thoughts.”
The democratic deficit is perhaps most acute in relation to decisions
made by the six-monthly summits, the European Council. As in the case of
the Council, the consultations and decision-making of the European
Council take place in a completely closed environment. Although formally
speaking the agreements made at these summits do not possess legal force
but are merely intended to map out contours, chapter  will show (in par-
ticular in .) that they have a decisive impact on policy decisions.
. Summary
This chapter has shown that drugs are discussed in a great many forums
within the . The Commission alone conducts a wide range of activities in
this area. Though several Directorates-General are involved, coordination
is in the hands of the Directorate-General for Justice and Home Affairs.
The Commission’s powers lie chiefly in first-pillar matters such as health
(including drugs prevention), development cooperation, precursors and
money laundering. In recent years it has raised the drugs issue with increas-
ing frequency in the ’s external relations; drugs have become a routine
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part of talks with third countries, which are required to take certain meas-
ures as a prerequisite for cooperation. This applies not only to  applicant
countries but to the developing world as well, with Latin America and the
 (African, Caribbean and Pacific countries) being designated priority
regions. In general, the Commission’s activities in relation to drugs are
rather diffuse. This is partly because it bears responsibility for different
aspects of the issue, and as a result its activities may appear to lack coher-
ence.
The Council too is active on many drug-related fronts at once. It may be
the most obscure of the ’s major institutions, but it is nonetheless proba-
bly the most important, as it is responsible for decision-making. Directly
under the Council comes Coreper, composed of the member states’ Perma-
nent Representatives to the , which prepares the decision-making. But in
practice the member states try to reach agreement earlier still, in the Coun-
cil’s working groups, which consist of officials from the member states. In
drugs policy the most important Council group is the Horizontal Group on
Drugs, set up in , which coordinates this policy area. Everything to do
with drugs has to pass through this Group before it goes to Coreper.
Although it has been a horizontal, or cross-pillar, group from the outset, the
third pillar has long played a dominant role. In  the Horizontal Group’s
cross-pillar structure became more tangible, as it started paying attention to
first and second pillar issues. Like the Commission, the Council is very
active in incorporating drug-related issues into the ’s external relations. It
conducts dialogues about drugs measures with numerous countries and
regions, in second as well as third-pillar talks.
The European Parliament has also taken an active interest in drugs in
recent years, and has set up various committees of inquiry. The  is in effect
the only place within the  apparatus in which real debate, sometimes
heated debate, takes place, as different positions are aired there in public.
The positions adopted within the  have changed quite a bit in recent
years, partly because of Sweden’s accession, and it is not clear how they will
develop. However, Parliament has only limited powers in this area. It has
the power of codecision (i.e. together with the Council) only in relation to
health issues, money laundering and precursors. In other drug-related
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issues its function is purely advisory. This restriction also applies to the par-
liamentary committee that discusses drugs most frequently, the third-pillar
committee on Citizens’ Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs. 
The many ways in which the theme is raised within the Commission, the
Council and the Parliament have caused some to comment that drugs could
not possibly be discussed more often than they already are. Within the
numerous forums all sorts of agreements are made and measures announced,
but none of it is coordinated. So “policy” is made in all sorts of ways, but the
sum total of all the policy measures and the interaction between them dis-
plays little if any coherence.
The chief “growth area” in all this activity is in the ’s external relations.
Drugs prevention receives a great deal of emphasis in talks with third coun-
tries, and measures are more or less imposed on them. The  adopts the
position that such talks should be based on a balanced approach – that is,
balancing supply and demand reduction measures and taking the third
countries’ interests into account. But it is questionable whether this works
out in practice, and whether the measures taken are not primarily a matter
of law enforcement. The documents make great play with this “balanced
approach”, creating the impression that it is in the third country’s interests.
But this too is open to question; one cannot help but get the impression that
the agreements are made largely with a view to reducing the flow of drugs to
the . In any case, given the wider issue of poverty in many Southern
countries, and the small budget that the  makes available for this bal-
anced approach, ensuring the effectiveness of demand reduction measures
is fraught with difficulty. What is more, most of these measures are third-
pillar (law enforcement) rather than first-pillar (health and development
cooperation) activities. Finally, one may question the legitimacy of the ’s
imposition of policy on countries, especially since the criminal law regime
on drugs has actually been slackened in many  countries.
There is another factor at work within the  when it comes to drugs pol-
icy. A power struggle is going on here – a battle for competence between the
Commission and the Council. Given the Commission’s powers in health
issues, it would benefit from a health-oriented approach to the drugs prob-
lem. Leaving aside this substantive difference, there is also a more general
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tussle for ascendancy going on, with both Commission and Council trying
to gain the upper hand in drugs policy. This is partly a consequence of the
process of change: the  is still “under construction” and powers have not
yet solidified. Another factor is that before Maastricht the Commission was
the most active institution in this policy area, while since then the Council
has moved to the fore. Furthermore, many forums view the drugs problem
as an excellent vehicle for expanding their influence, precisely because it is
discussed in so many different places.
At the moment, the institution that has the greatest say on drugs is the
Council. Among other things this means that law enforcement currently
takes precedence over a health-oriented approach, since the Council’s drug-
related activities are heavily biased towards the third pillar. The European
Council, the six-monthly summits of heads of state and government, is also
highly influential. Although formally speaking it only issues guidelines, its
pronouncements have a major impact on policy.
In conclusion, given the way in which decisions are made, a certain
bureaucratic power has arisen within the . The real decisions are increas-
ingly made in closed official working groups, whose members possess a sub-
stantial margin of discretion in the positions they adopt. This sometimes
produces a discrepancy between the drugs policy of a country and the posi-
tions that are put forward on that country’s behalf in Brussels. Not only is
the decision-making process hard to grasp, it is also questionable to what
extent the decisions that eventually emerge from official working groups
represent the end result of a real debate on content. This decision-making
process bears the hallmark of a democratic deficit. The groups meet behind
closed doors, and public debate is simply not part of the equation.
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
     -
 
. Introduction
This chapter will discuss in greater detail the dynamics of European deci-
sion-making on drugs and try to explain it. The first question to be dealt
with is why drugs should figure so prominently on the ’s political agenda.
The two reasons most often cited are the need to tackle organised crime, for
which drug trafficking is an important source of income, and the need to
respond to European public opinion, which surveys show to be concerned
about drug-related crime. These two points are said to have driven Euro-
pean politicians to take action. Section . will discuss both in detail.
But there are other reasons too. It will become clear that drugs are viewed
as an “attractive” political theme, because they easily lend themselves to
populism. In other words, labelling drugs a problem is politically expedi-
ent. It is to a large extent this political expediency that sends the issue to the
top of the ’s political agenda (in words, if not in action) and ensures that it
is constantly raised in talks with third countries. But the situation is more
complex still. Once drugs have been identified as a major policy issue, a
bureaucratic dynamic comes into play to preserve this prioritisation. For
the drugs issue can also serve as an instrument to increase bureaucratic
power: individuals or forums that have brought the drugs problem within
their field of competence have increased scope to expand this power. So
drugs serve a useful purpose not only for politicians but also for the officials
in charge of implementation.
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. Drugs on the political agenda
The need to tackle organised crime
It is often claimed, both in policy documents and in interviews, that the
main reason for the prominence of drugs on the ’s political agenda is the
close relationship between drugs and organised crime. Drug trafficking is
one of the primary activities and sources of income of organised crime, not
only in Europe, but worldwide. The  estimates the turnover in the inter-
national drugs trade at  $  billion. This means that drugs represent %
of world trade – a figure comparable to the automobile industry – and con-
stitute a key sector of the global economy. Criminal organisations derive
their income from a variety of sources, but drugs appear to be among the
most important.
As the  is concerned about the growing influence of organised crime, it
has declared drug trafficking a priority policy area. Policy documents regu-
larly refer to drugs as one of the biggest threats facing society. The threat is
greater still, they go on, with the forthcoming accession of countries from
Central and Eastern Europe, making it more urgent still to tackle organised
crime.
The constant repetition of this line of reasoning is rather curious, since
its logic is far from watertight. It is certainly true that organised crime takes
a keen interest in traffic in illicit drugs. This is obviously because it is such a
lucrative sector. Drugs became a part of youth culture a few decades ago,
and since then they have spread and acquired a fixed place in Western soci-
eties. The large majority of recreational users, including a great many
adults, choose to use drugs and are willing to take certain risks related to
their illegality. For many of these recreational users there is little difference
between smoking cannabis, in particular – the most popular illicit sub-
stance – and drinking alcohol. Their consumption is part of their normal
lives, and does not dominate it.
Then there is a small group of problem or compulsive drug users, for
whom drugs occupy a prominent place in their everyday lives. They persist
in this habit for a variety of reasons, in spite of the harm it may cause, for
instance to their health. It is impossible to make any sweeping generalisa-
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tions about the causes or underlying reasons for this problem drug use, nor
would it be appropriate here. It may be noted, however, that specific pop-
ulation groups account for a disproportionately large share of the addict
population. Many addicts come from minorities and other vulnerable
groups, often from poor inner-city neighbourhoods. What is more, a size-
able proportion of female addicts may be former victims of sex abuse.
Some male addicts have connections with a criminal subculture, in which
criminal behaviour and drug use have become part of a certain lifestyle.
Finally, a relatively large number of problem drug users have psychological
problems or a psychiatric disorder.
In spite of the many anti-drugs measures that have been taken nationally
and internationally, the demand for drugs has not declined. On the con-
trary, it has become more differentiated in comparison to the s and
s. This trend is related to the advent of synthetic drugs, the composi-
tion and hence effect of which can easily be varied. As the demand for the
drugs that are currently illicit is unlikely to diminish, there will always be
suppliers interested in operating in this market, whether in an organised
framework or not. Socio-economically disadvantaged groups or individuals
with few opportunities for advancement see drug trafficking as a way of
improving their position. Look at Albania, for instance, the poorest coun-
try in Europe. Over the past few years Albanian heroin networks have rap-
idly become major suppliers in the European market. The crime this gener-
ates is in part a direct result of the illegality of drugs. As long as there is a big
demand for illegal drugs, and while the current approach is maintained,
operating in this market will always be financially attractive. The reasons
that the  advances for continuing the fight against drugs crime are little
more than a circular argument: the crime that arises from criminalising
drugs is presented as a reason for continuing to criminalise them. The fact
that the current approach in a sense actually generates drugs crime is seldom
brought into discussions on policy.
Occasionally a lone voice is raised within the  that questions or
nuances the current drugs policy, such as the ’s  Cooney Report on
drug trafficking and organised crime. The Report noted that the financial
profits from drug trafficking enable criminal organisations to corrupt gov-
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ernment structures at every level and sometimes to impose conditions on
those who are responsible for making political decisions. It also alluded to
several instances in which clandestine agreements had come to light
between criminal groups and secret services and other state agencies. Cur-
rent policy had scarcely had any impact, it went on; it had not even reduced
the quantity of drug trafficking in the . The Cooney Committee there-
fore wondered whether such a reduction could be achieved by trying hard-
er, or whether it was time to explore a new approach. Without answering
this question, it called for a cost-benefit analysis of current drugs policy, an
analysis that would include the consequences of the fight against drugs.
However, in a resolution adopted in response to the Cooney Report, the
European Parliament rejected legalisation and called upon member states
to conform to the  conventions. This basically put an end to all discus-
sion, as it confirmed a general desire to continue as before. No evaluation of
drugs policy was commissioned.
A fresh, modern appraisal of the phenomenon of organised crime would
also be useful. Contrary to what is regularly suggested by politicians and the
media, organised crime is not a “hostile power infiltrating civilised Western
culture”. A better premise, deriving from the criminological literature, is
that organised crime comes from society’s demand for illegal goods and
services; it provides a provisional solution for problems that have been neg-
lected or poorly regulated by government. In other words, crime fills up
the gaps that arise in between pieces of legislation.
International drugs policy and general attitudes to crime are unlikely to
change within the foreseeable future. Organised crime will always exist, and
for the time being drugs will remain a welcome and substantial source of
income for it. This is obviously a problem for individual countries and for
the , especially in the light of people’s increasing mobility, the unstable
situations in Central and Eastern Europe, and the growth of criminal activ-
ity both targeting and within the . Notwithstanding the seriousness of
the problem of organised crime, it is legitimate to inquire whether it is truly
as serious as it is suggested within the . Several people whose work within
the  involves tackling organised crime stated when interviewed for this
book that they believed that politicians have rather exaggerated the prob-
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lem of organised crime and the seriousness of drug-related crime. It there-
fore appears that the problem has been given higher priority on the political
agenda than it merits on purely objective grounds.
Public concern
Another, related reason that is given for the  investing so much in the bat-
tle against drugs is that the European public is so concerned about it. Euro-
pean politicians and people who work in the field regularly cite opinion polls
indicating the great public concern about drugs. The booklet The European
Union in action against drugs gives an overview of the ’s anti-drugs initia-
tives. The question of why the  is taking these measures is answered in its
introductory chapter: the “active approach” to drugs, it explains, is “in
response to European citizens’ concerns” as reflected in answers to a ques-
tionnaire on a variety of issues. The results of the poll on “fears among
European citizens” cover an entire page at the beginning of the pamphlet,
with fears about “increase in drugs/organised crime” topping the list. Other
surveys supposedly reflect similar anxieties. Given the regularity with which
these polls are cited and the importance that is evidently attached to them, it
is worth dwelling on them here in detail.
The ranking order of public fears is determined by presenting intervie-
wees with a number (ranging from  to ) of possible areas of concern and
asking them whether they are personally worried about each one in turn.
According to the  poll cited in The European Union in action against
drugs, % of interviewees had fears about an “increase in drugs/organised
crime”. This was slightly higher than the percentage who feared “more
taxes” (%), and the “loss of small farms” (%). In a similar poll of fears
held in  (Eurobarometer ), increased drug trafficking and organised
crime came second (%), after tax increases (%). In a subsequent ques-
tionnaire held at the end of ,  citizens were asked which of various
policy areas they thought should be given priority. The first two places were
taken by “reducing unemployment” (%) and “fighting poverty and social
exclusion” (%). In joint third place came “fighting organised crime and
drug trafficking” and “maintaining peace and security in Europe” (%).
Finally, in  people were asked what policy areas should have priority in
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the European Parliament. Reducing unemployment clearly led the field at
%, followed by “tackling drug trafficking and crime” (%) and in third
place “protecting the environment and consumers” at %.
These polls lead to the conclusion that organised crime and drug traf-
ficking rank among the constants in the concerns and fears of the general
public. Nonetheless, the way in which the drugs theme is dealt with in these
questionnaires is open to criticism. To begin with, given the way the ques-
tions are formulated, it is hardly surprising that fears about an “increase in
drugs/organised crime” or “organised crime and drug trafficking” end up
with a high score. People are being asked here about not one but two phe-
nomena at the same time, whereas most of the other questions relate to a
single issue. One would expect this ill-considered formulation to yield a
high score. The answers also need to be seen in perspective. In the two ques-
tionnaires about public fears, the increase in drugs, drug trafficking and
organised crime had to compete with the issue of higher taxes. One would
be justified in concluding that the level of public concern in the prosperous
 is rather low. Citizens appear to have “luxury worries” rather than real
anxieties.
More important than this criticism of the content of questionnaires and
the political weight attached to them, however, is the question of whether
the explicit concerns they reflect justify  policy on drugs. After all, 
politicians point to them as a primary reason for their active anti-drugs pol-
icy. The preface to the  drugs booklet states “The fight against drugs is of
more fundamental importance today than ever before. Drugs are a source
of pain, suffering and social isolation for too many people, especially the
young. Though we cannot dispense with punitive measures, we must try to
understand the underlying social malaise and the reasons behind this
scourge if we are to develop a comprehensive strategy to combat it.”
This seems a rather curious line of reasoning, and strictly speaking it is
untenable. For what the polls express is concern about crime. If you want to
reduce this concern, you should surely focus on law enforcement, or better
still, take steps to deprive criminals of the basis for their existence. After all,
criminal organisations prosper under current policy, and it is far from clear
than tightening it up would do them much harm. In other words, if tack-
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ling organised crime were really the main aim, it would make more sense to
try a different approach altogether.
First among the measures listed, it should be added, is “action on drug
users”. This is puzzling. Why take action against drug users if citizens are
concerned about organised crime? To put it differently, can people’s fears
about an increase in organised crime, which is in part funded by drugs, justi-
fy the pursuit of a more active drugs policy? The only way these two phe-
nomena can be linked is by assuming that taking action against drug users
will reduce the demand for drugs, which would make drug trafficking less
attractive for criminal organisations. But there are no facts to back up this
assumption. There is nothing to suggest that taking action against users has
ever led to less or less frequent drug use or that it has reduced dealers’ profits.
The same  booklet on drugs policy also examines the public’s opinions
on drug use. According to the Eurobarometer survey, the public believes
that “the consumption of drugs can lead to”:
Total - year-olds
Health problems % %
Problems with the law % %






These figures supposedly reflect public opinion on the risks of drug use. The
figures in this table, however, are so improbably high as to call in question
their validity and representativeness. The answers should probably be inter-
preted as meaning that most adults and young people consider that such
consequences are conceivable; they cannot be ruled out. The above list can
therefore scarcely be regarded as giving a reliable picture of the public’s views
about drugs. The main problem here, of course, is the woolly phrase “can
lead to”, which is so suggestive as to invite an affirmative response.
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. The political use of drugs
Some European politicians are said to have been surprised, even shocked,
about the degree of public concern about drugs reflected by the various
opinion polls. But given the formulation of the questions, the presentation
of the results, and the way in which  policymakers respond to them, it is
legitimate to ask whether drugs are really such a problem, or whether they
have largely been made into one. The answer probably lies somewhere in
between. In any case, it is important to note that policymakers’ responses to
the public’s real or projected anxieties help to shape the drugs problem. By
focusing on what are perceived as the dangers of drugs, as discussed in the
previous section, they create the impression that they are taking them seri-
ously and acting accordingly. In this way they validate the poll findings,
although not a single expert would maintain that drug use is likely to have
the consequences listed in the above table.
This raises the question of the role and responsibility of leaders and
politicians. Should politicians respond objectively to unrealistic anxieties
and place them in perspective, of should they go along with the vox populi?
On the one hand, politicians should have the courage and sense of responsi-
bility to resist the tide of emotion by adopting a more objective, rational
point of view. On the other hand, they must take the public’s concerns
seriously and take initiatives based on their political responsibility, for
instance by placing the subject on the political agenda. This will reassure
citizens that their voices have been heard. But just how far politicians
should go is the key question, as the slippery slope of populism is never far
away.
For it is undeniable that the idea of drugs can strike fear into the general
public and create a sense of insecurity. This is particularly true of older peo-
ple who have no experience of drugs, parents who are worried about what
their children may encounter, and members of small communities. The
same paradox can arise with drugs as with immigrants: the more unfamiliar
something is and the less likely one is to come across it, the more fear it pro-
vokes. Big city dwellers are more familiar with the phenomenon and can
often put it in perspective. A questionnaire held in eleven European cities
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on drug problems, policymakers and public opinion revealed that people
who do not encounter drug-related nuisance are more in favour of strong
law enforcement measures than those who are confronted with it. What is
more, people who have themselves tried illicit drugs favour a health-orient-
ed approach rather than punitive measures – even more so if they have some
experience of drug-related nuisance. And since young adults and relatively
well-educated people have in general experimented more with drugs than
people of older generations and those with less education, the former are
more in favour of a health-oriented approach than the latter.
The fact that drugs can provoke feelings of unease, especially among peo-
ple who have had little or nothing to do with them, makes them a potent
political issue. By emphatically referring to drugs as a problem or by magni-
fying the problems that do exist – whether deliberately or not – politicians
exploit and inflame these fears. Noam Chomsky has remarked that one of
the most traditional and clearest ways of controlling people in societies is by
frightening them, something easily achieved with the drugs issue. People
in politics set out to acquire power to achieve certain ends, and drugs can
serve a useful role in this endeavour. The subject has ranked high on the
political agenda in the United States for many years. In the  presiden-
tial election, the Republican candidate Dole used the rise in experimental
drug use among young people as one of his main weapons against Clinton.
As the economy was doing well and unemployment and violent crime were
on the wane, the opposition needed other ammunition with which to
attack Clinton. By accusing Clinton of being “soft on drugs” and present-
ing himself as “tough on drugs”, like Reagan and Bush before him, the
Republican hoped to win votes. Clinton’s answer was to “out-tough Dole
on drugs”: he adopted an even more rigorous approach, which he under-
scored by appointing four-star general Barry McCaffrey as drugs czar, coor-
dinator of national drugs policy.
The political use of drugs in Europe is somewhat more muted, but it cer-
tainly exists. In France the phrase discours de securité refers to the bold and
uncompromising rhetoric that politicians adopt when speaking about cer-
tain problems or threats to society, such as violence, terrorism or drugs. The
chief spokesman is generally the Minister of the Interior, a job that therefore
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tends to go to a forceful, unyielding individual. By claiming that he will
tackle the problem or “evil” rigorously, and by creating a strong police pres-
ence in the streets, he sets out to reassure certain sections of the community.
This presents the image of a politician who takes his responsibilities serious-
ly and protects the general public. The far right Front Nationale has used
this discours de securité skilfully in recent years, attracting voters away from
traditional right-wing parties, which have therefore been obliged to
respond in kind. This is part of the explanation for President Chirac’s rigid
stance on drugs and his unflagging efforts to harmonise European drug pol-
icy along French lines.
In Swedish politics too, drugs became a major election theme in the s
and s, with parties trying to outdo one another in the severity of the
punitive measures they advocated. As a result, Sweden now has the harshest
anti-drugs legislation in the . Throughout this process, drugs were
increasingly labelled as a problem, although prevalence statistics and other
indicators did not point to a growing problem. In their book on the harsh
anti-drugs policy of several Scandinavian countries, Bruun and Christie call
drugs and drug addicts “the ideal enemy”. Starting from the premise that
no phenomenon is a problem until it is labelled as such, they posit that the
drugs issue has acquired the role of the perfect social problem because of the
lack of any power or influential lobby arguing an alternative point of view.
The authors list several characteristics of the perfect social problem: there is
no one standing up for the “enemy”; the fight against the problem confers
prestige; the battle is largely paid for by underprivileged groups; and the
lifestyle of the majority is not disrupted by it. Finally, the problem can be
used to explain all manner of social ills, such as problems associated with
young people, crime, poverty and violence.
It would be going too far to suggest that the ’s drugs policy can be
entirely explained in this way. Nonetheless, this approach can clarify the
role that drugs sometimes play in our society. There is a distinct mechanism
at work in the  tending towards a demonisation of drugs on political
grounds. Given the remoteness of  decision-making to ordinary citizens,
as reflected in questionnaires and above all in  parliamentary elections, 
leaders and policymakers have even more need than their national counter-
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parts of themes with which they can enhance their image and reach the elec-
torate. Drugs, with all the fears and insecurities they may arouse among the
general public, are undoubtedly a good vehicle for populism. And partly for
this reason, drugs and drug use are now regarded by definition as a problem
in  politics – so much so that it has become quite customary for  drugs
documents to start out by identifying drugs as a major threat to society or
even to humanity.
. The genesis of political agendas
The above discussion has shown that drugs rank high on the ’s political
agenda. Let us now turn to look at the precise mechanism that puts them
there. Which individuals or forums are actually responsible? From the
many interviews conducted in the course of researching this book, and
from numerous  documents, it is clear that politicians bear primary
responsibility. The European Council and the rotating six-monthly Presi-
dency are particularly significant, since the country holding the Presidency
is expected to take political initiatives during its term of office. The follow-
ing section will show that the drugs issue is a useful theme that enables
politicians to tackle national issues through  channels.
The European Council
Every six months, and sometimes more frequently, the government leaders
meet at what is called the European Council, chaired by the President of the
European Commission. The venue is the country holding the Presidency.
The Presidents of Finland and France are the only heads of state in the
European Council, and they are accompanied by their prime ministers.
The heads of government are accompanied by their foreign ministers, and
the foreign relations Commissioner is generally also in attendance.
The European Council initially had no formal status. But this changed,
partly as a result of its own gradual appropriation of more powers, with the
entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty on  May . Officially, it is the
Council of Ministers that takes the ’s actual decisions, with the European
Council only issuing guidelines for future action. However, these terms are
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relative and fairly flexible: while the European Council cannot make legally
binding decisions, its pronouncements have an enormous influence on poli-
cy. In part this is undoubtedly because the heads of government are at the top
of the pyramid and are therefore accustomed to having a great deal of power.
Sometimes the European Council does actually make formal decisions, in
particular when the Council of Ministers has failed to reach agreement.
Where drugs are concerned, the European Council plays a key role in
mapping out the political course to be followed, for instance by proposing
new initiatives or calling for some matter to be investigated. Its proposals
often have far-reaching consequences and help determine the dynamics of
the ’s political agenda. Section . discussed this mechanism in relation
to the period before the Maastricht Treaty: it was at the Strasbourg Euro-
pean Council in  that President Mitterrand proposed the establish-
ment of the anti-drugs committee . Although the committee had a
poorly defined status and was set up outside  structures, it played an
important part in the development of the ’s policy on drugs.  pre-
pared the first and second Action Plans to Combat Drugs that were adopted
at the European Councils of Rome () and Edinburgh () respective-
ly, and it was  that launched the .
At the Cannes European Council of June  the heads of government
decided that an annual progress report on drugs should be presented at
future summits. Since then drugs have been a recurrent theme at every Euro-
pean Council. Although the heads of government arrive at such agreements
jointly, the President’s influence is crucial, as he determines the agenda. The
Cannes European Council was hosted by President Chirac of France, who
attached great political importance to the drugs issue and was highly instru-
mental in setting the new trend. Chirac enjoyed the support of Chancellor
Kohl of Germany as well as the British and Irish Prime Ministers.
It was this same European Council that adopted in broad outline the new
European Global Plan of Action in the Fight against Drugs (-).
The heads of government asked the “national drugs experts” to work out
the details. The original plan contained  measures,  of which related to
public health. However, these latter  were not adopted at the summit. So
all the measures that were adopted had a punitive slant, as a result of which

 The Dynamics of European Decision-making on Drugs
Union binnen  16-11-2001  11:06  Pagina 91
the special group of national drugs experts effectively became a third-pillar
group. (It was from this body that the Horizontal Drugs Group would
eventually be formed.) The  health-related measures of the original plan
were subsequently adopted at the Madrid European Council of December
, but under the Italian Presidency they were later moved to the drugs
prevention action plan -.
Although the drugs prevention action plan is officially part of the imple-
mentation of the Plan of Action in the Fight against Drugs, in fact the two
operate separately. Basically, then, two distinct anti-drugs plans were creat-
ed: a cross-pillar Plan of Action that in practice was strongly oriented
towards the third pillar and ran from  to , and a first-pillar drugs-
prevention programme that started a year later and ran from  to .
Hence the agreements made at successive European Councils were at the
root of the distinction that was introduced between health-related and
punitive aspects of drugs policy. Since health aspects were initially excluded
from the Plan of Action, their implementation started a year later. This also
affected the working groups: in the Horizontal Drugs Group, for instance,
for instance, health matters were somewhat marginalised for a long time.
The Madrid European Council of December  adopted yet another
anti-drugs measure. Jacques Chirac and John Major, with the support of
the Dutch prime minister Wim Kok, launched a Plan of Action for the
Caribbean. At Spain’s request Latin America was later added, leading to the
creation of the Coordination and Cooperation Mechanism on Drugs for
the Caribbean and Latin America. The Caribbean is the region in which
international cooperation is furthest advanced, including consultations
with the  and the  . At Madrid it was also proposed that the drugs
problem would in future be incorporated into the ’s foreign policy.
At the Florence European Council of June , the heads of government
called for research to be carried out on the harmonisation of drugs legisla-
tion. Later, in Madrid, this was changed into a study of the desirability of har-
monisation. In Florence, France had submitted a memorandum on a Euro-
pean social model advocating the harmonisation of national legislation on
drugs. As we have seen, the question of harmonisation was raised several
times after that. This European Council too decided to engage in third-pillar
cooperation with Russia and the other New Independent States.
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At the Dublin European Council of December , Chirac and Major
proposed a Plan of Action on Drugs for Central Asia, focusing on ways of
curbing production and trafficking. This summit also agreed on the impor-
tance of defining an  strategy on organised crime, and established a High-
Level Group to map out the main policy outlines in an action plan. At the
Amsterdam European Council of June  this plan was adopted and a
Multidisciplinary Group created to implement it. One of the plan’s recom-
mendations was to inaugurate a pre-accession pact on organised crime;
countries wanting to join the  would have to meet certain conditions,
including signing the  drugs conventions.
At the Cardiff European Council of June , the main outlines of 
drugs strategy were determined for the period after . The European
Council then asked the Council of Ministers, the Commission and the 
to work out the details. The Commission responded with its Action Plan to
Combat Drugs -. Meanwhile, the Council responded with a sep-
arate document on  Drugs Strategy after , added to which the Parlia-
mentary Committee on Citizens’ Freedoms and Home Affairs issued a
report of its own and adopted a number of resolutions. The next stage is for
the reports issued by the Commission and the Council to be discussed at a
European Council. However, so many measures have been announced that
it is unclear – especially in view of the limited budget – what they will
amount to in practice. It is equally unclear which body will bear final
responsibility for implementing one or more of the plans.
This overview demonstrates the European Council’s immense influence
on the ’s political agenda. Although its decisions are formally non-bind-
ing, in practice it often functions as the highest body in the European
Union. With their guidelines and agreements, the heads of government
meeting at the European Council do much to determine the ’s political
priorities and to ensure that the drugs issue ranks high on the list.
The Presidency
The system whereby each member state in turn holds the Presidency of the
 for six months at a time also has considerable influence on policy. Dur-
ing this period the country presides not only over the Council of Ministers
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but all the ’s other forums as well. The Presidency is primarily of impor-
tance in the second and third pillars, since it is the member states that take
the initiatives there. Many insiders describe the Presidencies as crucial to
the setting of priorities. What is at issue here is far more than mere chair-
manship. The Presidency draws up agendas for meetings and prepares doc-
uments that create a framework for discussion, and is expected to make a
variety of proposals. In practice other countries leave a great deal to the Pres-
idency, and their own interventions tend to be rather passive unless a coun-
try knows from the outset that it is fiercely opposed to a particular proposal.
Every Presidency is eager to enhance its image during these six months.
After all, it will be a long time before the opportunity comes around again –
seven years with the current fifteen member states, and after enlargement it
will be longer still. So any good Presidency needs a few striking initiatives.
This image building has two sides to it. One is impressing other member
states with the country’s vision and vigour. Of equal importance, however,
is bolstering the country’s image in relation to public opinion and the media
at home. Particularly since “Europe” is remote from the experience of many
of its citizens, it is important for the country to come up with some
resounding new proposals. This is reinforced by the close scrutiny of politi-
cians, and above all of the media, in the home country. So it makes good
political sense for the Presidency to raise some important national themes
within a European framework; it shows the people at home the importance
of the Presidency and brings “Europe” closer to their world. Drugs are a use-
ful theme when it comes to image building. Several Presidencies have pri-
oritised the drugs problem in recent years, as a result of which the issue
appears to have undergone a degree of inflation.
We have already discussed France’s persistent concern with the drugs
issue. The authors of The Gentlemen’s Club identify France as one of the
main countries (after the  and the ) that have actively pursued the
cause of international drugs control. Unlike the , say, which has tended
to favour regulation, France emerges as a traditional advocate of a total ban
on drugs. It has consistently argued this position in international forums
and has made a series of proposals in this line. In  President Pompidou
launched the Pompidou Group within the Council of Europe, which Presi-
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dent Mitterrand took as his inspiration almost twenty years later, in ,
when he inaugurated  at the Strasbourg European Council.
Mitterrand’s successor Jacques Chirac has likewise proved a passionate
advocate of a harmonised European policy on drugs, based on a ban and
strict punitive measures. It should be added that Chirac is also, or perhaps
primarily, motivated by personal and electoral considerations. His family
history has given the President a fierce aversion to drugs and to a liberal
approach such as that of the Netherlands. At the same time he hoped to use
the issue to gain a political victory in a classic theme in French politics, as
discussed in the previous section. At the Cannes European Council the
French Presidency placed drugs on the political agenda by launching the
European Global Plan of Action in the Fight against Drugs (-).
This was the summit that inaugurated the periodic progress reports that
made drugs a fixed theme at every European Council. The French President
has regularly sought to keep drugs on the European agenda since then, gen-
erally by advocating harmonisation. French politicians have emphasised
the importance of the  harmonising drugs policy so strongly that many
French people evidently assume that the decision to do so has already been
taken.
Ireland accorded great importance to the drugs issue during its Presiden-
cy, during which no fewer than  proposals were adopted concerning it.
This should be seen in the context of the national political situation. A
sharp rise had been reported in the use of drugs, particularly of heroin,
among the Irish population, which is very young in  terms. Added to this
was Ireland’s outdated drugs legislation, which the Presidency sought to
modernise by making agreements at European level. Opinions were further
inflamed by the murder of a journalist who had been investigating drug
trafficking in Ireland, which galvanised Dublin’s political circles. All in all,
drugs had become a hot item in Ireland, and by adopting an active stance on
drugs during its  Presidency, Ireland could move forward on this sensitive
domestic issue.
Meanwhile, agreements on harmonising drugs policy were concluded in
the  Committee. While originally advocated by France, the plans had
enjoyed Ireland’s support. They were later revoked as the Netherlands refused
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to sign up to them. Then the Dublin European Council of December 
decided (albeit in response to a French-British proposal) to launch an action
plan for Central Asia, focusing on the fight to curb the production and traf-
ficking of drugs. Preliminary steps were taken at this summit towards formu-
lating a  strategy on organised crime. Finally, at the Dublin European
Council the results were presented, and the recommendations adopted, of a
report on the comparability of drugs legislation.
The Netherlands too used its Presidency to tackle a domestic problem.
The agreements on the harmonisation of drugs policy that had originally
been reached in the  Committee could have forced the Netherlands to
change its policy on cannabis. That the Dutch Ministry of Justice had
endorsed them without consulting the Health Ministry was partly related
to the competition between the two ministries in this policy area. While
the Netherlands was able to correct this later on, it had blotted its copybook
in the eyes of other member states. To prevent any recurrence of this embar-
rassing lack of coordination between ministries, the Dutch Presidency pro-
posed the launch of a Horizontal Drugs Group.
One of the conclusions of the working conference on the comparability
of legislation that presented its results at the Dublin European Council was
that there was no need to harmonise legislation on drugs. However, dele-
gates agreed that it might be useful to develop a control system for synthetic
drugs. The Netherlands was worried that this might eventually lead to a
largely punitive system, which might compel it to alter its drugs policy. It
therefore proposed an early warning mechanism for new synthetic drugs.
Since the Netherlands was known not only for its liberalism in relation to
drugs but also as a major producer of synthetic drugs, it also hoped that this
move would ingratiate it with other member states. By taking an initiative
on synthetic drugs it demonstrated that it was taking the problem seriously.
The  Presidency likewise prioritised the fight against drugs – at least, it
appeared to do so in the documents drafted during its six-month term. In
retrospect this was largely a matter of rhetoric, however: the  did little
about drugs in terms of specific measures or agreements. It seems very likely
that the  too referred to the subject as a priority in order to score political
points at home. The ’s primary achievements in the sphere of drugs were
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the preparations for  (at which the  however failed to make a
strong political statement) and the drafting of the Drugs Strategy Plan
-. The European Councils of Cardiff and Vienna had asked the
Council, the Commission and the Parliament to develop a post- plan
for  action on drugs. The Council’s response was largely formulated by
the Horizontal Group. All in all, the activities and priorities of the British
Presidency seemed very much aimed at the press and public opinion in the
outside world. Some documents actually say as much. One reference to
 described it as a “politically useful document, to ensure maximum
media impact”. This comment probably relates to the style of govern-
ment adopted by New Labour under Tony Blair, which accords consider-
able political importance to public relations and media policy.
Finally, under the Austrian and German Presidencies, drugs retained
their prominent place on the agenda, but less so than in previous Presiden-
cies. Some shifts of emphasis emerged in these twelve months. Demand
reduction was accorded a more prominent place than before during Aus-
tria’s Presidency, a trend consolidated by Germany.
. Drugs and the dynamics of bureaucracy
We have seen that organised crime and public concern about drugs – leav-
ing aside the question of how great that concern really is – have forced Euro-
pean politicians to define drugs as a problem and as a priority on their polit-
ical agendas. Sometimes a country will accord the issue prominence within
the  partly to satisfy domestic public opinion. It may do so during its
Presidency or its head of government may raise the matter at the European
Council.
But there is another mechanism at work in this process, and that is the
power of  bureaucracy. Although politicians determine the broad out-
lines of policy, they are far less involved in implementation and in the ardu-
ous process of forging compromises between the fifteen member states. As
was described in chapter , this task lies largely in the hands of officials from
the member states who belong to the Council’s working groups in Brussels,
or those who work directly for the , whether for the Commission or the

 The Dynamics of European Decision-making on Drugs
Union binnen  16-11-2001  11:06  Pagina 97
Council. The ’s committees and working groups have mushroomed to
such an extent as to compromise the transparency of decision-making. This
proliferation is to a large extent due to the process of “comitology”, whereby
the Commission is assisted by committees of experts from the member
states when it is formulating measures to implement legislative acts. A
grand total of  committees could be counted in . Given these offi-
cials’ key role in the negotiation and decision-making process, they can be
said to possess a certain bureaucratic power. This is strengthened by the
superior knowledge of these officials, who have permanent jobs, in compar-
ison to politicians with their rotating jobs. Max Weber wrote that it is the
bureaucracy, the officials, that constitute the real power behind the throne
of every large organisation.
The power of officialdom is exemplified by the Council secretariat. The
Maastricht Treaty gave the  competence in a number of new policy areas,
and the role of the Council, and hence its secretariat, has steadily grown in
importance since then. Strictly speaking this secretariat ought to be nothing
more than a body of officials whose task it is to support the Council and its
working groups. Yet its strategic position in the Council’s apparatus has
given it substantial influence on policy. One of its tasks is helping the Presi-
dency prepare documents, which in itself provides scope for exerting influ-
ence – especially since the Presidency changes every six months, while the
secretariat is a permanent body with a finger in every pie. It should be borne
in mind that the officials of the country holding the Presidency have gener-
ally had little or no experience with it. Even if the country has held the posi-
tion before, it will have been at least seven years ago, and its experienced
officials will have gone on to fresh pastures. To the newcomers the secretari-
at is a tower of strength, with its thorough knowledge of key aspects of poli-
cymaking and the Presidency: it is familiar with the policy areas and differ-
ent member states’ attitudes to them, and it knows how to make compro-
mises and formulate texts. In practice, the Presidency will tend to delegate
some of its tasks to the secretariat.
For the secretariat – even more than for Coreper – compromise is the all-
important goal. While Coreper has to navigate between a country’s nation-
al interests and a possible compromise within the , the secretariat is total-
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ly single-minded. Little concerned by the interests of individual member
states, it adopts a totally pragmatic attitude. Some people working within
the  feel that it on occasion abuses or overstretches its mandate. Coun-
tries are sometimes aggrieved by a sense that the secretariat takes too little
account of them. What is more, the secretariat’s approach, geared as it is
towards results and rapid decision-making, sometimes provokes irritation
at the Commission, which may feel that it has been passed over. Once the
Commission is involved in a decision, documents have to be processed by
the slow wheels of its machinery, and the European Parliament too might
have to be given a say. It is precisely because of the Commission’s circuitous
and time-consuming procedure that the Council often prefers to keep files
in its own hands, manoeuvring them through the appropriate channels
with informal telephone calls. That this goes faster is undeniably true, but
results are achieved by bypassing what are essentially democratic safe-
guards. What is more, the secretariat’s key role tends to reduce to a mini-
mum all deviations from the safe middle course, diminishing the likelihood
of any innovative proposal.
Sections . and . discussed the power struggle between the Commis-
sion and the Council, the outcome being that the Council now has more
say where drugs are concerned. It also described the decision-making proce-
dure and the issue of bureaucratic power. Some indeed claim that the offi-
cials hold the real power in Brussels; the Permanent Representatives to the
 have been called the “fifteen wise men” of Europe. While politicians
are responsible for putting drugs on the ’s political agenda, it is officials
who keep them there. A political decision on drugs in the  sets in motion
an inexorable bureaucratic mechanism from which the issue, once sucked
in, is unlikely to emerge in the foreseeable future. Whenever the European
Council announces some new initiative, it triggers a process at the Com-
mission or the Council – or both, as in the case of the dual documents spun
by the announcement of the  drugs strategy. The Commission feels
obliged to make a proposal in the spirit of the announcement, a proposal
that will then be discussed not only in diverse departments of the Commis-
sion’s Directorates-General, but in several of the Council’s working groups
as well.
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As noted above (in .), the power struggle between Commission and Coun-
cil in this policy area is related to the fact that the ’s different institutions
are still under construction. Drugs are not so much a problem that needs
tackling in its own right as a means for the institutions to expand their power.
This is quite obvious in the case of the Commission, which seizes on the issue
or particular aspects of it to exert and extend its influence. The Council, on
the other hand, tries to keep things as much as possible in its own hands. This
power struggle is also influenced by the ’s administrative culture. One
spokesman who has worked within the  for many years commented on its
“Latin” style of administration, and equated it with the style inculcated by
the École Nationale d’Administration. This basically means focusing on sur-
vival – always trying to be one step ahead of everyone else.
Once a body has acquired a foothold of competence in one drug-related
theme, it has an opportunity to expand it to others, or to similar policy
areas, to which the multi-faceted drugs issue serves as something of a portal.
Conveniently, it can rest assured that drugs will remain on the political
agenda, since they belong, like unemployment, to the class of permanently
insoluble problems – although, as argued above, this applies only as long as
the consumption of certain psychoactive drugs is seen by definition as a
problem. And since they provide politicians with so much scope to “score”
(in which sense drugs have been likened to child pornography), there is sure
to be a steady stream of proposals. For the officials concerned, this means
that though ever-present, this field is never dull; on the contrary, it is always
a busy and topical policy area with a certain imaginative appeal. Most offi-
cials find it more interesting than a traditional  policy area such as agri-
culture, for instance. Working on the Declaration of Cochabamba, for
instance (a drugs agreement concluded between the  and the Rio Group
in ) is more exciting than negotiating agriculture subsidies. And there
are other things that make drugs an attractive policy area. The prestige
attached to working for a good cause, for one thing. Ambitious officials or
diplomats also regard it as a useful stepping-stone in their careers. The
multi-faceted nature of the drugs problem means that they gain experience
in several different areas and make numerous international contacts – ideal
for anyone building up a network. Drugs also provide an opportunity to

Drugs and Decision-Making in the European Union
Union binnen  16-11-2001  11:06  Pagina 100

 The Dynamics of European Decision-making on Drugs
travel, especially now that the  is making so many agreements on drugs
control with countries all over the world.
For all these reasons, it is in the interests of the many groups and individ-
uals that concern themselves with the drugs issue in the , and vie for com-
petence in the area, to keep things as they are. Neither the constant discus-
sions nor the agreements with third countries have led to any substantial
improvements. Drugs as a problem is pumped around the ’s bureaucracy
without the effectiveness of the measures and agreements ever being
demonstrated. But although a solution to the problem seems as far away as
ever, this does not lead to despondency or to a debate on a possible change
of course, since change would not be in the interests of those concerned. On
the contrary – for individuals and groups within the  that concern them-
selves with drugs, the issue fulfils a certain function, and they have a stake in
preserving the status quo.
. A vicious circle
Max Weber wrote at length about bureaucracies and the way they operate.
Though dating from the early th century, many of his analyses can be
applied to present-day society and the way it is governed. In particular, his
insights into the significance of bureaucracy, the mechanisms at work in it
and the potential dangers it poses, especially to democracy, are still extreme-
ly valuable today. Bureaucracy was originally created as means of furthering
justice and equal rights. But it gradually developed a dynamic of its own
and made its influence felt in an increasing number of places in society,
eventually becoming an apparatus that was no longer amenable to con-
trol. Weber used the term Schicksal (fate) in connection with such mecha-
nisms: human beings set in motion social developments that they are later
unable to control. He also believed that a fully-fledged bureaucracy is one of
the most indestructible of all social structures.
The attitude to drugs within the  has set in motion such a strong inter-
nal dynamic that the likelihood of a different approach to the problem
being adopted in the foreseeable future is very slim. Officials have a certain
amount of leeway in the confidential Council working groups, which
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sometimes leads to a discrepancy between national policy and the positions
adopted by the country’s representatives in Brussels. The fact that changes
in a member state’s national policy do not automatically filter through to
the meetings held in Brussels is part of the internal dynamic. Some officials
interviewed for this book were unaware of all sorts of developments in other
member states because those countries’ representatives had said nothing
about them. Some had not even heard about the policy of tolerating soft
drugs adopted by Belgium – even though its government is in Brussels! And
yet they regularly travel to Brussels to discuss drugs policy in the  member
states. One gets the impression that within these forums, a specific, almost
ritualistic approach to the drugs problem is mandatory. People want to con-
tinue along the familiar path without getting into fundamental questions
about the point of it all.
Examples of other self-perpetuating systems are not hard to find. Such a
system becomes so complex, it consists of so many participants with their
own interests, that the entity as a whole not only sustains itself but acquires
its own momentum and gradually expands. One example is the military
industrial complex in the United States – the system of the arms industry
together with the employment it generates and the powerful lobby that
keeps the industry great. A more recent example is the prison industrial
complex in the United States. This industry has grown to such an extent,
and combines so many different interests, that it too has become self-sus-
taining. Following a wave of privatisations, prisons have become a major
branch of industry that has quite simply developed into an attractive
growth market. Prison companies have to compete for the contract in a par-
ticular state. Since their goal is to make a profit, the product is supplied for
as low a price as possible (resulting in cheap prisons, sometimes in camps)
for a maximum yield (with prisoners working on the roads in chain gangs,
for instance). As these companies look on prisoners as profit-making fac-
tors, they have an interest in keeping their jails full. And since increasing
numbers of jails are private companies, a large commercial and employ-
ment interest has been generated in maintaining and even expanding
prison numbers. The interest that should really be at stake, that of creating a
peaceful society and preventing people from ending up in jail, and if they
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do end up there of ensuring that they are rehabilitated as well as possible, is
no longer of prime importance in this situation.
Of course there are many differences between the commercialised 
prison system and the way in which the  tackles the drugs problem, but
the mechanism at work is basically the same. So many parties are now
involved in every aspect of policy in the  today that a sort of perpetual
motion machine has been created. Changing any part of it is becoming
increasingly difficult. The situation can endure, since there is no holistic
vision or central orchestrating agency. The development of a holistic vision
is impeded by the fact that so many parties are involved in the current poli-
cy, especially since they all pursue their own ends and sometimes obstruct
each other. Understandably, the results are insubstantial and incoherent.
Another part of the bureaucratic dynamic is that what counts for those
involved is not the end result but their own role, the link they form in the
chain. The larger the organisation and the more people join a system, the
stronger are the interests in favour of preserving the status quo.
 booklets sometimes assert that the ’s bureaucracy is not really that
big – that it has no more officials than a city the size of Stockholm. Howev-
er, there is a big difference between the work and dynamics of a local
authority such as that of the city of Stockholm and those of an international
organisation such as the . Local authorities concern themselves with
highly practical matters. If these are not carried out, the people responsible
will be called to account. Since numerous channels connect local authori-
ties to those involved with day-to-day practicalities, shortcomings generally
come to light quite soon. Take refuse collection, for instance. If a city adopts
an inadequate policy on refuse collection and the system breaks down,
those in charge will soon face repercussions. In the , on the other hand,
there is a large gap, and plenty of background “interference”, between offi-
cials and everyday life: there are no clear, direct channels connecting them.
The ’s administrators are far higher up the hierarchy. Their responsibili-
ties have to do with defining broad lines of policy, distributing money to
other organisations in different countries, and in general delegating and
contracting out a great many tasks. As a result, if something fails to work
properly, it will not be noticed straight away; in fact it may not be noticed at
all, with the result that no one will be called to account.
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To stay with rubbish for a moment, let us look at a fictional example of
European refuse collection policy. Suppose that the  is planning to har-
monise refuse collection throughout the Union. Perhaps politicians have
decided that closer integration means that countries must have identical
refuse collection systems. They might advance practical reasons as well: per-
haps some noxious virus has originated from bacteria found in household
rubbish. The risk to public health could be so great that the Council of the
 decides that refuse collection, transport and incineration in all  coun-
tries must henceforth conform to strict European rules. Before this policy
can be implemented, of course, a comprehensive list will be needed of the
refuse collection services in all member states. The next step is to perform a
feasibility study to find out whether harmonisation is possible. Part of the
work is contracted out to specialist consultancies. Gradually, hundreds of
people and numerous forums become involved in the project. Working
groups of experts are created, largely first-pillar groups since it is a public
health matter. But the third pillar is also involved, as the police and judici-
ary bear joint responsibility for enforcement, to guard against refuse being
taken to illegal dumps inside or outside the . And to prevent illegal trans-
ports of contaminated refuse to countries outside the  the second pillar
will also come into action, as agreements must be made with third coun-
tries. So eventually all sorts of people will be working on the many aspects of
the problem, from collection services, transport and incineration to safety,
research, public health and enforcement.
The point is that by this time, something has been set in motion that is
almost impossible to stop. So many people are working on the project, and
so much money is being invested in it, that substantial interests are now
involved. The fact that there are money and power to be distributed gener-
ates competition between different parts of the ’s bureaucracy. If har-
monisation breaks down, for instance because it turns out to be insuffi-
ciently tailored to local conditions, this will not lead to a rapid rethink of
the whole approach. The problems will be most obvious at local level, and
the  is unlikely to be called to account. Even if certain clear-headed indi-
viduals conclude at some point that it would be better, after all, for refuse
collection to be regulated at national or local level, the harmonisation plan
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is unlikely to be ditched, since too many interested parties would oppose
such a move. The harmonisation project would by then be many people’s
livelihood, which they would not want to lose. What is more, when a proj-
ect involves such large numbers of people, in the  as well as in member
states, it becomes hard to determine who is really in charge. Added to this,
perhaps, is the fact that the heads of government have nailed their colours to
the mast of harmonisation, something that has received extensive media
coverage throughout Europe. Since heads of government hate suffering a
loss of face, they will not want to consider throwing the whole project over-
board, especially with a view to forthcoming elections.
The fictional situation sketched above provides a good illustration of the
way in which the drugs issue is dealt with in the . Numerous individuals
and forums have become dependent on the current approach through their
work, and they have therefore become part of the system that preserves it.
They automatically oppose any change, for fear of losing their jobs. They
are imprisoned, as it were, in the machinery of their bureaucratic system.
The British historian Theodore Zeldin once commented on the  in gen-
eral, “Brussels is full of intelligent, well-meaning people. If you talk to them
they are full of ideals, but they are prisoners of the system.” A clear indica-
tion of this, where drugs are concerned, is the lack of any debate on the poli-
cies pursued. It is quite unclear whether all the measures that are in place
have any impact, and this issue is rarely discussed. This is quite odd, when
you consider the heavy burden drug-related measures place on the police
and judiciary, the poor results that have been achieved with crop replace-
ment projects, the fact that the supply of drugs seems to be increasing rather
than diminishing, and the criticism that has been levelled of international
drugs policy, from academic circles in particular. Although some of those
involved,  officials as well as representatives of member states, do feel that
the current policy is not the answer, and that it creates problems of its own,
they rarely air these views with other  colleagues; it appears to be impossi-
ble to debate the matter.
One reason for the absence of any debate on drugs policy is the general
lack of expertise on the subject. Most of those involved in decision-making
know little about drug use and the different patterns of consumption; they
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are barely acquainted with standard works on drugs, or the literature on the
history of drug use and regulatory control. This lack of knowledge makes a
discussion of the drugs problem among officials a rather dreamlike or surre-
alistic affair to anyone who does possess expertise on the subject. Some of
the people interviewed for this book who are well-read in the drugs field
(and they count as rare exceptions) complained of the lack of expertise of
most of their colleagues – the ’s bureaucracy contains too few specialists
and too many ill-informed technocrats. The latter’s eagerness to come to
grips with the drugs problem sometimes produces absurd proposals. For
instance, one working group drew up a list of substances that needed to be
banned because they were used in the production of drugs – it included
oxygen!
Another aspect that becomes clear when we look at specific measures is
that  decision-makers are ill-informed about what is being done outside
the Brussels machinery. In fact their approach lags behind developments in
many  member states, especially at local level. Numerous authorities
throughout the  have opted for a pragmatic approach, for instance by
according low priority to investigations of drug use. And while several 
member states have shifted the emphasis of drugs policy towards health
aspects, the  itself still focuses primarily on containment, for instance by
trying to reduce the supply from third countries. The underlying hope and
belief is that reducing drugs production will diminish the supply and hence
the consumption of drugs. These measures too are taken without any
debate on their likely effectiveness, and without taking on board the United
States’ longer experience in this field. For the  has focused on supply
reduction for many years without making any impression on the drugs
market or consumption levels. Nor have its crop replacement projects been
at all successful. Yet none of this is really taken into account by the bureau-
crats in Brussels.
Another characteristic feature of the drugs issue is that all manner of pro-
nouncements can be made, for instance about the dangers of drugs, with-
out advancing any corroborative evidence. References to the literature are
few and far between in  documents. The problem with many bureaucrats
is that the drugs issue is too remote from their world, enabling them to for-
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mulate all sorts of ideas that have little to do with reality. Their views may be
influenced by their age and position in society, which may mean that virtu-
ally the only time they are confronted with the issue is at meetings. In their
lives, drugs exist solely as a problem that needs to be tackled.
In consequence, it is taken for granted at every meeting that drugs are by
definition a problem, regardless of the substance concerned or the mode of
consumption. They are discussed almost exclusively in terms of the harm
they cause. It is assumed that all drug users will have problems of some kind,
which totally discounts the fact that most people who use drugs do so
because they attribute positive qualities to them. The men and women sit-
ting around the conference table seem to be ignorant even of the fact that
the vast majority of drug users do not get into difficulties. The distinction
between use and abuse is seldom made, nor is any attention paid to the fact
that many drug users are adults. The general lack of expertise is reflected in
the “solutions” that are put forward. For instance, various documents pro-
pose compulsory treatment for addicts as an alternative to a custodial sen-
tence. They deal with treatment rather glibly as a sure-fire solution, without
adducing any proof of its effectiveness. These discussions also fail to take
into account the background factors in the lives of problem drug users and
the functions drugs may fulfil for them.
Given all these omissions, the fact that bureaucrats automatically discuss
this whole policy area in terms of problems is probably not so much because
of any intrinsic characteristics of drugs, but quite simply because the drugs
issue has been classified as a problem in an institutional or bureaucratic
sense. As this interpretation is of a different order from the way in which
drug use is perceived by experts, discussions of drugs in the  are suggestive
of a virtual problem. Since the drugs issue has been accorded this specific
role, there is no room for a different perspective. For instance, drugs are sel-
dom discussed – although a cautious change of attitude is perceptible here –
in terms of the wider framework of public health, taking on board the fact
that tobacco and alcohol constitute a greater health hazard than the use of
illegal drugs. One isolated exception was the Cooney Report, commis-
sioned by the European Parliament, which stated explicitly that cannabis
was less harmful than tobacco and spirits. Yet when Parliament convened in
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a plenary session to respond to the report, it ended up emphasising the need
to retain the ban on drugs. Similarly, nothing was done with the Cooney
Report’s proposal for an evaluation of drugs policy.
The distinctive, almost ritualistic way in which drugs are discussed with-
in the , with all knowledge of the subject being superfluous, does in fact
serve a purpose. Not, of course, in the sense that it brings a solution any
closer, but for those involved and the bureaucracy as a whole it is convenient
to keep things as they are. This raises the question of how this situation
came about, and why drugs acquired this role. One probable explanation is
that drugs have for many decades served as a scapegoat for social ills. In
this connection they have been defined as the ideal problem. One insider
observed, “With drugs you can always find some horrifying story to tell.
That will immediately get plenty of people in high places on your side.”
Other interviewees noted that the end of the Cold War heightened the need
for a new common enemy. The drugs theme fits the bill perfectly.
One important feature of the “ideal problem” is the lack of power or a
lobbying group. Hosts of unfounded claims are made about drugs. This
would be impossible in any other policy area, since interest groups such as
unions or employers, which are so crucial to Brussels politics, would imme-
diately protest. So the drugs issue contrasts sharply with other European
policy areas, which have strong interest groups such as the European Round
Table of Industrialists and the agriculture lobby. Users’ organisations do
exist in some countries, but the authorities of the  and its member states
scarcely listen to what they have to say. This is probably precisely because
their members openly admit to using drugs, which automatically stigmatis-
es them and deprives them of credibility. s too are excluded from the
circles involved in formulating policy and drafting documents, even
though many are active in drugs issues, in Brussels and elsewhere. This
exclusion is another factor that helps ensure that drugs can continue, for the
time being, to play the role that has been assigned to them.
This unique role that drugs have acquired in  politics is probably also
related to the big gap that exists between ordinary people and politicians.
Many citizens are unaware of the significance of  politics, as is clear from
the low turnout at  elections. Politicians therefore need themes that will
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close the gap. This sometimes leads them to make inflated claims for what
they are doing. Some insiders have pointed out that the difference between
rhetoric and reality becomes clear when you look at the budgets earmarked
for drugs. “The  has defined almost the whole world as a priority area,
and yet the total amount made available for anti-drugs activities comes to
about  million . What can you do with that? Nothing.” This differ-
ence between rhetoric and reality is further underscored by the fact that the
modest drugs budgets have actually been lowered, not raised, in recent
years. For the North-South cooperation on drugs, by which the politicians
set such great store, an annual €  million was available several years ago,
but in  this budget was cut to € . million. If the problem were truly as
serious as is claimed, more money would be set aside to tackle it.
. International cooperation in the fight against drugs
This chapter will conclude with a discussion of two extra-European organi-
sations that influence trends in  policy. One is the  drugs agency,
which recently opened offices in Brussels, and the other is the Dublin
Group, a relatively obscure, informal forum in which the industrialised
Western countries discuss the fight against drugs.
UNDCP
The external organisation that has most influence on  policy is the Unit-
ed Nations Drug Control Programme (), which comes under the 
Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention.
The  member states are represented in the Commission on Narcotic
Drugs (). The  maps out the main contours of  drugs policy,
which are later confirmed by the ’s Economic and Social Council. The
 is the administrative and executive branch of  drugs policy. It also
acts as the secretariat for the International Narcotics Control Board, an
independent agency that monitors compliance with the drugs conventions.
The three  drugs conventions are generally regarded as the basis for
international drugs policy. They are the Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs (), the Convention against Psychotropic Substances () and
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the Convention against Illicit Trafficking in Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances (). Many countries, and certainly all  member states, have
signed these conventions, whereby they commit themselves to prohibiting
the specified drugs and to actively pursuing the fight against them. The
conventions further state that the production, manufacture, possession and
use of drugs must be limited to medical and scientific purposes. The
 tries to get as many countries as possible to sign the conventions.
The stated rationale is that the  conventions are the basis for internation-
al action, and so the more countries sign and implement them, the more
effectively the fight against drugs can be fought. A few years ago the  too
adopted the policy of encouraging all countries to sign the drugs conven-
tions, and has made it a condition for any country wanting to sign a treaty
with the  or enter into some relationship with it.
In  it was ten years since the last  drugs convention had entered
into force. To mark the occasion, a United Nations General Assembly Spe-
cial Session () was held in June of that year, devoted specifically to
the drugs problem. The  presented this three-day session as the
supreme drugs summit. Although officials had reached agreement before-
hand on all the matters tabled for debate, great importance was attached to
the summit: witness the presence of eight heads of government and  heads
of state, all of whom addressed the assembly, including the Presidents of the
United States and France. 
This mammoth assembly had been prompted in part by a specific devel-
opment. Several Southern countries, led by Mexico, had asked for an evalu-
ation and a cost-benefit analysis of international drugs policy. However,
during the official preliminary consultations this idea received too little
support from several Western countries (including the  ) and the 
itself. The evaluation was therefore dropped from the agenda. As a result,
 largely ended up reaffirming its commitment to existing policy and
its determination to intensify the fight against drugs. However, there were a
few clear shifts of emphasis in comparison, for instance, to the Vienna drugs
summit of . While policy had previously centred almost exclusively on
curtailing supply from the Southern production countries (supply reduc-
tion), there was now more emphasis, under pressure and protest from sever-
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al of these countries, on ways of influencing demand in Northern consumer
countries (demand reduction). In the , prior to , the  mem-
ber states had already agreed on the guiding principles of demand reduc-
tion. One of them was to try to limit the adverse effects of drug use. This
effectively incorporated harm reduction (though the term itself was never
used) into  drugs policy.  also concluded that production and
consumer countries shared responsibility for the drugs problem, a conclu-
sion that was formalised in the adoption of a Declaration on guidelines for
demand reduction. The Southern production countries welcomed the
principle of a balanced approach to demand and supply, with the “burden
of blame” being distributed more equally. At the same time they asked
Western countries to help fund their programmes to curb production and
the transit of drugs through their countries, underscoring the relationship
between the drugs problem and underdevelopment, or more specifically
poverty. Besides the Declaration on guidelines for demand reduction,
 adopted five resolutions on synthetic drugs, precursors, judicial
cooperation, money laundering and alternative development.
In spite of the consensus reached on a balanced approach to demand and
supply, the  came in for a certain amount of criticism at . The
original objective of the agency’s new Italian director, Pino Arlacchi, had
been to eradicate the illicit cultivation of opium poppies and coca bush
from the planet within ten years through the programme “Strategy for Coca
and Opium Poppy Elimination” or . The  had adopted as its
slogan “A drug-free world. We can do it” and hoped for pledges of political
and financial support at . The preliminary consultations soon
revealed that there was little enthusiasm for this unrealistic plan, however,
which would have dealt the production countries a disproportionately hard
blow; in the event, neither political support nor financial resources materi-
alised. What is more, Arlacchi was criticised for his emphasis on punitive
measures, with many Western countries advocating a more pragmatic
approach based on public health and harm reduction. Several countries’
representatives discussed drug use in the wider context of substances such as
alcohol and tobacco. The Western countries outside the  that advocated a
health-oriented approach were Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway
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and Switzerland. The  countries favouring this approach were Austria,
Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal. Only France and Sweden
continued to emphasise punitive measures, both of them warning of the
dangers of trivialising cannabis use.
More fundamental was the criticism levelled at  policy by out-
siders.  drugs policy has been the target of criticism for some time, both
from scientific circles and from numerous s that are working to achieve
a change in drugs policy. One of the charges is that the agency’s point of
departure, on the basis of the drugs conventions, is that continuing the
fight against drugs is the only possible approach. There is little or no room
to discuss alternatives such as decriminalisation or legalisation, or even
harm reduction measures. What is more, the  has been accused of
avoiding any discussion of the effectiveness of its work and of stifling open
debate on the advantages and disadvantages of various policy options.
Some critics point out that the international ban on drugs itself has harmful
effects. It gives rise to unnecessary health risks among addicts and human
rights violations in the name of the fight against drugs, it overburdens
police and justice systems and generates violence and corruption, and plays
into the hands of criminal organisations and a huge black-market economy.
In a word, some claim that the “cure” is worse than the disease. On the first
day of , an open letter signed by hundreds of politicians (including
former presidents and prime ministers), professors and scientists, Nobel
laureates, businesspeople, writers, intellectuals and other public figures was
published in a two-page advertisement in the New York Times, addressed to
 Secretary-General Kofi Annan. The core of its message was: “We believe
that the global war on drugs is causing more harm than drug abuse itself ”.
The criticism of  drugs policy as formulated in the open letter picked up
such momentum that it ended up actually overshadowing the ’s
plans in the media.
Since January  the  has had offices in Brussels. It claims that it
wishes to partner the  and help it develop its drugs policy, for instance by
contributing expertise. As the  and the  are the two largest internation-
al organisations in the world, they want to cooperate more. The  is
particularly keen on this – partly, no doubt, because its director Pino Arlac-
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chi is preparing for an expansionist drive. The  is still promoting its
extremely ambitious plan to virtually eradicate the cultivation of coca bush
and opium poppies within ten years. The  is the fastest-growing 
sector and its plans are not cheap to implement, which makes lobbying
essential.
In this light, the decision to open an office in Brussels was probably moti-
vated in part by the desire to gain easier access to the  and its drugs pre-
vention budgets. The  already gets % of its budget from  coun-
tries. Italy is by far the biggest donor, providing almost half of the total con-
tributions by  countries and accounting for % of the ’s overall
revenue – twice the proportion contributed by the  . This probably
explains why Italians hold so many key positions at the , not only at
the headquarters in Vienna but at regional offices too. Another explanation
for the opening of a  office in Brussels may be that the agency hopes
to exert more influence on  drugs policy from the Belgian capital, and to
bring it more into line with  policy, which is largely based on the Ameri-
can approach.
There are certainly clear differences between the policy currently pur-
sued by the  and its member states on the one hand, and the  on
the other. Though  countries provide the lion’s share of the agency’s
funds, the  still declines to embrace the harm reduction approach
explicitly; it takes it on board rather vaguely as part of demand reduction.
Even the , the  agency whose primary responsibility is in the sphere
of public health, does not yet consider harm reduction acceptable. More-
over, most of the ’s budget is spent on punitive measures, and the
agency systematically uses the word “abuse” for the consumption of all illic-
it drugs. All this is bound up with the strong influence of the  – an oppo-
nent of the harm reduction approach – on the ’s drugs policy. The  has
no qualms about bringing pressure to bear on countries or  agencies. In
contrast, most other Western countries, such as Australia, New Zealand,
Canada and the countries of the , do consider harm reduction an impor-
tant avenue to pursue, and some feel it should be the cornerstone of policy.
In the  only Sweden opposes the policy of harm reduction; in the other
member states, especially in the major cities, it is accepted practice. With
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the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty on  May , harm reduc-
tion was placed on a somewhat firmer footing in the  treaties.
So it would be fair to say that  policy, which has only recently accepted
demand reduction (and as part of this approach, harm reduction measures)
alongside the existing policy on supply reduction, lags several years behind
developments in most Western countries, with the  serving as the great
exception to the rule. There is little likelihood of the  changing
course under Arlacchi. His many years in law enforcement have clearly
determined his approach to the drugs problem. As head of the , his
concern for demand reduction has been minimal. Instead he focuses on the
fight against drugs, which he pursues with diligence, if not fanaticism, and
some of the ’s activities, such as its agreement with the Taliban in
Afghanistan, have aroused controversy.
In spite of the differences between the ’s policy and customary
practice in the  member states, the  increasingly invokes the  con-
ventions. In justification, the conventions are presented as the basis of inter-
national drugs policy, and hence of the ’s activities in this area. The con-
ventions are not open to discussion within the , and in internal docu-
ments they apparently play a useful role when member states fail to reach
agreement, being a body of texts to which all countries have signed up.
Some bodies and forums, especially second-pillar groups, want the 
to play a bigger role in the fight against drugs. They claim that it is the ideal
coordinating agency, and has proved its worth in the Caribbean. Other par-
ties are less enthusiastic. The Commission in particular is unwilling to
involve the  too much in  policy. This partly has to do with a reluc-
tance to give up too many of its powers, and partly with the difference
between the ’s strong orientation towards punitive measures and the
Commission’s emphasis on health issues and development cooperation.
The Commission may also be apprehensive about having any of the contro-
versies associated with Arlacchi rub off on it.
The Dublin Group
Finally, there is a relatively little-known consultative body on international
drugs control, the Dublin Group, named after the city where it was con-
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vened for the first time. The Group was set up in response to a letter from 
President Bush to Prime Minister Haughey of Ireland in the spring of 
proposing the launch of a transatlantic dialogue on the international fight
against drugs. After some bilateral exchanges, and having gained the ’s
support, Ireland, which held the  Presidency at the time, submitted its
proposal for a multilateral forum to , the European Committee to
Combat Drugs, although  had no formal status within the . Not
long afterwards, in June , the first meeting took place between 
and Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, the United States and Sweden.
Although  has long ceased to exist, the Dublin Group continues to
meet, with representatives of the member states’ foreign affairs ministries
taking ’s place as  mouthpiece.
The Dublin Group has no firm status and no mandate. It is an informal
group involving consultations between the donors of drugs programmes,
the main theme being the progress made in the international war on drugs.
The countries now taking part are the  member states, Australia, Canada,
Japan, and the  . The  also takes an active part in the consultations.
In  the 8 decided that Russia should also participate.
The Dublin Group meets in Brussels for two days every six months; once
every three years it convenes in Washington. The secretariat of the Council
of the  takes care of its administrative work. Meetings discuss the produc-
tion and trafficking of drugs and ways of curbing them, focusing on differ-
ent regions in turn. The Group divides the world into eleven regions, with
one member of the Group chairing talks on each region. Thus the  is
responsible for Latin America, France for the Caribbean, the Netherlands
for Eastern Europe, Sweden for Africa and so on. Each regional chair in
turn reports on “his” region until a picture emerges for the whole world.
The minutes of these meetings are not released into the public domain; they
are only sent to the  and the foreign ministries of the participating
countries.
In addition to this central Dublin Group there are numerous “mini-
Dublin Groups” throughout the world, consultative bodies involving the
same countries but at local or regional level. They issue regional reports and
exchange information on drugs prevention in their own area. Mini-Dublin
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Groups are based in towns and regions in production countries (Bogota,
Lagos and Bangkok, for instance), but not in the countries of the Dublin
Group itself. The consultations are conducted by embassy representatives.
Not all countries are persuaded of the usefulness of the Dublin Group,
although the mini-Dublin Groups are valued more highly than the central
one. Some countries are fairly indifferent, while others see no need for
another international consultative platform, since the  already fulfils
this role. Since the  is a firm advocate of this consultative framework, it is
unlikely to be discontinued. Still, given the substance of recent discussions,
and the adoption at  of the principle of a balanced approach to
demand and supply, some may find it puzzling that Western countries are
continuing to tolerate a consultative body that is so exclusively dedicated to
the supply side of the drugs problem in non-Western countries.
Although the Dublin Group has only informal status and cannot make
legally binding agreements, it has undergone immense expansion. There
are by now about  regional mini-Dublin Groups around the world.
Whether the central Group will retain its informal status remains to be
seen. The history of international drugs control shows that decisions or
measures are often prepared informally in meetings or consultative bodies
without clearly defined powers, with agreements being formalised later on;
this is a tradition stretching back to the Shanghai Opium Commission of
. The later history of international drugs control as related in The Gen-
tlemen’s Club contains several other examples of informal or unofficial doc-
uments or agreements that have ended up playing a decisive role in policy.
This same mechanism is visible within the :  was formed outside
the formal channels of the , and yet it played a key role in setting up more
cooperation between member states in drug-related issues.
. Summary
This chapter has tried to answer the question of why drugs figure so promi-
nently on the ’s political agenda. One of the reasons often given is the
need to tackle organised crime, which derives a significant proportion of its
income from drugs. To fight organised crime, the  has set up various
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activities aimed at reducing both the trafficking and use of drugs. This
approach is open to criticism, as it is based on a circular argument: the crime
that arises from criminalising drugs is advanced as a reason to continue the
fight against drugs. In spite of all the national and international measures
that have been taken, the demand for drugs has not declined. And as long as
the demand endures, there will always be individuals and organisations
eager to operate in this extremely lucrative market.
Another important reason often given for the ’s investments in the
fight against drugs is public concern. But the opinion polls supposedly
reflecting this concern are highly questionable. Not only are the questions
formulated in a woolly fashion, but the logical connection between the
answers and the consequences in terms of policy are anything but clear.
On closer inspection, the reasons for the prioritisation of the fight
against drugs within the  turn out to be largely political. Since drugs can
arouse feelings of insecurity among the general public, they are regarded as a
politically attractive subject: the drugs problem is easy to sell, politically
speaking. Examples abound in  politics, but in recent years this political
exploitation of drugs has taken root in Europe too. Some observers suggest
that this has to do with the gap between “Europe” and the electorate. Oth-
ers say that drugs satisfy the need for a common enemy, particularly since
the end of the Cold War.  insiders claim that politicians often exaggerate
the seriousness of the problem; the more politicised a subject becomes, the
harder it is to discuss in rational terms. Inflating a problem and subsequent-
ly announcing measures to tackle it, perhaps accompanied by some
resounding political rhetoric, can help invest one’s actions with greater
legitimacy. It is also a good way to reassure worried members of the public,
to curry favour with them and hence to strengthen one’s ties with the elec-
torate.
This explains why drugs have acquired a specific function within  pol-
itics. It also explains why it has become more or less standard for official 
documents to describe drugs as one of the foremost threats to society or
humanity. In line with this emphasis, almost every European Council now
includes a brief statement on drugs in its closing document, whether or not
the subject has actually been discussed. This statement expresses the con-
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cern of the heads of government about drugs and reassures the public that
the matter has their full attention.
The rotating Presidency of the  is another important agenda-setting
factor. Every country is eager for its own Presidency to make a lasting
impression, both at home and abroad. Making a few bold pronouncements
about drugs, or announcing some new measures, may help to achieve this.
What is more, holding the Presidency can give a member state an opportu-
nity to tackle a national issue through  channels.
While political considerations ensure that drugs are accorded a promi-
nent place on the agenda, bureaucratic mechanisms keep them there.
Fuelled by political decisions such as those by the European Council, one
package of anti-drugs measures is soon amplified by another, giving the var-
ious working groups plenty to do. Several institutions and forums of the 
are engaged in a power struggle over this policy area. This is partly because
drugs are such a multi-faceted issue that they provide groups with ample
opportunity for expanding their powers. Many departments have become
involved in aspects of the drugs problem, and yet there is no proper coordi-
nation. This complex, non-transparent structure generates confusion
about where the responsibility for making decisions actually lies. This helps
to ensure that the drugs issue remains a fixed item on the agenda, and that it
is constantly pumped, as it were, around the structures of the .
One element of this bureaucratic mechanism is that drugs are treated as a
problem by definition; there is little room for placing them in a wider per-
spective. In fact there is scarcely any debate at all about the policies that are
pursued, and it is unclear if, and to what extent, they have any effect. Nor
does anyone ever openly ask whether the problem they are addressing is an
intrinsic one or one that has to some extent been fabricated and perpetuat-
ed. Many of those involved are imprisoned in the dynamic of their own
bureaucratic structures. So many parties have become involved that drugs
policy has become a kind of perpetual motion machine. One consequence
of this is that people have an interest in preserving the status quo. Since drug
use does not have a pressure group that is taken seriously and that could
provide measured opposition, and since s too are excluded from policy
development, the situation can easily endure.

Drugs and Decision-Making in the European Union
Union binnen  16-11-2001  11:06  Pagina 118
Since the solution seems to be as far away as ever, and no debate is conduct-
ed on the real issues, endless treaties and agreements are concluded that
have gradually made it almost impossible to rethink drugs policy. Given the
totality of the constraints in place, the only option is to carry on or intensify
the fight against drugs. Since the  has not really succeeded in reaching a
consensus on the main emphases of policy, it often harks back to the 
drugs conventions, which all member states have signed. It has also stepped
up international cooperation with the , and in some contexts the ,
whether within or outside the Dublin Group. In consequence, internation-
al policy on drugs control has come to a standstill and the lack of debate per-
sists, in spite of the fundamental criticism of it that has existed for years, and
that was expressed with renewed force at the special session of the  Gen-
eral Assembly on drugs in June .

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    
. Introduction
The previous chapters have described the ways in which the European
Commission, Parliament and Council and the European Council address
drugs policy. Forums in several institutions are involved in designing and
implementing policy, but it is not clear which of them have most influence:
there is an amalgam, as it were, of activities and responsibilities. Further-
more, the centre of gravity has shifted over the past decade: before the entry
into force of the Maastricht Treaty the Commission played the primary role
in developing drugs measures, whereas since Maastricht the Council has
moved into the ascendancy.
Chapter  demonstrated that the drugs issue is “pumped” around the
’s bureaucracy. This shorter, final chapter will look at what the  actual-
ly does. Following on from all the agreements that have been mentioned in
the above pages, we shall be looking here at the ’s concrete drugs meas-
ures, both at Community and intergovernmental level. As this report focus-
es on decision-making and does not aim to describe all the ’s drug-related
activities, the overview will be fairly concise.
Section . examines the question of the harmonisation of member
states’ drugs policies, which was on the political agenda for several years.
Section . describes the two “joint actions” on drugs about which countries
have reached agreement: mutual adjustments to their legislation and prac-
tices, and the early warning mechanism for new synthetic drugs. Section .
discusses activities and strategies that are currently under development, and
reviews the ’s drugs budget. This section also deals with the powers and
activities of Europol and the . The work of these two agencies is not
discussed in detail here, however, as their mandate is solely in implementa-
tion; they do not – yet – have any direct influence on decision-making.
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Although this chapter describes measures agreed jointly within the , it
should be emphasised that drugs policy does not yet belong entirely to the
’s sphere of competence. Whatever the  does in this area is complementa-
ry to action taken by national governments; drugs legislation and many other
related matters are still for member states to determine. Public health care is
also largely a national policy area, on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity.
Section . will review the main points of this chapter and draw some
conclusions. The study ends with some reflections on the future of Euro-
pean drugs policy.
. Harmonisation of drugs policy?
The recurrent question of whether member states’ drugs policy should be
harmonised has led to political turmoil on several occasions. Indeed, politi-
cians have spoken so much about it, and the question has generated so
much media attention, that some  citizens are under the impression that
the decision to harmonise has already been made. Not so.
The practical difficulties of harmonisation become clear when we look at
Germany, where substantial differences exist between federal drugs legisla-
tion and implementation by the Länder. In general, the southern Länder have
a stricter regime than those of the north. If a single country, with a single
body of drugs legislation, cannot arrive at a uniform drugs policy in practice,
how could this be achieved in the framework of the ? Even in a country
with a more centralised government, such as France, drugs legislation is not
implemented in an identical fashion everywhere. There are substantial
regional differences, in the policy pursued by the police as well as in investiga-
tion and prosecution practices, especially between urban and rural areas.
The harmonisation debate arose in the negotiations on the implementa-
tion of the Schengen Agreement (see section .). Although the  coun-
tries had already decided in principle that complete harmonisation was not
essential – provided that measures were taken to reduce imports and
exports of drugs – France in particular continued to stress the importance of
harmonising drugs legislation, and made no bones about the fact that its
main target was the liberal policy pursued by the Netherlands. Since France
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was not satisfied with the eventual compromise forged on Schengen, it
decided to apply an exceptional provision to the Agreement along its north-
ern border. France still sometimes conducts border controls there to stop
drug smuggling it alleges is promoted by Dutch policy.
It is common knowledge that France’s position was largely inspired by
the determination of President Chirac. He not only seized virtually every
opportunity to attack what he saw as the undue leniency of the Nether-
lands’ policy, but he tried to gain support for his position from other 
leaders, and succeeded in the case of Chancellor Helmut Kohl and prime
minister John Major. Within Council working groups in Brussels, the
French proposals for harmonisation were supported by Spain, Portugal and
Ireland. Other countries, notably Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria and
Sweden, opposed the plan. However, France continued to raise the issue
whenever it could, gradually arousing a certain irritation among other
member states. In mid- Chirac’s bid to increase the majority of his
right-of-centre government by calling an early general election misfired. To
the surprise of many, the socialists won the election, as a result of which
France acquired cohabitation rule. Besides the personal loss of face this
meant for Chirac, the changeover also clipped his wings. As the socialists’
attitudes to drugs policy were less rigid, especially under the then state sec-
retary for health Bernard Kouchner, a firm advocate of liberalism on drugs,
Chirac no longer had the same scope to pursue his crusade.
The advent of France’s cohabitation government is the main reason why
drugs no longer figure so prominently on the ’s political agenda. France’s
position clearly changed after the election, and its representatives in Brus-
sels received instructions from Paris to adopt a milder stand. This was part-
ly because of the lack of support for harmonisation, which was a very sensi-
tive issue in some countries. The new policy of the French was to leave the
issue of harmonisation alone for the time being and to focus on problems
that countries had in common and on finding workable solutions. France’s
increased flexibility, geared towards cooperation rather than confrontation,
restored its credibility. It is simply not acceptable in the  for a member
state to harp on the same subject for too long, especially when it has become
abundantly clear that its ideas enjoy too little support.

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The policy line adopted in the  was that harmonisation is no longer an
objective, but that more of an effort will be made than in the past to resolve
problems together. So harmonisation is not on the table at the moment,
although it is not a dead issue. A new Presidency, perhaps (but not necessar-
ily) France, could revive it. The most tangible result of the debate on har-
monisation has been joint action on adjustments to member states’ drugs
legislation and practices.
. Joint action
Alongside the ’s many different decision-making procedures, there is also
provision for what is called a “joint action”. The exact legal status of a joint
action and the implications it may have are not yet entirely clear. Up to now,
two joint actions have been taken on drugs, one on legislation and the other
on an early warning mechanism for synthetic drugs.
Mutual adjustment of drugs legislation and practices
At the Florence European Council of March , the heads of government
called for a study on the desirability of harmonising drugs legislation.
France had submitted a memorandum on a European social model at this
summit, recommending the harmonisation of national drugs legislation.
However, shortly before the summit, the Task Force of the European
Commission had already decided to take stock of member states’ drugs leg-
islation, and had enlisted the services of Brice De Ruyver of the University
of Ghent for this purpose. His study, Identification of differences in drug
penal legislation in the member states of the European Union, was subsequent-
ly discussed at a series of working conferences on drugs policy that were
organised by the Commission, Council and Parliament in  and .
The discussions on comparability focused on implementation as well as the
legislation itself. The conferences reached the conclusion that there was no
need to harmonise drugs legislation, which displayed enough similarities
and scope for action against drugs. Harmonisation would have no added
value. The participants saw increased cooperation between member states,
for instance in the fight against drug trafficking, as a better option: “It is
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proposed to identify areas where greater cooperation would help to resolve
the practical problems encountered by member states when applying the
legislation. This approach is regarded as more effective and realistic than a
possible harmonisation of national legislations. More in-depth cooperation
will lead to greater approximation in practice”.
Since a study on the comparability of drugs legislation had already been
launched in , the Commission could easily respond to the Florence
European Council’s request. The results of the study were ready for presen-
tation only six months later, at the Dublin European Council at the end of
Ireland’s Presidency in December , which adopted its conclusions.
However, in the meantime something else happened. During Ireland’s
Presidency, the question of harmonisation had been raised once again with-
in the  Committee. Ireland had prioritised drugs and consistently taken
an active role in this connection. It seems that France formulated the new
proposal, and Ireland supported it. Agreements were then concluded in ,
a high-ranking Council working group (at  level) on a joint action to har-
monise legislation and practices on drugs. This aroused considerable alarm
in the Netherlands and indeed triggered something of a row, as it would
have had far-reaching consequences, possibly forcing the Netherlands to
abandon its policy on cannabis. In the end, the Dutch justice minister,
under pressure from the national Parliament, was forced to withdraw the
country’s support for harmonisation, even though agreement had already
been reached at official level. A political compromise on mutual adjust-
ments of drugs legislation and practices materialised in due course.
This compromise was the ’s first joint action on drugs. Today, it looks
very much like a paper tiger. Though the document itself runs to  pages,
one hears very little about it. Of course, this could always change.
Early warning mechanism
During the Dutch Presidency in the first half of  it was decided to intro-
duce an early warning mechanism to enable new synthetic drugs to be
reported quickly as soon as they appeared on the market. The system
includes a mechanism for rapid risk assessment, and for deciding whether
or not to ban the new substance.
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The early warning mechanism arose from one of the conclusions of the con-
ferences on drugs policy mentioned in the previous section. While conclud-
ing that it was unnecessary to harmonise legislation, participants were con-
cerned that legislation constantly lagged behind the appearance of new syn-
thetic drugs. It was therefore thought advisable to make agreements on this
particular issue. The fact that it was the Dutch Presidency that took the ini-
tiative to launch the early warning mechanism may be placed in the context
of the Netherlands’ fear of harmonisation. The proposal killed two birds
with one stone: it deflected the danger of harmonisation while demonstrat-
ing goodwill towards the other member states. Given its reputation as a pro-
ducer of synthetic drugs, it was sensible for the Netherlands to prove its
willingness to take action.
The early warning mechanism is only intended for new synthetic drugs
that appear on the market, not for every incidental occurrence of some new
drug. It is implemented when some new substance is apparently being used
regularly in more than one country. It starts with a round of information-
gathering by the  and Europol, which send out questionnaires to
the “focal points” (the relevant public health services) and police or criminal
investigation departments of member states. Their initial aim is to ascertain
the extent of the phenomenon within the . Once the forms have been
sent back, they compile the information supplied and send it to the Hori-
zontal Drugs Group (), which decides whether it should be passed on
to the ’s scientific committee, which meets specifically to discuss
such cases. If convened, this committee, which is composed of representa-
tives of the member states, sometimes augmented with a number of special
experts, makes an assessment of the situation. This assessment is not so
much an advisory report as a presentation of the advantages and disadvan-
tages of prohibiting the substance. It is sent back to the , which makes
the final decision on a ban. The Commission also has a role here; it studies
the ’s assessment and prepares draft recommendations for the ,
which may however choose to ignore them.
The early warning mechanism first went into action at the end of .
The substance , a milder variant of ecstasy, had been encountered in
several countries and the  decided to test the system on it. When the
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results of the initial information-gathering survey had been debated in the
scientific committee of the , the committee delivered a nuanced
verdict. On the one hand, since the substance was potentially dangerous,
like ecstasy, there was something to be said for a ban. On the other hand,
there was not really much need for a ban, since the substance was uncom-
mon, its effects weaker than those of ecstasy, and at that stage nothing was
known about whatever health risks it might pose. The scientific committee
also noted that there were certain disadvantages to prohibition, since it
would make it harder to monitor the use of  and increase the difficul-
ty of preventive measures. On the basis of this assessment, the Commission
(represented by the Task Force drugs unit) decided that there were insuffi-
cient grounds to ban the substance and advised against it. The statement
that there are certain disadvantages attached to prohibition, as posited by
both the scientific committee of the  and the Commission, repre-
sent a completely new trend in thinking within the .
Nevertheless, in December  the Horizontal Drugs Group decided
otherwise. A majority of the member states favoured a ban, with a minority
opposing it. Since this Council group takes its decisions by unanimity, a
compromise was agreed: the use of  would be monitored for six
months. In the event, the substance had virtually disappeared by the end of
this period, and the majority then voted against a ban. So the final outcome
was that no agreement was made at  level to prohibit  throughout
the member states.
. Action plans and strategies on drugs
The  has produced a series of plans on drugs in recent years.  had
already prepared two such plans before the Maastricht Treaty, which were
adopted at the Rome () and Edinburgh () European Councils,
respectively. At the Cannes European Council of June , the main con-
tours of the European Global Plan of Action in the Fight Against Drugs
(-) were adopted, after which they were redrawn several times.
In  a start was made on developing  drugs policy for the next few
years. The Cardiff European Council of June  adopted the basic princi-
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ples of the  drugs strategy for -. The summit then called upon
the Council, the Commission and the Parliament to elaborate the measures
in detail. This led the Commission to formulate its European Union Action
Plan to Combat Drugs (-). The Council presented its own 
Drugs Strategy Plan, in response to which the ’s Committee for Citizens’
Freedoms and Home Affairs drew up a report and adopted some resolutions.
All these documents claim to map out the ’s future action on drugs.
They refer to the ’s balanced approach to demand and supply reduction.
The plans also emphasise preventive measures and international coopera-
tion – in which context they comment on the shared responsibility of pro-
duction and consumer countries. The documents exhibit certain differ-
ences of emphasis. For instance, the Council appears more concerned about
the fight against production and trafficking, while the Commission tends
to emphasise prevention and harm reduction. The latter phrase turns up
frequently in the Commission’s Action Plan, but it does not occur in any of
the different versions of the Council’s Drugs Strategy. One new element of
the plans is that an evaluation is to be performed of the existing drugs activ-
ities. The Commission’s plan states that evaluations should be an integral
part of the ’s approach to drugs.
It has already been pointed out that the existence of these two separate
plans has caused confusion about the relationship between them – not just
for outsiders, but also for people in the Commission and Council who are
directly involved. Nor is it clear who bears ultimate responsibility for over-
seeing the implementation of either of these plans. This rather vague situa-
tion obviously contributes to the competition over drugs policy that exists
between the Commission and the Council. Anyone who reads between the
lines of either plan can see that both institutions consider themselves the
appropriate coordinating body. The new Commissioner for drug-related
matters, Antonio Vitorino (Justice and Home Affairs) is supposed to be
developing a holistic approach to this policy area. However, the health
aspects of drugs, in which area the Commission has most powers, continue
to fall under the Health and Consumer Protection Commissioner, David
Byrne. This makes it difficult for the Commission to develop either a holistic
approach or any kind of central coordination. It is also unclear how much
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freedom the Council will give the Commission to get on with this work. The
likeliest outcome is that the Commission’s Action Plan and the Council’s
Drugs Strategy will eventually be combined into a single document.
Both the Council and the European Parliament can exert a certain influ-
ence over the subsequent trajectory; the  has the power of codecision
where health aspects are concerned, and can make recommendations in
other areas. At the Tampere European Council (October ) the heads of
government underlined the importance of addressing the drugs problem in
“a comprehensive manner”. They asked the Council to formally adopt the
European Drugs Strategy before the Helsinki European Council of Decem-
ber , and in the event the  and Coreper adopted it only one month
later, in November . This request seems to imply that the European
Council wants the Council to take the leading role in formulating drugs pol-
icy. This is hardly surprising, given the history of the power struggle between
the Commission and Council (see .). Most member states, and their heads
of government in the European Council, would far rather see the Council –
composed of their own representatives – have most say in the ’s drugs pol-
icy. It is not inconceivable that the fact that officials working for the Council
and its secretariat generally draft the conclusions of the European Council in
broad outline may have played a role in the European Council’s request.
It is hard to detect any consistent line in the ’s various action plans and
strategies on drugs. Outsiders may imagine that such plans arise as a result
of detailed discussions with frontline organisations, external experts and
s. The truth is rather different. They are basically bureaucratic products
drawn up by a small circle of officials to whom it may seem a fairly routine
job, amounting to a comprehensive list of possible measures and intentions
in a variety of areas. The officials seek little contact with civil society or any
other part of the outside world while working on them. The result is a wide-
ranging and fairly inscrutable array of possibilities that is scarcely servicea-
ble as a basis for specific measures. What it all ends up meaning in practice –
certainly when the limited budgets are taken into account – will largely
depend on where the emphases are placed.
As earlier chapters have shown, the  and its politicians often exaggerate
what they are actually doing. Judging by the statements of political leaders

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and the high priority they claim to be according to the fight against drugs,
you could easily get the impression that this is a cornerstone of  policy
and that large sums of money are set aside for it. The difference between
political rhetoric and the reality of drugs policy is underscored by the size of
the budgets. The sums earmarked for action against drugs are unimpressive
and bear little relation to the priority  politicians claim to accord to it.
What is more, some of them were actually cut in  relative to ,
including the much vaunted North-South budget line, which went down
from €  million to . million. The budget for health aspects too (includ-
ing the drugs prevention programme) was slashed in the same period from 
€ . million to €  million.
To get a good idea of the ’s activities in this area it is therefore wise to
take the budgets into account. However, it is difficult to gain a clear picture
of them, even for Commission and Council officials, since so many differ-
ent budget lines are involved. Judging by available overviews, the  has set
aside about €  million annually for drug-related measures in recent years,
about two-thirds of which is spent within the  and one-third outside it.
In  a total of €  million was available, . million of which (%) was
spent internally. More than half of this amount (€ . million = %) went
to “Employment-Integra” rehabilitation programmes for drug addicts. As
for the remainder of the . million: % went to the , % to rele-
vant public health projects (including drugs prevention), % to third-pillar
cooperation, % to controls on precursors and money laundering, and the
remaining % to training and research.
Total annual expenditure on external drug-related measures has averaged
about €  million in recent years. According to an  survey for , a little
over half of this (€ . million = %) went to demand reduction pro-
grammes. The rest was allocated as follows: institution building (%), pre-
cursors (%), demand reduction (%), information (%), alternative crop
development (%), combating money laundering (%) and training (%).
It is also worth noting the general approach to drugs as reflected in the
activities of the . Drugs policy is generally discussed in terms of “supply
reduction” and “demand reduction”. The  regularly states in its docu-
ments that it adopts a balanced approach to these two approaches. A third
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term sometimes used is “harm reduction”, which means shifting the empha-
sis away from drugs prevention to measures aimed at limiting drug-related
damage. When this approach is adopted, it basically means that the phe-
nomenon of drug use has been more or less accepted.
In the s and s, drugs policy -wide developed in the direction
of harm reduction. By the end of the s this approach was accepted in
almost all member states, particularly at local level, where drugs problems
manifest themselves. The only member state that opposes harm reduction
is Sweden, whose position explains why there are no explicit references to
the term in  documents. Still, the approach is gaining ground at  level,
sometimes as an element of demand reduction. Since the adoption of the
guiding principles of demand reduction at , the same now applies in
the . Harm reduction is viewed as tertiary prevention, and as such as an
element of demand reduction.
Aside from taking measures to reduce demand and supply, the  is
active in various other fields related to drugs policy. The following pages
will discuss these other activities.
. Information
The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction ()
and Europol’s European Drug Unit () are responsible for gathering infor-
mation about the drugs phenomenon in the . The member states’ Reitox
Focal Points supply the  with the necessary data.
The primary objective of the , which was founded in , is to
gather, process and publish reliable information on drugs and drug addic-
tion and their effects. Having analysed the data, it distributes its findings to
the countries of the . For the purpose of analysis and comparison, the epi-
demiological indicators in the different member states – indicators such as
the prevalence of drug use and its impact on health – have to be har-
monised. So improving comparability is one of the ’s main tasks. It
contracts out some of its work to research schools. The  issues
annual reports on the drugs situation in the . Its  report included
applicant countries in Eastern and Central Europe for the first time. The
Centre also publishes scientific studies of specific subjects such as epidemi-
ological trends, synthetic drugs and demand reduction.
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Although the  is not allowed to pronounce on policy, some experts
believe that it may eventually acquire responsibility for developing Euro-
pean policy on drugs. Among its recent tasks, as set forth in its -
working programme, was the development of resources and methods for
the comparison of national intervention, legislation, strategies and policy.
The latter activity could be an initial step towards such an extension of the
Centre’s mandate.
. Research and training
Biomed is a research programme (with annual funds of €  million) on the neu-
rophysiological aspects of problem drug use. Several DGs and the 
also have budgets for projects that they contract out to research schools.
The  has several other research programmes. The biggest is the
Employment-Integra programme already mentioned, which accounts for
more than half of the ’s internal drugs budget. A total of € . million
was allocated to this budget line for the years - – about €  to 
million a year. This programme supports about  projects focusing on the
problems of drug users. Leonardo da Vinci is a vocational training pro-
gramme, and is indirectly related to drugs in that it includes projects to
combat social exclusion (funded from a budget of € ,). Youth for
Europe is another programme that does not focus specifically on drugs, but
supports a number of drug-related youth projects with funds ranging from
€ , to € ,.
. Demand reduction
A significant proportion of the ’s demand reduction activities come
under the joint drugs prevention programme. This Community pro-
gramme currently has an annual budget of about €  million, with which it
subsidises diverse drug-related health projects in the member states. The
emphasis is on network building: cooperation among health workers from
different countries, training for professionals, exchanges of experience and
the formulation of best practice for reaching specific target groups.
Part of this programme is the annual European drugs prevention week.
Advertisements in European newspapers call attention to the week and to
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the programme’s support for local drug prevention projects. Largely a sym-
bolic event, the week advertises the ’s concerted efforts in this area. There
is little evidence that Europe’s citizens, and its young people in particular,
pay any attention to this week or its message. Still, the week does fulfil a spe-
cific function, in that it gives those responsible for the programme a sense of
being involved in a Community drug prevention policy.
In general, demand reduction and prevention appear to have become the
main buzzwords of  drugs policy in recent years. This reflects the fact that
most member states have come to the conclusion that a punitive approach
to users is not the answer to illegal drug use. The Austrian Presidency gave
demand reduction a prominent place on the agenda, and the German Pres-
idency followed suit. However, despite the frequent use of the term, it is still
not entirely clear what it entails. Some people appear to use it a little glibly.
According to an  survey for , a little over half (€ . million = %)
of the funds for external drugs programmes was earmarked for demand
reduction. This would mean that a very large proportion of the North-
South and  anti-drugs programmes belongs under this heading. But
this is a distortion of reality. It implies that many of the measures involved in
these programmes serve the interests of these third countries (i.e. reduce the
demand for drugs there), a conclusion not borne out by the Commission’s
documents. The programmes are made up of a variety of elements, including
adjustments to legislation, alternative crop development, law enforcement
and demand reduction. But the emphasis is still squarely on the supply side
– on measures aimed at ensuring that fewer drugs are produced and trans-
ported to the . (It may be added that “exported” demand reduction meas-
ures are of questionable usefulness, given the social, economic and psycho-
logical context of some of the countries involved.) It seems possible that as
people lose faith in the efficacy of supply reduction, they are praising
demand reduction as the new panacea, though not yet doing much about it.
Within the  too, it proves easier to talk about demand reduction than
to implement it. How can you reduce the demand for drugs without look-
ing at the wider social and cultural context? Recreational drug use among
young people appears to be closely bound up with international youth cul-
ture, and up to a point it is actually part of it. In spite of all the efforts that
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have been made in the sphere of prevention, legislation and information, it
has proven hard to influence this use. Even campaigns that greatly exagger-
ate the dangers of taking drugs do not have any effect. On the contrary,
drug use is in general increasing in the .
Problem drug use, on the other hand, is bound up with a different set of
factors, such as mental illness, and increasingly with socioeconomic factors
such as social exclusion and marginalisation. While it is true that both the
Council’s Drugs Strategy and the Commission’s Action Plan state that it is
important to acknowledge the relationship between drug abuse and social
exclusion and that instruments should be developed to prevent social mar-
ginalisation, as long as  politicians fight shy of truly coming to grips with
this relationship, demand reduction will be little more than an empty slo-
gan. In any case, given the limited budget that is available at present, it is
wishful thinking to expect that much progress can be made on this front.
The acceptance of the guiding principles of demand reduction at
, on the other hand, including harm reduction as a mode of tertiary
prevention, can be expected to yield more concrete measures. Most mem-
ber states have already developed harm reduction activities, such as needle
exchange and methadone programmes. Little is done at  level as yet, but
this seems set to change over the next few years.
. Supply reduction and law enforcement
The ’s activities in supply reduction and law enforcement take place in a
variety of frameworks, one of the most important being Europol. Designed
as a police service to structure cross-border investigations and police coop-
eration between member states, Europol was intended to streamline efforts
to combat and prevent international organised crime, including terrorism
and drug trafficking. It was some time before its exact mandate was clari-
fied, and in the meantime Europol Drug Unit () was set up in ,
specifically to combat drug trafficking and related money laundering. For
several years this unit was the only truly operational part of Europol.
The  gradually secured more wide-ranging powers and started focus-
ing on other offences, such as trafficking in radioactive and nuclear materi-
al, illegal immigration networks, the illegal automobile trade and related
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money laundering. Later on it added trafficking in human beings to its list
of concerns. When Europol became operational on  July , it took over
the ’s work, and its working area was widened to include the fight
against terrorism and counterfeiting.
Considering its extensive mandate, Europol was actually set up surpris-
ingly quickly. The credit is often given to Chancellor Kohl, for many years
the ’s informal leader, who was eager to get the agency on its feet as soon
as possible. Equally surprising is the ease with which the  expanded its
own powers. Europol’s far-reaching powers caused quite a stir when they
were announced in . The agreement establishing the new agency pro-
vided for its officers to have a status approximating diplomatic immunity:
the protocol was to exempt all personnel from prosecution on account of
anything they said, did or wrote in the exercise of their duties.
Third-pillar cooperation also takes place in the Grotius, Falcone and
Oisin programmes, which promote cooperation between the police and
judicial authorities of the member states. All three are scheduled to run for
several years, and their combined budget is about € . million. More in gen-
eral, third-pillar cooperation – not just on drugs but in all areas -appears to
have been stepped up considerably in the past few years. During the Finnish
Presidency, agreements were made about increasing cooperation between
police and judicial authorities, and this trend seems set to continue. 
The Commission has a number of budget lines that are indirectly related
to drugs. They are used for alternative crop development programmes, the
aim being to reduce drugs production and hence the quantity of drugs enter-
ing the European market. The Commission funds several such projects in
South America. In  the Spanish Commissioner Marin met with the
American drugs czar McCaffrey, which led to an agreement on a dramatic
increase (in stages) in the budget for drug-related aid to South America, to
€  million. Most of this money will come from development cooperation
budgets. It is chiefly intended for alternative crop development programmes
to reduce the cultivation of coca. This €  million has not yet been incorpo-
rated into the Commission’s Action Plan to Combat Drugs, although the
increase was agreed several months before the Plan’s publication. Some ele-
ments of it are included in the Plan, however, including programmes in Peru
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and Colombia. In Peru the Commission has made €  million available for a
six-year alternative crop development programme. In Colombia a system is
being funded to gain a better overview of the country and its drug produc-
tion areas. This is a four-year programme with a budget of €  million. Not
included in the plan are two alternative crop development projects in
Bolivia, one budgeted at €  million and the other at €  million.
. International cooperation
It has been noted several times in this study that where drugs are concerned,
the  is most active in the sphere of external relations. Third countries have
to fulfil a number of conditions if they want some form of cooperation –
including trade and development cooperation – with the . Taking drug-
related measures is presented to third countries as one of the main condi-
tions for cooperation.
When we look at the drug-related budgets, however, it becomes clear
that the  itself does not spend very much in this area. In the mid-s it
budgeted about €  million annually for drug-related measures outside the
. In  this sum was increased to about €  million. Although ’s
anti-drugs component saw its budget increased from €  million to €  mil-
lion, cuts were made in various parts of it.
For  and  the budget for the special North-South drugs budget
line was set at € . million. It is divided among four regions: Latin America,
Asia, the  countries and the Mediterranean, in particular the Maghreb
and Mashreq. In  the centre of gravity lay in Asia and Latin America
(which accounted for % of expenditure), but a gradual budgetary shift
has taken place since then towards the Caribbean and the Maghreb and
Mashreq. The priority is on demand reduction, strengthening the police
and judiciary, and stepping up controls on precursors.
The European Development Fund allocates part of its budget to drug-
related projects. In  € . million was made available for this purpose,
but this was cut to € . million the following year. One-fifth of this money
goes to African countries (primarily Guinea-Bissau, Zambia and Botswana),
while the lion’s share (%) is earmarked for the Caribbean.
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 was set up to help applicant countries in their economic and political
transition to  membership. Its Multi-Beneficiary Drugs Programme pro-
vides assistance to the applicant countries in Central and Eastern Europe.
Basically, these countries must have taken the same anti-drugs measures as
those already taken by the member states; it is a key condition for accession.
The Programme’s annual budget was about €  million in the mid-s. In
 it was increased to €  million, because this was the first year in which
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were incorporated into the
’s data, as is clear from its annual report for that year. The general
objective of ’s drugs programme is to strengthen the capacity of the
participating countries to take action against drugs. The idea is to develop
a regional approach to drugs prevention, with the countries gradually
adopting the  acquis on drugs and cooperating more both within their
own region and with the . Other priorities of the  drugs pro-
gramme in recent years included measures against synthetic drugs, stepping
up controls (together with the ) on the Balkan route, which is one of
the most important heroin routes in Europe, and developing a drugs pre-
vention policy.
Finally,  is a Commission programme for cooperation with Russia
and the other New Independent States – the countries of the former Soviet
Union. It embraces political, commercial, economic and cultural coopera-
tion. Within the framework of , the Commission provides financial
support for customs cooperation, partly to improve drugs detection tech-
nology and partly to help build and staff border checkpoints. The underly-
ing objective is to stem the flow of heroin from Afghanistan and other
countries. €  million was made available for customs cooperation for the
years -. Another €  million was made available for  and 
to help the countries of Central Asia in their fight against the production
and trafficking of drugs. In spite of the large sums of money that have been
made available for the fight against drugs and related matters within ,
these efforts have failed to produce any results.
General remarks
Reviewing all these measures, it is clear that there is a strong emphasis on
reducing the supply of drugs from third countries. Although the  claims

Drugs and Decision-Making in the European Union
Union binnen  16-11-2001  11:06  Pagina 136
to have adopted a balanced approach to demand and supply reduction, the
specific measures it takes suggest otherwise: demand reduction – whether
in the countries of the  or in third countries – is still a slogan that amounts
to little in practice. This may be partly because the problems involved are so
complex. It is hard to come to grips with demand reduction without study-
ing the socio-cultural and socioeconomic context. If the  really wants to
reduce problem drug use, it will have to consider wider social intervention
instead of focusing narrowly on the drugs problem. This would mean, in
particular, taking measures to prevent and reduce social exclusion.
Meanwhile, it is much simpler to take measures aimed at curbing supply.
It is not only cheaper, but the  does not have to do so much: it can “con-
tract out” drugs measures by imposing them on other countries as condi-
tions for development assistance and other forms of cooperation. In the rel-
atively brief period that the  has possessed competence in the field of
drugs, it has made drugs control part of its foreign policy. It is easy for the
wealthy  to impose these demands. For the poorer countries that have to
comply with them, it means they have to adjust their drugs legislation to
suit the ’s wishes (or introduce such legislation if they do not yet have
any). Decriminalisation, according to  policy, is out of the question. For
the rest, these countries have to take all sorts of measures to reduce the flow
of drugs, such as setting up special institutions and taking action against
precursors and money laundering. It is legitimate to question the ’s right
to impose its own attitudes on these countries. This question is particularly
relevant when it comes to countries where certain currently illicit drugs
have a long cultural tradition, such as coca in South America, opium in Asia
and cannabis in several continents. The  takes no account of this; in its
own fight against drugs, it demands that other countries outlaw the same
substances as the  and take action to curb their use.
With its supply reduction measures, the  is more or less copying the .
The fact that an  Commissioner pledged large sums of money for alterna-
tive crop development in Latin America after meeting with  drugs czar
McCaffrey fits into this picture. Still, there are differences between the
American and European approaches. While the  emphasises crop destruc-
tion, with alternative crops a secondary consideration, the  prioritises the

 An EU Drugs Policy?
Union binnen  16-11-2001  11:06  Pagina 137
introduction of alternatives, and is trying to make it attractive for farmers to
switch from coca to other crops.
Given the past experience of the  in this field, these measures are
unlikely to have much effect. After all, the  and the  have been trying in
vain to reduce supply by introducing alternative crops for several decades.
The study Unintended consequences: illegal drugs and drug policies in nine
countries, which was commissioned by a  research institute, gives a pic-
ture of the inefficiency and failure of crop replacement programmes.
Since drug crops are so much more lucrative than any legal replacement,
and since these countries, and especially their impoverished farmers, are
weighed down by socioeconomic disadvantages, getting them to switch to
other crops is extremely difficult. The political context should also be taken
into consideration. In quite a number of drug-producing regions, it is not
the authorities but guerrillas and paramilitaries who call the tune. Colom-
bia provides a clear illustration. Drugs provide all sorts of organisations
with a huge source of income that they would not find it easy to replace.
The fact is that the global production of drugs has risen in recent decades,
especially in the s. If production is reduced in one area, it simply relo-
cates. The difficulty of having any real impact on drugs production means
that crop destruction is often accompanied by excesses such as militarisa-
tion, human rights violations and damage to the environment.
. Summary and conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the ’s activities in relation to drugs. They are
basically intended to complement action taken by member states. This cer-
tainly applies to public health matters, which are firmly governed by the
principle of subsidiarity – health policy is for national governments to
determine. This explains why the member states make more agreements on
drugs in policy areas that come under the other two, intergovernmental,
pillars, especially the third. 
Views differ as to whether there is such a thing as an “ drugs policy”.
Some say that  drugs policy is the sum of the measures taken by the Com-
mission, Council and Parliament, while others maintain that you cannot
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speak of “policy” in an area that still falls primarily under the competence of
the member states. Although the  takes complementary measures, there is
still no coherent holistic approach, and it is unclear which body would be
responsible for developing one. However, the fact that the  presented its
third Action Plan to Combat Drugs in  seems to suggest that the  does
have a substantial and influential policy on drugs. Many of the ’s citizens
are under the impression that an  policy on drugs already exists, or that its
development is not far away. This assumption undoubtedly derives in part
from the debate on the harmonisation of anti-drugs legislation and imple-
mentation, which received a lot of attention from politicians and in the
media.
Harmonisation has not been achieved, however, as it proved too political-
ly sensitive. What is more, a series of working conferences concluded that it
was not necessary; stepping up practical cooperation between the member
states was a more realistic and effective option. Cooperation will largely
mean countries joining forces to devise solutions when faced with similar
problems. This is the course set for the near future, although harmonisation
may return to the agenda later on, if France or another country revives it.
The debate on harmonisation and efforts to achieve it in the  commit-
tee did have a concrete outcome, however: they led to the first two joint
actions on drugs. The first involved mutual adjustments to legislation and
practices, although this has remained something of a paper tiger. In  a
second joint action followed, an early warning mechanism for new synthet-
ic drugs. This system makes it possible to react quickly to the appearance of
any new synthetic substance on the market, to make a rapid risk assessment
and decide whether or not the new substance should be banned. The first
time the mechanism was used, for , a mild variant of ecstasy, the mem-
ber states eventually decided against a ban.
The various action plans and strategies that the ’s institutions have pro-
duced are presented as an overview of the ’s anti-drugs measures from 
onwards. There is still an element of confusion here, however, as even those
directly concerned are unclear about the relationship between the Commis-
sion’s Action Plan to Combat Drugs and the Council’s Drugs Strategy, and
about which institution is ultimately responsible for implementation – both
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institutions see themselves as the most suitable body to take the lead. This
muddle can be traced back to the Cardiff European Council, in June ,
which asked the Council, the Commission and the Parliament to elaborate
the  Drugs Strategy -, after it had been adopted in broad out-
line. At the moment it looks as if the European Council would prefer the
Council to take responsibility for coordinating drugs policy.
Politicians often claim that the  accords high priority to the fight
against drugs, leading one to assume that it is one of the spearheads of 
policy and that large sums of money are spent it. Yet a glance at the budgets
reveals that much of this is pure rhetoric. The  sings the praises of its anti-
drugs activities, and an army of Brussels officials is hard at work in this sec-
tor, and yet the  makes a mere €  to  million available for drug-related
measures each year. The total external expenditure on drugs activities in
recent years was about €  million a year. It is fair to say that these figures
do not present the whole picture, however, as various other budget lines
exist besides those discussed in the concise overview in this chapter, which
are indirectly related to drugs.
 documents refer to a balanced approach to supply and demand reduc-
tion in all sectors, including development cooperation. They increasingly
stress the importance of demand reduction through preventive measures.
As things now stand, this is largely a matter of words, not deeds. It is signifi-
cant, however, that harm reduction has been incorporated into demand
reduction since  in , and this is likely to lead to more specific
measures.
Ways of achieving demand reduction, in the sense of a decline in drug
use, have yet to be worked out. Given the complexity of the issue, and its
social, cultural and economic parameters, this is a difficult area to tackle.
Recreational drug use among young people appears to be closely bound up
with international youth culture, while problem drug use is increasingly
bound up, besides factors such as mental illness, with socioeconomic fac-
tors such as social marginalisation. While both the Council’s Drugs Strate-
gy and the Commission’s Action Plan to Combat Drugs acknowledge the
link between drug abuse and social exclusion, as long as  politicians are
reluctant to come to grips with this wide-ranging social issue, there is
unlikely to be any decline in problem drug use.
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It is therefore easier for the  to focus on efforts to limit the supply of
drugs, in the hope that this may reduce drug use. Drugs measures are “con-
tracted out” – imposed on other countries as a condition for cooperation.
For all the ’s claims to have adopted a balanced approach to supply and
demand reduction, the actual measures it takes are still heavily oriented
towards supply reduction. What is more, if we compare policy develop-
ments within the  with its external policy, a discrepancy emerges. While
there is a clear trend within the  towards decriminalisation, the  insists
that third countries take more punitive measures.
The question of whether a truly European drugs policy is likely to mate-
rialise in the future is hard to answer. For the time being, the accent is on
leaving member states to pursue policies of their own. Whether this will
change depends first and foremost on the success of further European inte-
gration and the form it takes, including political and military cooperation
between member states. Not everyone is as optimistic about the realisation
of this integration as Europhile politicians. In any case, the European land-
scape is changing, and it will change more dramatically still over the next
few years, whatever else happens, with the advent of the new member states.
The old debate about the future will undoubtedly flare up once again:
should we head for a truly federal Europe with ever-increasing powers at
Community level, or should the  remain predominantly an intergovern-
mental Europe of states?
In drugs as in other policy areas, forging agreements and achieving har-
monisation are easier said than done. Political debates often fail to address
the issue of exactly what should be harmonised. After all, drugs policy has so
many facets that it has to be discussed in all three pillars, which makes devel-
oping any kind of uniformity far from simple. Besides such practical diffi-
culties, there are also questions of principle. Harmonisation is a politically
sensitive issue. It is evidently going too far to harmonise policies that are
closely interwoven with national cultures and traditions, such as the role of
health care, the police, the criminal law, and legal drugs and medicine in
society, and the way in which a society responds to deviant behaviour. In all
debates on harmonising policy – not just on drugs – the key question is how
far one should go. In Europe’s long and turbulent history, its diversity has
Union binnen  16-11-2001  11:06  Pagina 141
always been its strength. In the th century, the Swiss historian Burckhardt
warned of the “suffocating monopoly of power” by a single state. He held
that the greatest threat to Europe was enforced uniformity, homogenisa-
tion, and that the continent should seek its salvation in pluralism.
The future direction of drugs policy, harmonised or not, is therefore hard
to predict, as it depends on numerous factors and trends. Unforeseen polit-
ical developments may always prove influential, such as the advent of one or
more heads of government who are personally committed to a more active
approach to drugs, whether or not through harmonisation, and who urge
the adoption of proposals to this effect at the European Council.
Another factor is the influence of the ’s inscrutable bureaucratic
machinery on policy. This is related to the question of how the relationship
between the Commission, the Parliament, the Council and the European
Council will evolve. At present the drugs theme is pumped around the ’s
bureaucracy without having much impact; yet there is no debate on the real
issues and the effectiveness of different measures. Though many individuals
working in the field are personally convinced that the current approach is a
dead end, the ’s structures and the ritualistic way in which drugs are dis-
cussed within them leave little room for such views. This is partly because of
the dynamics of the ’s bureaucracy. The ’s institutions and working
groups have an interest in maintaining the status quo; for many of those
involved, drugs are not so much a problem in need of an effective solution
as a useful vehicle for scoring political points, or for expanding their sphere
of competence. Whether the  will start looking more closely at the real
issues at stake in drugs policy will partly depend on the extent to which
Brussels bureaucrats succeed in burying the hatchet of competence and
pooling their resources in the three pillars.
The ’s drugs policy will also be influenced by other internal factors
such as the activities of the  and Europol, and the political conclu-
sions attached to them. The advent of the  has been a boon, as it has
brought scientific expertise to bear on decision-making to a greater extent
than before. That was clear, for instance, with the decision not to ban .
The largely rational weighing of the evidence owed much to the ’s
scientific assessment. Still, the gap between scientific views and the ’s
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general approach to the drugs issue remains quite considerable. For the rest,
Europe’s future drugs policy will also depend on the implementation of
third-pillar agreements on cooperation between police and judicial author-
ities and on the fight against organised crime. The Treaty of Amsterdam laid
down rules for such cooperation in illicit drug trafficking, but the legal and
practical implications are not yet entirely clear. Although third-pillar deci-
sions are still taken by unanimity, there appears to be a slow development –
partly because of the growing number of member states – in the direction of
qualified majority voting.
External factors too may affect what happens. The history of interna-
tional drugs control teaches us that drugs policy is often – perhaps primari-
ly – influenced by emotional considerations. So it is far from certain that
the ’s future drugs policy will be based on a dispassionate assessment of
the facts. There is also the international political situation and the balance
of power to be considered, in particular the dominance of the United States.
The  has exerted immense influence on the policy pursued by the United
Nations and its drugs agency, the . For the past few years the 
has been cooperating with the . But the policies it advocates lag behind
those of the European member states; it focuses on punitive measures and is
fairly reluctant to adopt and implement harm reduction measures. This
applies even more strongly to the United States, which clearly opposes the
harm reduction approach. In this respect the  is the main exception in the
Western world, which displays a clear trend towards an approach based on
harm reduction. Nonetheless, or possibly because of its loss of dominance in
this policy area, the  has been seeking more cooperation with the  on
drugs than before.
Notwithstanding the influence of the  and – following in its footsteps
– the , it will probably be what happens in Europe itself that ulti-
mately determines the future of European drugs policy. In particular, much
will depend on policy development in the member states in the “front line”,
that is at local level. This is certainly not to imply that everyday practice will
automatically be translated into policy in Brussels, where working groups
have a dynamic of their own. In the long term, however, solutions adopted
in the member states are bound to influence  policy. This is conditional,

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of course, on agreements between member states – especially in the third
pillar – leaving enough room for countries to experiment and find out
which approach works best. Given the importance of practical experience
and the gap that already exists in this policy area between the ’s apparatus
and everyday practice, it would be advisable to involve local authorities and
s (including users’ organisations) more in the ’s policy development
from now on.
The latter half of the s witnessed great changes in drugs policy in 
countries. Local authorities in particular displayed a definite trend towards
a more pragmatic approach to problem drug use. This is part of a longer
trend that started in the late s, in response to the advent of . To
limit the spread of the epidemic, pragmatic measures such as needle
exchange and methadone programmes became virtually essential. The
s this harm reduction approach spread, especially in the cities, where
local authorities were most often confronted with the problems and sought
workable solutions. The same pragmatic trend emerged in relation to recre-
ational drug use. This may have been because experimental drug use
increased in many countries in this decade, and it was clear that punitive
measures had made no impact. The  reports a clear shift in the
direction of decriminalisation in most member states in /.
This development is in line with the restructuring of the relationship
between government and society that has been described by sociologists
such as Anthony Giddens. The social role of the welfare state was trans-
formed in the s, and this change is set to continue. Citizens are becom-
ing more autonomous, they take more responsibility and make more deci-
sions for themselves. For policy, this may mean a shift of emphasis to local
government level. Policymakers in drugs and other areas will have to take
account of the declining role of central government and people’s increasing
right to self-determination. This could present Europe with a chance to
reaffirm its diversity while developing a European drugs policy, and in so
doing to distinguish itself from the United States.

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
 See e.g. the booklets The European Union in action against drugs () and The
European Union and the fight against drugs ().
 The best known of these drinks, of course, is Coca-Cola, named after the two
ingredients it initially contained with a stimulant effect, coca leaves and cola nuts.
 For a detailed description, see David M. Musto (), op. cit. See also Christian
Bachman & Anne Coppel (), La drogue dans le monde, pp. -, and Marcel
de Kort (), Tussen patiënt en delinquent, pp. -
 In their book Crack in America the American sociologists Reinarman and Levine
survey drug scares in the , describing them as “phenomena in their own right,
quite apart from drug use and drug problems”. They show how a particular drug is
scapegoated and linked to a group that is seen as problematic, such as immigrants,
ethnic minorities, or rebellious youth. The best known and oldest drug scare
focused on alcohol. The th-century anti-alcohol movement blamed alcohol for a
large proportion of the poverty, crime, violence and moral degeneration in the .
This culminated in Prohibition (-), which its advocates praised as a panacea
for society’s ills. The most recent and fiercest drug scare centred on crack cocaine in
the late s.
 California had a large Chinese population, most of whom had been hired as
contract labourers on the railways and goldmines. With the depletion of the mines
and the completion of the railway lines came an economic recession in the last
quarter of the th century. In the increasingly tight labour market the Chinese,
who tended to work for low pay, were increasingly perceived as a threat to
Americans of European origin.
 Ibid. p. .
 Musto (), p. . See also Reinarman & Levine (), op. cit. p. .
 Ibid.
 Reinarman & Levine point out (op. cit., p. ) that marijuana was being described in
completely different terms a few decades later. Instead of being labelled a drug that
aroused violent tendencies, it was called a “drop-out” drug that would make users
un-American, for instance by turning them against the Vietnam War.
 When the  gained possession of the Philippine archipelago it was confronted with
the use of opium among both the Filippino and Chinese population. In  the 
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Congress eventually decided to ban the use of opium by Filippinos with immediate
effect, while the ban for the Chinese population would take effect three years later.
 Gerritsen (), The control of fuddle and flash: a sociological history of the regulation
of alcohol and opiates.
  businesses made handsome profits in the opium trade with China in the th
century. However, Britain’s position in this market was strengthened after the Second
Anglo-Chinese Opium War, as it secured Hong Kong as a key transhipment centre
for opium. Britain’s gain was partly America’s loss. So in the early th century the
 could support the Chinese in their opium struggle without putting their own
commercial interests in the balance. See Gerritsen (), op. cit. p. .
 At the time Kettil Bruun was research director at the Finnish Foundation for Alcohol
Studies, Lynn Pan was the coordinator of the International Research Group on Drug
Legislation and Programmes in Geneva and Ingemar Rexed was the secretary of the
Nordic Council on Criminology and a magistrate at Stockholm appeal court.
 Ibid. For a description of the Gentlemen’s Club, see pp. -.
 The Commission on Narcotics Drugs () is the body in which member states are
represented. It generally meets twice a year. This is where the general lines of 
drugs policy are outlined; they are later formalised by the Economic and Social
Council () of the . The  is the implementing and administrative
organ.
 The United Nations Office for Drugs control and Crime Prevention -  ⁄ 
(), European-United Nations partnerships against perils, p. . This page displays a
table showing the sums of money that countries donate to the .
 The term “prison industrial complex” was coined by analogy with the military
industrial complex, a similar though older system consisting of various actors that
impact on and reinforce one another. Schlosser enumerates the active partners in the
prison industrial complex as follows: “[...] politicians using fear of crime to garner
votes, low-income rural areas clawing for new prisons as a cornerstone of economic
development, private companies angling to share in the lucrative $-billion-a-year
prison industry, and government officials expanding their bureaucratic empires.” See
Eric Schlosser (), “The prison industrial complex”, The Atlantic Monthly, pp. -
.
 See e.g. a study conducted by the Washington Office on Latin America (),
Reluctant recruits: the U.S. military and the war on drugs, or see Transnational Institute
() et al. (), Democracy, human rights, and militarism in the war on drugs in
Latin America.
 According to a survey conducted by the American Management Association, % of
companies tested their employees for drugs in . Ten years earlier the percentage
was %.
 Besides Crack in America (see note ), in which Reinarman and Levine look at
several American drug scares, a classic Scandinavian study should also be mentioned
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in this connection. Originally published in Norwegian, this book describes drugs as
the ideal social problem or “the ideal enemy”. For the German translation, see
Christie & Bruun (), Der nützliche Feind. Die Drogenpolitik und ihre Nutznieber.
 See my studies of  and  respectively: Heroïne, cocaïne en crack in Frankrijk
and The Swedish drugs control system.
 The  member states refer to their representatives in Brussels not as ambassadors
but as Permanent Representatives.
 Werner Weidenfeld & Wolfgang Wessels (), Europe from A to Z: Guide to
European integration.
 This is an old debate about the future of Europe, in which France and the
Netherlands frequently clashed; France (under President De Gaulle) was
traditionally an advocate of a Europe des Etats, while the Netherlands (with Foreign
Minister Luns) had a definite preference for a more federal structure.
 The official title of the report it produced was Report drawn up by the Committee of
Enquiry into the Drugs problem in the Member States of the Community ( document
A-/).
 See Hedy d’Ancona, “Het Nederlands drugsbeleid in West-Europees perspectief ”, in
M.S. Groenhuijsen and A.M. van Kalmthout (), Nederlands drugsbeleid in West-
Europees perspectief, pp. -.
 Ibid. 
 An approach that would later come to be known as “harm reduction”.
 This survey is partly based on the lucid account by P.H.S. van Rest & R.A. Visser
(), in Drugs: nationale aanpak, internationale grenzen, pp. -.
 P.H.S. van Rest & R.A. Visser (), op. cit., p. . The title of the Resolution
adopted in response to the Stewart-Clark Report was “Council Resolution on
concerted action to tackle the drugs problem” (No. C /,  November ).
 Its French name was Comité Européen de Lutte Anti Drogue.
 Georges Estievenart (), The European Community and the global drug
phenomenon: current situation and outlook, p. .
 See also Hilde Van Lindt (), Construction of the European Union drugs policy: an
interactive process.
 European Parliament, Report drawn up by the Committee of Enquiry into the spread of
organised crime linked to drugs trafficking in the member states of the European
Community, rapporteur Patrick Cooney, .
 Ibid. p. .
 Ibid.
 Ibid.
 Ibid., p. .
 Ibid.
 R.A. Visser, “De Europese samenwerking bij de bestrijding van drugs”, in Van Rest
& Visser (), op. cit. p. .
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 Ibid.
 Ibid., p. .
 For a concise overview, see the article by Curtin (), op. cit. See also section .
below.
 With thanks to Ben van der Velden, who summarised this procedure clearly and
concisely in his article in the daily newspaper NRC Handelsblad of  June .
 Formally speaking, subsidiarity means that in policy areas that do not come within
the exclusive competence of the Community, the latter takes action only “if and
insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by
the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the
proposed action, be better achieved by the Community” (Article B of the
Maastricht Treaty). The roots of this principle are in the papacy. In  Pope Pius 
issued an encyclical against the rise of socialism and social democracy, which in his
view threatened to monopolise the life of society. He therefore advocated a plural
social structure governed by the principle of “subsidiarity”. The term has been used
in relation to the EU since the latter half of the s.
 For a description (in French) of how drugs policy works in practice in France, and
the regional differences that occur there, see chapter  (pp. -) of Tim Boekhout
van Solinge, “Le cannabis en France” in Peter Cohen & Arjan Sas (eds.) (),
Cannabisbeleid in Duitsland, Frankrijk en de Verenigde Staten. A brief summary in
English can be found in Cedro’s online library at cedro-uva.org.
 Van Rest & Visser (), op. cit. p. .
 This point is made by C.W.A. Timmermans, deputy Director-General of the Legal
Service of the European Commission, in the article “De complexe procedures en de
rol van de Europese Commissie daarin”, in T.M.C. Asser Institute (), op. cit. p.
.
 For a clear survey, see Werner Weidenfeld & Wolfgang Wessels (), Europe from
A to Z. Guide to European integration.
 Previous action programmes were “Europe against cancer” in , followed by
“Europe against ” in .
 European Commission, Directorate-General for Development (), Lomé IV.
Programming of the Second Financial Protocol (Compilation of Sectoral Notes).
 In a book including ample documentation, Lamond Tullis compiles nine case
studies of the consequences of the traffic in illicit drugs. He focuses on Colombia,
Peru, Bolivia, Mexico, Thailand, Laos, Myanmar (Burma), Pakistan and the  (the
state of Kentucky). On pp. - Tullis surveys the inefficiencies or failures of crop
replacement programmes in the nine countries. See Tullis (), Unintended
Consequences: Illegal Drugs & Drug Policies in Nine Countries.
 E.g. European Commission, Directorate-General for Development (), Human
& Social Development Issues, No. , June , “The European Union and the fight
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against drugs in the  countries”. (At the bottom of this four-page document is a
note explaining that it is a “briefing paper” and not an official publication by the
Commission). For a more official document, see European Commission,
Directorate-General for Development (), op. cit.
 European Commission, Directorate-General for Development (), Human &
Social Development Issues, No. , June .
 On cannabis consumption in Jamaica, see e.g. Tim Boekhout van Solinge (),
“Ganja in Jamaica”.
 European Commission, Directorate-General for Development (), op. cit. pp. 
and .
 Coreper is an acronym for “Comité des représentants permanents”.
 The term “” derives from the numbering of the Articles in the Maastricht Treaty
that deal with the third pillar. Article  called into existence a coordinating
committee composed of senior officials. In the renumbering occasioned by the
Amsterdam Treaty, Article  became Article .
 The composition of the group varies according to the subject under discussion.
Nonetheless, the third pillar is generally represented far more strongly than the first.
 Codro was eventually incorporated into the Horizontal Group in .
 Report, including key elements of a post-  drugs strategy, to the European
Council on activities on Drugs and drugs related issues under the  Presidency.
 The official turnout (expressed as a weighted average) was .%.
 Weidenfeld & Wessels (), op. cit. p. .
 The report’s official title was Report drawn up by the Committee of Enquiry into the
drugs problem in the Member States of the Community ( document -/).
 Cooney (), op. cit.
 Resolution B-/ on the work of the Committee of Inquiry into Drugs
Trafficking; see R.A. Visser, “De Europese samenwerking bij de bestrijding van
drugs, in Van Rest & Visser (), op. cit. p. .
 This term refers to the approach in which the drugs problem is seen as a “normal”
social problem.
 One key reason cited by several Scandinavian scholars for the emotional tone of
Sweden’s approach to drugs is that drugs have become a scapegoat for the demise of
the welfare state, and the fight against drugs has come to be seen as a last stand to
protect Swedish identity. This makes it hard for Swedish politicians to put the
dangers of drugs into perspective, since presenting such views would damage their
prospects. For a brief account, see section . of Tim Boekhout van Solinge (),
The Swedish Drug Control System.
 The reason why this debate was not conducted until October was that Parliament
had not succeeding in doing so prior to . In the end, the ’s position was
not formulated until four months later, in October .
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 European Union, the Council (b), Draft Report on Drugs and Drug-related issues
to the Vienna European Council, p. .
 Report, including key elements of a post-  drugs strategy, to the European
Council on activities on Drugs and drugs related issues under the  Presidency, p. .
 Ibid., p. .
 European Commission (), Communication from the Commission to the Council
and Parliament with a view to establishing a common European Union platform for the
Special Session of the UN General Assembly on international cooperation in the fight
against drugs.
 Report, including key elements of a post-  drugs strategy, to the European
Council on activities on Drugs and drugs related issues under the  Presidency, p.
.
 European Commission (), Communication from the Commission to the Council,
the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of
the Regions: on a European Union Action Plan to Combat Drugs (-).
 European Union, the Council (a), op. cit. p. .
 Ibid.
 Weidenfeld & Wessels (), op. cit. p. .
 Ibid.
 This was the view of the President of the , the Spaniard Gil-Robles, the day after
the  had dismissed the Commission, in an interview with Libération, on  March
.
 Chapter  will discuss the political exploitation of the drugs issue and the function
it fulfils in greater detail.
 There need not always be a consensus; in the case of a joint action a qualified
majority is sufficient, although this decision - that a qualified majority will suffice in
relation to a specific joint action - must first be approved by unanimity.
 Arendo Joustra (), Het Hof van Brussel. Of hoe Europa Nederland overneemt, p. .
 Ibid., pp.  and .
 Ibid. p. .
 Ibid., p. .
 The dissertation quoted by Joustra is Jan van de Bos (), Dutch EC policymaking:
a model-guided approach to coordination and negotiation.
 The effect of personal relationships should not be overlooked. Consultations
sometimes go better, and conflicts are sometimes resolved, because participants are
friends - or even lovers.
 D.M. Curtin (), “Enkele beschouwingen over de diversiteit en de rechtskracht
van -besluiten”, in T.M.C. Asser Institute (), Diversiteit van de besluitvorming
van de Europese Unie, p. . Curtin is Professor of the Law of International
Organisations at Utrecht University.
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 Ibid. p. .
 Ibid. pp. -.
 Ibid. p. .
 Ibid. p. .
 Ibid. To date, the Netherlands is the only country in which an agreement of this
kind has been concluded.
 Max Weber wrote: “The tendency towards secrecy in certain administrative fields
follows their material nature: everywhere that the power interests of the domination
structure towards the outside are at stake (...) If it is to be successful, the management
of diplomacy can only be publicly controlled to a very limited extent. The military
administration must insist on the concealment of its most important measures.” See
H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (), From Max Weber: Essays in sociology, p. .
 European Communities (), Building the European Union: Guide to the
institutions of the European Union.
 See sections . and . below.
 A. de Swaan, “Europa behoeft intellectueel debat”. This article appeared on the
opinions page of the daily newspaper NRC Handelsblad of  January  and is an
abridged version of a speech given by De Swaan to mark the departure of Hans van
Mierlo, leader of the Democrats ’ political party, from Dutch politics.
 For a good survey of different drugs and the way in which they are used, see e.g.:
Andrew Weil & Winifred Rosen (), From chocolate to morphine. Everything you
need to know about mind-altering drugs.
 For a recent survey of the situation in the , see e.g. S.C. Wilsnack et al. (),
Childhood sexual abuse and women’s substance abuse: national survey findings.
 Here too, it is hard to generalise; the situation differs from one country to the next
and even regionally. In Sweden, for instance, this link is very strong; a large
proportion of intravenous amphetamine users are part of a criminal subculture.
 Femke Halsema, “De carrousel van markt en misdaad”, p. , in Femke Halsema
() Ontspoord! Opstellen over criminaliteit en rechtshandhaving.
 Frank Bovenkerk () “De ontdekking van de georganiseerde misdaad in
Nederland” in Hedendaags kwaad. Criminologische opstellen, p. .
 European Communities (), The European Union in action against drugs. The
questionnaire cited is Survey no. , published in Eurobarometer  ().
 Eurobarometer (), Standard Eurobarometer. Survey no. , held January-March
.
 Eurobarometer (), Standard Eurobarometer. Survey no. , held January-March
.
 Eurobarometer (), Standard Eurobarometer. Survey no. , held November .
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 Preface to The European Union in action against drugs (see note ) by the then 
Commissioner Marcelino Oreja.
 A harsher anti-drugs regime will probably be reflected in higher prices and larger
profits.
 Ibid. p. . The source quoted is Eurobarometer (), Standard Eurobarometer.
Survey no. .
 The question “Do you believe that driving a car (or mountaineering) can lead to a
fatal accident?” would also lead to a preponderance of affirmative answers.
 A clear example of this is President François Mitterrand’s abolition of the death
penalty when he came to office in , while polls showed the French public
wanted to retain it. Public opinion later changed, rejecting capital punishment.
 Dirk J. Korf et al. (), “Urban drug problems, policymakers, and the general
public”, in European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research.
 In an interview with the  cannabis magazine High Times, Chomsky described the
American war on drugs as an instrument to control the population; see John Veit
().
 This definition derives from Max Weber.
 Tim Boekhout van Solinge (), The Swedish drug control system. An in-depth
review and analysis.
 Christie, N. and K. Bruun (), Der nützliche Feind. Die Drogenpolitik und ihre
Nutznieber. The late Professor Kettil Bruun was a leading authority on alcohol in
Helsinki. Nils Christie is Professor of Criminology at the University of Oslo.
 See the Communication from the Commission to the Council and Parliament on
 (European Commission [], op. cit.) and the summary of a
communication from the Council to the European Council on drugs drafted under
the Austrian Presidency: European Union, the Council (b), Draft report on drugs
and drug-related issues to the Vienna European Council.
 Bruun et al. (), The Gentlemen’s Club. It cannot be ruled out that Pompidou was
influenced by the , which, as is well known, is the driving force behind
international drugs control. When President Nixon placed the drugs issue near the
top of the domestic political agenda in the early s, it was soon increasingly
being brought into diplomatic relations. Bruun et al. observe (p. ): “Indicative of
the importance attached to the drug issue is the appointment of a Cabinet
Committee in International Narcotics Control in  and the inclusion of the item
of drug traffic control in negotiations at a high political level, such as those between
Nixon and Pompidou”. Without wishing to posit a causal relationship here, it is
striking that in the year in which Nixon met with Pompidou to discuss the fight
against drugs, Pompidou took the initiative to set up the European Pompidou
Group.
 Op. cit. p. .
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 The author has noticed this on many occasions when speaking to French audiences,
on the basis of questions or comments from the floor.
 Another factor was that the agreements had been made by the Ministry of Justice
and not by staff of the Permanent Representation, who tend to take more account
of the interests of all the ministries involved.
 European Union, the Council (a), Communication from the Council to the
European Council, p. .
 Wim van der Voort (), In Search of a Role. The Economic and Social Committee
in European Decision Making, p. .
 Max Weber (), Essays in Sociology. An outline of interpretive sociology.
 It should be noted, for the sake of clarity, that this refers to the period since
Maastricht.
 Arendo Joustra quotes from chapter  of the doctoral dissertation by Jan van de Bos
() on this subject; see Arendo Joustra (), op. cit.
 The École Nationale d’Administration is the French civil service academy, attended by
most aspiring top politicians and senior officials. The school, and the relationships
and old boys’ networks surrounding it, are famously influential on French
government.
 Noted by Patrick Dassen in an interview with Folia, the journal of the University of
Amsterdam, published on  April , about his doctoral dissertation on Weber,
De onttovering van de wereld. Max Weber en het probleem van de moderniteit in
Duitsland -.
 H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (), From Max Weber: Essays in sociology, p. .
 For a concise survey, see Eric Schlosser (), “The Prison-Industrial Complex”.
 This comment was attributed (in Dutch translation) to the historian Theodore
Zeldin, fellow of St Anthony’s College, Oxford, in an article entitled “Europa
bestaat” (“Europe exists”) by the journalist Marc Chavannes () in the
supplement “M” of the daily newspaper NRC Handelsblad,  December , p. .
 A clear example of this criticism was the open letter to Kofi Annan presented at
 calling for an open debate on international drugs policy because the
signatories believe that this policy does more harm than drugs themselves. See ..
 This was my impression on attending a meeting on the comparability of drugs
legislation, an impression reinforced by the content of interviews and documents.
 This has already been discussed in chapters  and ..
 The European Round Table of Industrialists (), with its  members, is an
important group. Founded in , this informal think-tank sets out to influence
the ’s political agenda. The  was one of the driving forces behind the
Common Market and European Monetary Union. Its efforts are currently directed
towards expediting enlargement with the applicant countries of Central and Eastern
Europe. The agriculture lobby, of course, is the mother of all lobbies.

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 P.H.S. van Rest & R.A. Visser (), op. cit. p. .
 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (), Betreft verslag SAVVN drugs (- juni
).
 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (), op. cit. The speeches by other
Western government representatives (i.e. other than France and Sweden) scarcely
mentioned cannabis.
 These diverse s include users’ groups, organisations that promote harm
reduction or legalisation, human rights groups and s from production countries
(e.g. farmers’ lobbies) or Western s that support their interests.
 The s had been assigned a fairly marginal place at , in a separate 
building. This is quite unusual at the , and may be interpreted as an indication
that the  did not want to engage in debate.
 The signatories included Perez de Cuellar, former Secretary-General of the ;
George Schultz, former Secretary of State in the Reagan administration; Arias,
former president of Costa Rica and Nobel peace laureate, and Emma Bonino, then
 Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs. The letter and the list of signatories can
be found at http://www.lindesmith.org/news/un.html
 Italy’s total contribution in the period - was almost $ million, as
compared to $ million from the . The total contributions of all  countries in
this period amounted to $ million. See United Nations Office for Drug Control
and Crime Prevention - ⁄ (), European-United Nations Partnerships
Against Perils, p. .
 The Gentlemen’s Club by Bruun et al. gives a lucid account of the United States’
dominant influence on international drugs policy in the chapter entitled “The
United States: the principal force” (pp. -). The authors write (on p. ) that it
is common knowledge that the United States has pressured countries into signing
the  drugs conventions or into enacting drugs legislation. A recent example is the
pressure that the United States exerted on the  to suppress publication of an
international study showing that most cocaine users take this drug in a controlled
fashion. The  is also said to have stopped publication of the data of a background
study on cannabis (suggesting that this drug is less harmful than alcohol or tobacco)
in a major  report on cannabis. The New Scientist released this story, which the
 later denied in a press release. In the latter half of the s the  pressured
Australia into abandoning plans for an experiment with supplying heroin to known
addicts.
 Chapter  of The Gentlemen’s Club discusses the history of the ban on cannabis. One
is struck by the amount of anecdotal, uncorroborated evidence, sometimes even
including personal experiences on the part of those involved in the decision-making
process, that ends up playing a decisive role in policy development.
 Stephan Quensel et. al. (), op. cit.

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 See Tim Boekhout van Solinge (), “Cannabis in Frankrijk”, esp. chapter : “De
uitvoering van het beleid in de praktijk”.
 Cohabitation refers to a situation in which the president and the prime minister are
from opposing parties.
 A report was drawn up on these conferences and published in a booklet: European
Parliament, Spanish Presidency & European Commission (), Conference on
drugs policy. Summary of discussions and conclusions. Brussels, - December  -
- March .
 Ibid. p. . The italics appear in the report.
 Opinions differed on whether it would in fact have had such a dramatic impact.
Some people believed that the Netherlands would only have had to sign. What
mattered was that the Netherlands towed the European line on paper; how much it
deviated from the European standard in practice was of lesser importance. But not
everyone in the Netherlands saw it the same way; some commentators believed that
the texts implied that the Netherlands would have to abandon its liberal policy on
cannabis.
 This incident was one of the factors underlying the launch of the Horizontal Drugs
Group (). Since then, drug-related issues can no longer be sent directly from the
 Committee (now the Article  Committee) to Coreper or the Council, but have
to pass through the  first.
 However, it is hard to ascertain the effect of these differences in practice, as the
plans are very wide-ranging and it is impossible to implement all of them. It should
be borne in mind that these differences correspond to the differences in competence
between the Commission and Council. The former has powers in relation to public
health, while the Council, which deals with all aspects of the drugs issue, has
exclusive competence in third-pillar matters.
 The Feira European Council of June  took note of the Action Plan, (the
European Council cannot actually adopt proposals - only the Council of the  can
do that) and acknowledged a connection between the two documents: “The
European Council endorses the EU Action Plan for Drugs as a crucial instrument
for transposing the  Drugs Strategy - into concrete actions which
provide an effective integrated and multidisciplinary response to the drug problem”.
 These figures are taken from two surveys. One appears in the ’s annual
report for , Annual report on the state of the drug problem in the European Union,
pp. -, and the other comes from the European Commission (), [...] on a
European Union Action Plan to Combat Drugs (-), pp. -.
 However, this amount and this percentage are of questionable accuracy. See . on
demand reduction.
 Drugs policy is developing in the direction of harm reduction in almost all Western
countries, the main exception being the United States, where the punitive approach

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still holds sway. A gradual shift towards harm reduction is also becoming visible in
several non-Western countries, because of the health risks associated with drug use.
 Reitox is a French abbreviation that stands for the European Information Network
on Drugs and Drug Addiction.
 See the financial overview in the ’s annual report (), op. cit. p. .
 There are examples of such campaigns in France, for instance (although they are
now changing) and in Sweden.
 See p.  of the Commission’s Action Plan to Combat Drugs. The same conclusion
can be inferred from the prevalence figures of several different countries, as is noted
in the ’s annual report.
 The Maghreb - Arabic for “west” - consists of the countries of North Africa:
Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia (sometimes widened to include Libya and
Mauritania). “Mashreq” means “east” and the term is used for the Arab countries of
the Middle East, i.e. Egypt plus the countries of the Arab peninsula, with the
exception of Israel.
 The  programme currently focuses on thirteen countries: Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Estonia, Macedonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic.
 The study was commissioned by the Research Institute for Social Development; see
Tullis (), Unintended consequences: Illegal drugs and drug policies in nine countries.
 This passage has been taken from Ach Europa! by Hans Magnus Enzensberger
(), quoted in W. Hansen (), Hans Magnus Enzensberger over Europa, 
p. .
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